Matthew Armstrong

The appellant appealed his convictions for a series of robbery and related offences following a judge-alone trial that turned on the question of identity.

Duty counsel argued the convictions constituted an unreasonable verdict, advancing four arguments relating to the trial judge's findings regarding Facebook Messenger communications, the robber's appearance, clothing, and proximity to the location where the van and drugs were found.

The court held the verdict was based on findings of fact open to the trial judge, to which deference was owed.

Duty counsel's additional argument that electronic messages should have been treated as presumptively inadmissible bad character evidence was rejected, as the trial judge concluded the messages were referable to the offence in question.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP, brought a motion to dismiss a class proceeding for delay, arguing that the plaintiffs, William Tataryn and Daya Nand Rajan, failed to comply with section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not taken the required steps towards certification within the statutory deadline of October 1, 2021.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that their efforts to amend faulty pleadings constituted progress under s. 29.1 or that the defendant had waived its rights.

The court also dismissed the request for a "Phoenix" order, which would allow a new action to be started, deeming it contrary to the policy of s. 29.1.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a second motion under Rule 21.01 to strike portions of the plaintiff's seventh amended statement of claim, alleging non-compliance with a previous ruling.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to add a new plaintiff and new statutory causes of action.

The court granted the motion to strike references to previously discontinued defendants and a claim of fraudulent concealment, finding them improper or insufficiently pleaded.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike new consumer protection claims and the challenge based on limitation periods, deeming these issues premature for a pleadings motion.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to add a new plaintiff was granted.

The applicant brought a motion regarding the child's school enrollment, which was decided in favour of the respondent.

The parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The court found that while the respondent was successful, both parties had engaged in unreasonable conduct.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 in favour of the respondent, but ordered that this amount be set off against $8,000 in costs that the respondent already owed to the applicant.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $230,000, arguing that the plaintiff's unproven allegations of fraud justified an elevated award.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of approximately $39,000.

The court agreed that unproven fraud allegations warrant higher costs, but found the defendants' claim excessive, particularly the $40,000 spent preparing brief costs submissions.

Costs were fixed at $200,000 all-inclusive.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for leave to appeal, the responding parties sought costs.

The court had initially ordered no costs because the respondents had not filed costs outlines.

The respondents subsequently contacted the court to request costs, arguing they had uploaded a bill of costs late or should be allowed to make submissions after the decision.

The Divisional Court declined to amend its order, noting that the scheduling direction clearly required all costs materials to be uploaded by a specific date, consistent with the court's practice direction.

No costs were awarded.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No order as to costs was made as the responding parties did not file costs outlines.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to dismiss its former client's application to void a contingency fee agreement, arguing the application was commenced without her informed consent and constituted an abuse of process.

The former client, who suffered from a cognitive disorder following a motor vehicle accident, admitted during cross-examination that she did not understand portions of her affidavits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that her inability to articulate detailed reasons did not vitiate her informed consent to commence the proceeding, and her evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

Following a nine‑day family law trial concerning child support income, arrears, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and distribution of trust funds, both parties sought substantial costs awards against the other.

The court considered the Family Law Rules, particularly Rule 24, and the principles governing costs including proportionality, success at trial, reasonableness of conduct, and the parties’ financial circumstances.

The court found that success at trial was divided, with each party prevailing on different issues.

Certain claimed fees and disbursements were disallowed because costs for earlier steps had not been reserved to the trial judge.

After weighing the relevant factors, the court concluded that fairness required each party to bear their own costs.

This addendum to prior reasons for judgment addressed an alleged error in the treatment of money held in trust following a family trial.

The court accepted that a prior consent order established that the trust funds belonged to the applicant, and found its earlier reasons mistakenly assumed each party was entitled to equal shares.

After setting off amounts owed between the parties, the court held the applicant was entitled to all trust funds.

The court struck specified paragraphs from the earlier reasons and corrected a typographical error relating to section 7 expenses.

Following a family trial, the court determined the payor spouse's income for child support purposes after rejecting the recipient's request to impute higher income based on alleged under-employment, cash income, and lifestyle evidence.

Applying the governing imputation principles and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, the court fixed adjusted incomes, found that the payor had overpaid table child support, and ordered reimbursement through funds held in trust.

The court also assessed disputed s. 7 claims, allowing certain daycare, medical, dental, travel, and extracurricular expenses but rejecting school uniforms and past cell phone charges, while directing future sharing of the eldest child's cell phone expense.

Although the evidentiary basis for substantial spousal support was weak at the income levels accepted by the court, a modest amount for two years was ordered, and the remaining trust funds were distributed by set-off.