Matthew Armstrong

The defendant, Diamond & Diamond Lawyers LLP, brought a motion to dismiss a class proceeding for delay, arguing that the plaintiffs, William Tataryn and Daya Nand Rajan, failed to comply with section 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not taken the required steps towards certification within the statutory deadline of October 1, 2021.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that their efforts to amend faulty pleadings constituted progress under s. 29.1 or that the defendant had waived its rights.

The court also dismissed the request for a "Phoenix" order, which would allow a new action to be started, deeming it contrary to the policy of s. 29.1.

The action was dismissed.

The defendants brought a second motion under Rule 21.01 to strike portions of the plaintiff's seventh amended statement of claim, alleging non-compliance with a previous ruling.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to add a new plaintiff and new statutory causes of action.

The court granted the motion to strike references to previously discontinued defendants and a claim of fraudulent concealment, finding them improper or insufficiently pleaded.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike new consumer protection claims and the challenge based on limitation periods, deeming these issues premature for a pleadings motion.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to add a new plaintiff was granted.

The applicant brought a motion regarding the child's school enrollment, which was decided in favour of the respondent.

The parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The court found that while the respondent was successful, both parties had engaged in unreasonable conduct.

The court fixed costs at $8,000 in favour of the respondent, but ordered that this amount be set off against $8,000 in costs that the respondent already owed to the applicant.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $230,000, arguing that the plaintiff's unproven allegations of fraud justified an elevated award.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity costs of approximately $39,000.

The court agreed that unproven fraud allegations warrant higher costs, but found the defendants' claim excessive, particularly the $40,000 spent preparing brief costs submissions.

Costs were fixed at $200,000 all-inclusive.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to dismiss its former client's application to void a contingency fee agreement, arguing the application was commenced without her informed consent and constituted an abuse of process.

The former client, who suffered from a cognitive disorder following a motor vehicle accident, admitted during cross-examination that she did not understand portions of her affidavits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that her inability to articulate detailed reasons did not vitiate her informed consent to commence the proceeding, and her evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.

Following a nine‑day family law trial concerning child support income, arrears, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and distribution of trust funds, both parties sought substantial costs awards against the other.

The court considered the Family Law Rules, particularly Rule 24, and the principles governing costs including proportionality, success at trial, reasonableness of conduct, and the parties’ financial circumstances.

The court found that success at trial was divided, with each party prevailing on different issues.

Certain claimed fees and disbursements were disallowed because costs for earlier steps had not been reserved to the trial judge.

After weighing the relevant factors, the court concluded that fairness required each party to bear their own costs.