Jordan V. Katz

The appellant appealed an order removing him as director and CEO of a privately held technology company under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding his conduct oppressive, assessing the respondents' reasonable expectations, and ordering his removal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion.

The court upheld the removal of the appellant as a proportionate remedy to address the corporate dysfunction he caused.

The plaintiff, 2724050 Ontario Inc., brought a motion seeking the appointment of an inspector under section 161 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) to investigate the defendants, BAS Sports Group Inc., Reid Acton, and Bob Acton Sports Ltd. The defendants opposed this motion and brought a cross-motion for the appointment of a business valuator.

The court found that the parties had irreconcilable differences and needed to separate.

The plaintiff's motion for an inspector was dismissed, as the court found no prima facie evidence of oppression or deceit by the defendants, and noted the plaintiff's "unclean hands" due to non-payment of purchase price instalments and deceptive use of the "Beast" brand for their own separate business.

The defendants' cross-motion for a business valuator was granted, with the court ordering a valuation under section 207 of the OBCA to determine the fair market value of the shares.

The appellant, Anjanette Passmore, appealed a Superior Court judgment granting summary judgment in favour of the City of Hamilton, dismissing her claim against the City.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to apply the established principles for partial summary judgment, which is appropriate only in rare circumstances.

The court noted that granting partial summary judgment in this case did not result in efficiencies, as the issue was raised late in the proceedings and required adjudication of the same issues and evidence as would be required at trial against the remaining defendants.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court of Justice for trial.

The plaintiffs, borrowers in a mortgage transaction, sued their own lawyers and the lender's lawyer.

The lender's lawyer brought a motion to strike the claim against her under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lender's lawyer owed no duty of care to the borrowers and that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against her.

The claim was struck without leave to amend, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party.

The appellants, Tyson Rogerson and his adoptive parents, appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against two physicians, Dr. Elyse Savaria and Dr. Nkiruka Nwebube.

The appellants argued that the physicians breached their duty of care by failing to report a suspected risk of harm to Tyson to the Children's Aid Society (CAS) under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act, which they contended would have prevented Tyson's catastrophic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the physicians did not breach the standard of care in failing to report, and even if there was a breach, the appellants failed to prove causation, as the CAS would not have intervened in a way that would have prevented the injury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants, Saad Aljabri and Mohammed Aljabri, to produce law firm trust ledgers and to answer certain questions from examinations.

The court held that trust ledgers are presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege and that the plaintiffs failed to rebut this presumption.

The court further concluded that the "crime/fraud" exception to solicitor-client privilege does not apply to civil wrongs, including civil fraud, following the principle of horizontal stare decisis.

Consequently, the motion to compel production of trust ledgers was dismissed.

The motion to compel Mohammed Aljabri to answer undertakings and other questions was allowed, subject to redactions for privileged information in bank statements.

The Law Society brought proceedings against the defendant for practicing law without a licence in breach of a court order.

The defendant previously consented to a contempt order and was penalized with community service and costs.

After failing to comply with the terms of the penalty order, a case conference was held.

The court gave the defendant one final opportunity to comply, setting new deadlines for obtaining approval for his community service organization and paying the balance of the costs.

The Superior Court of Justice heard motions and cross-motions arising from four identical actions.

The primary motion was brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers (the "Lawyers") to strike counterclaims asserted against them by the defendants by counterclaim (the "Lenders").

The Lenders' counterclaims alleged conspiracy, intentional interference with economic relations, and champerty and maintenance, and they sought to add a new claim for breach of privacy/misappropriation of confidential information.

The court dismissed the Lenders' motion for leave to tender evidence and granted the Lawyers' motion, striking the counterclaims in their entirety without leave to amend, finding that the claims against the Lawyers were untenable at law and contrary to public policy.

The Law Society of Ontario brought a motion for contempt against Mr. Sutharsan for breaching a 2021 injunction that prohibited him from providing unauthorized legal services.

Mr. Sutharsan consented to the contempt order, and the matter proceeded to a penalty hearing.

The LSO sought 30 days incarceration.

The court, applying the five-factor test for civil contempt sanctions, found Mr. Sutharsan remorseful and his breaches not egregious enough to warrant incarceration.

The court imposed a penalty of 100 hours of community service and ordered Mr. Sutharsan to pay $6,000 in costs to the LSO, payable at $300 per month.

The defendants (Moving Parties) sought an order for the issuance of two letters of request to judicial authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to compel the examination of two witnesses, Yasir O. Al-Rumayyan and Fahad Nasser Alarfaj.

The Moving Parties argued these witnesses had relevant evidence for their motion to set aside Mareva orders, particularly regarding alleged contradictory positions taken by the plaintiffs (controlled by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund) in this action versus unrelated U.S. litigation (LIV Golf Litigation) concerning PIF's independence from the KSA government.

The motion was unopposed by the plaintiffs.

The court found the proposed witnesses had prima facie relevant evidence and that the requirements under Rules 39.03 and 34.07(2) for examining non-parties and issuing letters of request for witnesses outside Canada were met.

The order for letters of request was granted.

This is an appeal from a decision dismissing an action for abuse of process due to the appellant's failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement.

The appellant, Skymark Finance Corporation, entered into Minutes of Settlement with a key defendant, Lorraine Smith, which fundamentally altered the litigation dynamics by changing an adversarial relationship into a cooperative one.

Skymark failed to disclose this agreement for eight months, only doing so after being threatened with an abuse of process motion.

The motion judge stayed the action, and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, reiterating the strict obligation for immediate disclosure of such agreements and confirming that the absence of prejudice does not excuse non-compliance.

The applicant sought a Norwich order against two lawyers to obtain transactional information regarding real estate purchases and transfers involving a judgment debtor, in order to enforce a $369,072.61 judgment.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the applicant did not meet the test for a Norwich order and that the information was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court granted the Norwich order, finding that the applicant met the test and that the requested transactional information, such as the source of funds and true ownership of the properties, was not presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court ordered the respondents to produce the non-privileged information and established a process for reviewing any specific claims of privilege.

The defendant vendors brought a motion to permanently stay the action, alleging the plaintiff purchasers failed to promptly disclose a settlement agreement reached with the co-defendant brokers.

The court found that the agreement was a 'simple settlement' involving only a without-costs dismissal and a standard release, with no terms requiring the brokers' cooperation against the vendors.

Applying recent appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the agreement did not entirely change the litigation landscape or the adversarial relationship between the parties, and therefore did not trigger the immediate disclosure requirement.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

This decision addresses a request by the respondent (defendant in the original action) to limit the scope of a new trial on liability and damages, which had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in a prior decision.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing that the evidence and issues were complex, interrelated, and interdependent.

Limiting the trial to specific issues would risk artificial credibility assessments and unreliable fact-finding.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against an obstetrician following a catastrophic birth injury.

The infant suffered acute near-total oxygen deprivation prior to birth, resulting in severe permanent brain damage.

At trial, the judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and no causation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were legally inadequate regarding causation and one of the standard of care issues (the failure to complete the delivery with Kielland forceps).

The reasons failed to explain critical findings, preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on all issues of liability and damages.

The Law Society of Ontario applied for a permanent injunction against a former paralegal whose license was revoked for misappropriation of trust funds.

Despite the revocation, the respondent continued to provide legal services and hold herself out as a licensed paralegal on social media.

The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

The court granted the permanent injunction under the Law Society Act and awarded costs to the applicant.

The defendants and plaintiffs both brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding the admissibility of evidence in a civil contempt proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on four issues concerning the application of sections 7 and 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to evidence compelled pursuant to a Mareva order and undertakings.

The court directed that the defendant be the appellant and the plaintiffs be the cross-appellants.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice M. Koehnen dated August 10, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicant brought an application for a permanent injunction against the respondents, a plumber and his corporation, for holding themselves out as legal practitioners.

The individual respondent used a fake law firm name to send demand letters to plumbing customers and maintained a website offering legal services.

The court granted the injunction, finding the respondents' actions violated the Law Society Act, and ordered the corporation to change its name to remove any reference to legal services.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a credit agreement and warrant certificate.

The applicant argued that the respondent could only exercise its share purchase warrants upon a liquidity event or additional security issuance.

The respondent argued the warrants could be exercised at any time.

The court applied principles of commercial contract interpretation, finding that the preamble clearly allowed exercise at any time and that restricting exercise to triggering events would lead to a commercial absurdity given the risk the respondent assumed.

The application was dismissed.