Jacob R.W. Damstra

The moving party sought panel review after a chambers judge refused to lift an automatic stay pending appeal.

Applying the deferential review framework for s. 7(5) CJA panel review, the court found no error in principle or unreasonable result and dismissed the review motion.

The appellant, Tek Holdings Limited, appealed an Order to Comply issued by the Chief Building Official requiring construction of a covered manure storage facility for a broiler chicken barn.

The appellant had initially obtained a building permit for an uncovered manure storage but was required to obtain a minor variance after a planning department error regarding Minimum Distance Separation (MDS) setbacks was discovered.

The Committee of Adjustment granted the variance on condition that the manure storage be covered.

The appellant subsequently constructed the facility with an uncovered manure storage, contrary to the revised permit.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Order to Comply was reasonable and within the Chief Building Official's authority under the Building Code Act, 1992.

A residential condominium developer sought a declaration that communications from the Chief Building Official regarding parking requirements constituted appealable orders or decisions under the Building Code Act.

The developer argued that emails threatening permit revocation if occupancy permits were requested without adequate parking prevented it from applying for occupancy.

The court found that the emails were pre-emptive communications indicating the CBO's future intentions, not final decisions on actual occupancy permit applications.

As no formal decision refusing occupancy had been made, the court lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

However, the court maintained a temporary parking ratio of 1.1 spaces per unit pending the Ontario Land Tribunal's decision on the developer's parking variance appeal.

This is a decision on costs following a judgment in which both parties received monetary awards, but the net result favoured College Grain Inc. The court considered the parties’ offers to settle, the proportionality of costs, and the policy behind the Simplified Rules.

Ultimately, the court awarded College Grain Inc. $50,000 plus HST for fees and $35,886.52 for disbursements, for a total of $92,386.52, to be paid by Wilhelm Concrete.

The respondents failed to close a residential real estate transaction, and the appellants (vendors) sued for breach of contract.

At trial, the judge awarded damages based on an appraiser's assessment of fair market value rather than the actual resale price, finding the appellants failed to mitigate their damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by bypassing the resale price as the presumptive fair market value and by relying on expert evidence that exceeded the appraiser's qualifications regarding marketing practices.

The Court awarded damages based on the difference between the original contract price and the resale price, plus certain expenses and legal fees.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the parties' costs submissions following an appeal.

The court determined that it was not an appropriate case for costs and, accordingly, made no order for costs of the appeal.

The appellants, Fredrick and Patricia Kentner, appealed the summary dismissal of their first appeal to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, which concerned convictions and a sentence for environmental offences related to unlawful fill operations.

The appeal was based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by their paralegal and errors in the original conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no ineffective assistance as the appellants' failure to pay fines (a mandatory condition for appeal) was a deliberate choice unrelated to the paralegal's conduct, and a waiver application would have had no prospect of success.

The court also found no merit in the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's reliance on regulatory maps for jurisdiction, and no basis to interfere with the sentence, which included a $25,000 fine and a property rehabilitation order.

The insured property owner appealed the dismissal of its claim for coverage following a wall collapse, while the insurer appealed the finding of coverage for a subsequent arson fire at the same vacant building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The wall collapse was not proven to be a fortuitous event.

For the fire loss, the insurer was bound by promissory estoppel preventing reliance on a vacancy exclusion, and its unilateral attempt to amend the policy to exclude arson was invalid under s. 124 of the Insurance Act for lack of written consent.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

The appellants, Tyson Rogerson and his adoptive parents, appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against two physicians, Dr. Elyse Savaria and Dr. Nkiruka Nwebube.

The appellants argued that the physicians breached their duty of care by failing to report a suspected risk of harm to Tyson to the Children's Aid Society (CAS) under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act, which they contended would have prevented Tyson's catastrophic brain injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the physicians did not breach the standard of care in failing to report, and even if there was a breach, the appellants failed to prove causation, as the CAS would not have intervened in a way that would have prevented the injury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The estate trustee appealed a costs order that denied her indemnification for legal expenses incurred while representing the estate in a dependent's relief application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in principle and failed to provide adequate reasons for denying costs.

Applying the framework for blended costs in estate litigation, the court awarded the estate trustee full recovery of her costs on a substantial indemnity basis, with the majority payable by the respondent whose egregious conduct unnecessarily increased the litigation costs, and the balance payable by the estate.

This appeal arose from a dispute among siblings concerning the care and property of their nonagenarian mother.

The appellant challenged the application judge's decision, which declared the mother incapable, validated existing powers of attorney, and ordered the appellant to account for funds held on a resulting trust.

The appellant alleged procedural unfairness, including failure to consider his materials, denial of an adjournment, and improper dismissal of his counter-application, and sought leave to appeal the costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error or procedural unfairness, and denied leave to appeal costs, affirming the application judge's discretion.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a 1975 cost-sharing provision in a Subdivision Agreement between a developer's assignee (appellant) and a municipality (respondent).

The appellant sought payment for infrastructure costs from the municipality, arguing that the provision was triggered by a new subdivision on adjacent lands.

The application judge found that the cost-sharing obligation was only triggered if the adjacent lands derived a benefit from the appellant's infrastructure, and no such benefit was proven.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, agreeing that the agreement, when read holistically and with commercial sense, required a benefit to be conferred for the cost-sharing to apply.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal arose from a priority dispute between insurance companies concerning accident benefits coverage following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant, Trafalgar Insurance Company, appealed an arbitration decision that found the injured party was not insured by Economical Insurance Company and not entitled to Statutory Accident Benefits from them.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's findings that the vehicle in question was not an 'owned automobile' under Economical's standard Ontario Garage Policy (OAP 4) because its use (leased to a rental company) was outside the scope of the insured's business and was specifically excluded by the policy.

The court also affirmed that section 233(2) of the Insurance Act did not apply as the issue was the vehicle's insured status, not a breach of contract or misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard appeals regarding a flooded access road.

The Township of Georgian Bluffs and the Ministry of Transportation appealed a lower court decision that found the road public, obligated the Township to maintain it, and ordered the Ministry to restore culverts and indemnify the Township.

The Crown's appeal was allowed due to procedural unfairness, as no relief was sought against the Ministry in the original application.

The Township's appeal was dismissed, affirming the public nature of the road based on historical statute labour and common law dedication and acceptance, and upholding its obligation to restore the road.

The applicant developer sought to enforce a cost sharing provision in a 1975 subdivision agreement against the respondent municipality, arguing the municipality was required to collect a proportionate share of servicing costs from a new adjacent development.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the cost sharing obligation was only triggered if the new development connected to or benefited from the installed services, which it did not.

The court also dismissed the applicant's alternative claim for unjust enrichment, holding that the subdivision agreement provided a juristic reason for the municipality's benefit.

In a medical malpractice action arising from catastrophic injuries inflicted on a newborn by his biological mother, the plaintiffs alleged that a family physician and a pediatrician negligently failed to report child protection concerns under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the family physician conducted adequate mental health and coping assessments, and that neither physician had reasonable grounds to suspect the infant was a child in need of protection.

Although the family physician breached the standard of care by not providing the pediatrician with a fuller mental health history, that breach had no causal consequence.

The court further held that, even if a report had been made, the Children's Aid Society would likely have treated the matter as low risk and would not have intervened in time to prevent the assault.

The action was dismissed, with damages nonetheless fixed by agreement at $13,250,000 under Rule 7.08.

The appellants, Trafalgar Insurance and Economical Insurance, appealed an arbitrator's decision in a priority dispute regarding statutory accident benefits.

The arbitrator had found that Arch Insurance was not the insurer of the vehicle involved in the accident because the vehicle was not owned or leased by Arch's named insured, despite being mistakenly listed on a fleet schedule.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law in the arbitrator's conclusion that the vehicle did not qualify as a 'described vehicle' under the OPCF 21A endorsement.

A related costs appeal was also dismissed as premature.

This decision addresses a request by the respondent (defendant in the original action) to limit the scope of a new trial on liability and damages, which had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in a prior decision.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing that the evidence and issues were complex, interrelated, and interdependent.

Limiting the trial to specific issues would risk artificial credibility assessments and unreliable fact-finding.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against an obstetrician following a catastrophic birth injury.

The infant suffered acute near-total oxygen deprivation prior to birth, resulting in severe permanent brain damage.

At trial, the judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and no causation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons were legally inadequate regarding causation and one of the standard of care issues (the failure to complete the delivery with Kielland forceps).

The reasons failed to explain critical findings, preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered on all issues of liability and damages.