Richard Campbell

The plaintiff, an electrical contractor, sued the defendants for breach of a time and materials contract for electrical services provided to a grocery store.

The central issues included the interpretation of the contract, the identification of the proper contracting parties given that "Dutchies Fresh Food Market" was a non-existent entity, the amount of unpaid invoices, and a claim for punitive damages.

The court found the individual defendant personally liable, jointly with specific corporate entities, for contracting on behalf of a non-existent corporation.

The court awarded the full amount of the unpaid invoices, accepting the plaintiff's evidence regarding time and materials, including overtime, breaks, and material costs.

However, the claim for punitive damages was denied, as the defendants' conduct, while uncooperative, did not meet the high threshold of malicious, oppressive, or high-handed behavior required for such an award.

The plaintiff, Jayson Hopkins, sued his former lawyer, Patrick Murphy, and law firm, Beament Green, for professional negligence, alleging that Murphy negligently advised him to settle his motor vehicle accident lawsuit in 2008 for an improvidently low amount.

Hopkins sought approximately $3 million in damages, arguing that the $127,900 settlement for general damages and loss of income was inadequate.

The defendants denied negligence, asserting that the settlement was reasonable and that they met the standard of a prudent solicitor.

The court addressed whether Murphy was negligent or breached his contract and whether the "loss of chance" doctrine should apply.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence or breach of contract, primarily due to the lack of expert evidence on the standard of care and the failure to conduct a "trial within a trial" or demonstrate its impossibility.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a motion by Fundstream Inc. to strike portions of 9695672 Canada Inc. o/a Vector's claim, which was dismissed.

Vector, as the successful party on the underlying motion, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, awarded Vector $7,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding this amount to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion, and considering the principle of indemnity and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The defendant Fundstream Inc. brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff Vector's Statement of Claim, specifically allegations of conspiracy by unlawful means, predominant purpose conspiracy, and false representation.

Fundstream argued that these claims lacked sufficient particularity.

The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings, emphasizing a generous reading of the claim and a high threshold for striking.

Despite the requirement for heightened particularity in pleading fraud and conspiracy, the court found that Vector's pleadings provided enough detail for the defendants to know the case they had to meet, acknowledging that some specific details of the alleged conspiracy might only become known through the discovery process.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The Applicant brought a motion for judgment, alleging that the Respondent's principal, Paul Halyk, accessed confidential and privileged communications between the Applicant's principal and its legal counsel.

The court found that Halyk accessed privileged material and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as he did not provide specific details about the extent of his review.

While declining to grant judgment on the Application due to insufficient evidentiary record for the underlying merits, the court ordered the Respondent's Notice of Appearance struck, allowing the Application to proceed as undefended.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $1,000,000 action, the court determined the costs payable to the successful defendants.

The defendants had served an offer to settle for $5,000 which was not accepted.

Applying Rule 49, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing the total costs at $40,701.10 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend him against his daughter's negligent parenting claim.

The appellant was an occupant of a vehicle driven by an impaired driver at the time of the alleged injury.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not covered under the automobile insurance policy because his liability did not arise from the use or operation of the automobile, but rather from his parenting decisions.

The plain language of section 239(1)(a) of the Insurance Act requires that an occupant's liability must arise from the use or operation of the automobile to be covered.

This costs endorsement follows a motion brought by House concerning the distribution of insurance proceeds, the application of the equitable doctrine of marshalling, and the garnishment of settlement funds.

The court had previously dismissed House's request for marshalling, ordered pro rata distribution of State Farm funds, and allowed House to garnish 20% of Baird's settlement.

Baird was deemed more successful than House on the garnishment issue and was entitled to costs.

The court awarded Baird $20,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, but excluded costs for an affiant who did not act as counsel or make submissions.

The plaintiff sought damages for inducing a breach of contract and defamation against the defendants, alleging false statements were made to third parties regarding his financial reliability and truck repossession, which hindered his ability to secure financing for a new truck.

The court dismissed the claim for inducing a breach of contract, finding no evidence that the defendant intended to cause a breach or that a valid contract existed at the time of the alleged inducement.

The defamation claim was also dismissed, as the court found the statements made by the defendant were truthful or not defamatory, and there was no evidence of malice or that the statements lowered the plaintiff's reputation.

The court also drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff for failing to call key witnesses and produce financial documentation to support his damages claim.

This motion concerned the distribution of insurance funds and the right to garnish a settlement following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant, Tyler House, sought directions on the interpretation of the Insurance Act regarding priorities and entitlement to insurance monies, a declaration applying the equitable doctrine of marshalling to prioritize his claim, and confirmation of his right to garnish Donald Baird's settlement funds.

The court found that the doctrine of marshalling was not applicable, affirming the pro rata distribution of first-loss insurance funds under section 277 of the Insurance Act.

The court also interpreted ambiguities in Baird's settlement and determined that 20% of Baird's settlement funds, specifically from the income loss portion, were subject to garnishment, applying principles from the Wages Act.

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the insured under a homeowner's policy for a third-party claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The underlying claim alleged the insured negligently operated his vehicle and also exited his vehicle to threaten the other driver.

The respondent automobile insurer argued the homeowner's policy might cover the threatening behaviour.

The court held that the insured's actions after exiting the vehicle were incident to the use or operation of a motor vehicle, and therefore fell within the homeowner's policy exclusion for claims arising from the ownership, use, or operation of a motorized vehicle.

The declaration was granted.

The self-represented defendant sought to re-open the issue of costs after his initial written submissions failed to reach the judge.

He claimed costs for time spent attending the seven-day trial and for preparation.

Applying the principles from Fong v. Chan, the court held that a self-represented litigant cannot recover costs for time that any litigant would have to devote to the case, such as attending trial.

The court awarded the defendant $1,330 in costs on a partial indemnity basis for preparation time, travel time, and filing fees.

The plaintiff, Bradley Clayton Hunt, moved for a declaration that he was an "insured person" under the Insurance Act and that the defendant, Peel Mutual Insurance Company, was obligated to defend and indemnify him.

This arose from a motor vehicle collision where Hunt and his daughter were passengers.

Hunt's daughter subsequently sued him, alleging negligent parenting.

The defendant insurer denied coverage, arguing that the allegations of negligence against Hunt did not involve the "use or operation" of the vehicle as required by section 239 of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that there was no direct or proximate causal relationship between Hunt's alleged negligent acts (negligent parenting) and the use or operation of the vehicle, thus not triggering the duty to defend.

This endorsement addresses the question of costs following a trial where the plaintiff, Iris R. Powell, recovered $26,700 plus interest against one defendant, Mohamed Afzal Sahadat, but her action was dismissed against other defendants and her co-plaintiff's action was dismissed entirely.

The defendants' counterclaim was also dismissed.

The court applied the principles of costs, including indemnity, encouraging settlements, and discouraging inappropriate behaviour, as well as the factors under Rule 57.01.

The court rejected the defendants' argument that the action should have been brought in Small Claims Court, as Ms. Powell's recovery exceeded the monetary limit.

Ms. Powell's costs against Mr. Sahadat were discounted due to her partial success (unsuccessful on a major claim for business losses) and the complexity she contributed.

Similarly, the costs awarded to the successful defendants (Ishan Dhanapala, Dhana Corporation, and First Financial Consulting Services (FFCS) Ltd.) against Ms. Powell were discounted due to their contribution to the trial's complexity and their unsupportable counterclaim.

The court declined to award personal costs against Ms. Powell's counsel, citing the principle of extreme caution.

Ultimately, Mr. Sahadat was ordered to pay Ms. Powell $19,000 in costs, and Ms. Powell was ordered to pay Ishan Dhanapala, Dhana Corporation, and First Financial Consulting Services (FFCS) Ltd. $23,450 in costs.

The defendant, Brian Radford, brought a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action initiated by Anna Gionet.

Radford argued that Gionet's claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, asserting that the two-year limitation period had expired before the action was commenced in January 2014.

Gionet contended that she did not discover her claim until September 2013 and, alternatively, that the limitation period should have been tolled due to her mental and psychological incapacity following her husband's death.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial to determine the actual discovery date of the claim and whether the limitation period was tolled.

The plaintiffs, Iris Powell and The Classic Plus Woman Inc., brought an action against multiple defendants concerning an advance of money.

The court found that Powell advanced $20,000 as a loan to Mohamed Afzal Sahadat, which was then directed to corporations controlled by Ishan Dhanapala for a membership in an investment club related to a condominium project.

Sahadat was obligated to repay $20,000 plus a 39.5% premium ($7,900), totaling $27,900, payable on demand, less $1,100 already repaid.

The court dismissed claims against other defendants (Sean Silva, Ishan Dhanapala, Dhana Corporation, FFCS Ltd.) and found that The Classic Plus Woman Inc. lacked standing.

Powell's claim for consequential business losses was denied, adhering to the principle that damages for failure to pay a debt are generally limited to interest unless special circumstances exist.

The appellants appealed an order of Justice Price of the Superior Court of Justice dated September 28, 2017.

Following questioning from the appellate panel, the appellants abandoned their appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs of the appeal in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.

The applicants and respondents are neighbours who disputed ownership of a patch of land behind the respondents' garage.

The applicants sought an injunction to remove a storage container placed by the respondents, claiming ownership of the land through a self-conveyance.

The respondents cross-applied for a declaration of ownership by adverse possession.

The court traced the historical conveyances and determined that neither party owned the land nor held a right of way over it; rather, it belonged to a third-party neighbour.

Both the application for an injunction and the cross-application for adverse possession were dismissed.

The respondents were seriously injured in a motorcycle accident in Minnesota caused by a state-owned truck operated by a state employee.

Due to Minnesota's statutory damage cap under the Tort Claims Act, they recovered only US$500,000 (inclusive of legal fees), despite damages exceeding that amount.

They sought the shortfall from their Canadian insurer under an underinsured motorist endorsement (OPCF 44R).

The insurer refused, arguing Minnesota was not "inadequately insured" and that legal fees were not recoverable.

The motion judge found in favor of the respondents on both issues.

On appeal, the court held that Minnesota was an inadequately insured motorist despite being self-insured and having statutory immunity, but reversed the finding that legal fees could be claimed as special damages.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $70,563 in damages, the successful defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis to the date of its offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court found that the defendant was only entitled to partial indemnity costs, as elevated costs require a clear finding of reprehensible conduct, which was absent here.

The court also reduced the costs claimed to account for some inefficiency in the defendant's use of two counsel at trial, ultimately fixing costs at $141,568.73.