Richard Campbell

The plaintiffs requested a case conference to address typographical errors in the court's original order granting a stay of proceedings.

The original order mistakenly stayed a discontinued action instead of the 2024 action and omitted the relief allowing the plaintiffs' counterclaim to proceed as undefended.

As the defendants did not object, the court issued a corrected order to accurately reflect its original reasons for decision.

The applicant neighbours sought declarations, injunctions, and damages to prevent the respondents from using an eight-foot right of way across the applicants' property for motor vehicle access.

The applicants alleged the right of way was intended only for pedestrian use and that the respondents' vehicles repeatedly trespassed and caused damage.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the original 1905 grant and 1973 modification did not restrict the easement to pedestrian use, and that motor vehicle access was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.

The court further held that the right of way was safe for vehicular use and that any minor incursions were de minimis, resulting in no compensable damages.

The respondents failed to close a residential real estate transaction, and the appellants (vendors) sued for breach of contract.

At trial, the judge awarded damages based on an appraiser's assessment of fair market value rather than the actual resale price, finding the appellants failed to mitigate their damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by bypassing the resale price as the presumptive fair market value and by relying on expert evidence that exceeded the appraiser's qualifications regarding marketing practices.

The Court awarded damages based on the difference between the original contract price and the resale price, plus certain expenses and legal fees.

The plaintiff, an electrical contractor, sued the defendants for breach of a time and materials contract for electrical services provided to a grocery store.

The central issues included the interpretation of the contract, the identification of the proper contracting parties given that "Dutchies Fresh Food Market" was a non-existent entity, the amount of unpaid invoices, and a claim for punitive damages.

The court found the individual defendant personally liable, jointly with specific corporate entities, for contracting on behalf of a non-existent corporation.

The court awarded the full amount of the unpaid invoices, accepting the plaintiff's evidence regarding time and materials, including overtime, breaks, and material costs.

However, the claim for punitive damages was denied, as the defendants' conduct, while uncooperative, did not meet the high threshold of malicious, oppressive, or high-handed behavior required for such an award.

The plaintiff, Jayson Hopkins, sued his former lawyer, Patrick Murphy, and law firm, Beament Green, for professional negligence, alleging that Murphy negligently advised him to settle his motor vehicle accident lawsuit in 2008 for an improvidently low amount.

Hopkins sought approximately $3 million in damages, arguing that the $127,900 settlement for general damages and loss of income was inadequate.

The defendants denied negligence, asserting that the settlement was reasonable and that they met the standard of a prudent solicitor.

The court addressed whether Murphy was negligent or breached his contract and whether the "loss of chance" doctrine should apply.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence or breach of contract, primarily due to the lack of expert evidence on the standard of care and the failure to conduct a "trial within a trial" or demonstrate its impossibility.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a motion by Fundstream Inc. to strike portions of 9695672 Canada Inc. o/a Vector's claim, which was dismissed.

Vector, as the successful party on the underlying motion, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, awarded Vector $7,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding this amount to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and importance of the motion, and considering the principle of indemnity and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The defendant Fundstream Inc. brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff Vector's Statement of Claim, specifically allegations of conspiracy by unlawful means, predominant purpose conspiracy, and false representation.

Fundstream argued that these claims lacked sufficient particularity.

The court reviewed the test for striking pleadings, emphasizing a generous reading of the claim and a high threshold for striking.

Despite the requirement for heightened particularity in pleading fraud and conspiracy, the court found that Vector's pleadings provided enough detail for the defendants to know the case they had to meet, acknowledging that some specific details of the alleged conspiracy might only become known through the discovery process.

The motion to strike was dismissed.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident and was denied by the respondent insurer.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue arguing the applicant was barred from proceeding with his application for catastrophic impairment because he failed to attend insurer examinations.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's notices of examination did not comply with section 44(5) of the Schedule because they failed to provide specific medical reasons or refer to the applicant's medical conditions.

As the notices were deficient, the applicant was not barred from proceeding to a substantive hearing.

The Applicant brought a motion for judgment, alleging that the Respondent's principal, Paul Halyk, accessed confidential and privileged communications between the Applicant's principal and its legal counsel.

The court found that Halyk accessed privileged material and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as he did not provide specific details about the extent of his review.

While declining to grant judgment on the Application due to insufficient evidentiary record for the underlying merits, the court ordered the Respondent's Notice of Appearance struck, allowing the Application to proceed as undefended.

The applicants sought judicial review of interlocutory orders staying their proceedings before the License Appeal Tribunal (LAT) regarding catastrophic impairment claims.

The LAT had stayed the proceedings to allow the applicants to attend medical examinations requested by the insurer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications as premature, applying the principle that courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no such exceptional circumstances, even though the applicants raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the LAT's power to issue the stays.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Morgan J. dated February 24, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the plaintiffs to pay costs of $10,000 all-inclusive to the responding defendants.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory decision of the License Appeal Tribunal directing her to attend insurer-requested medical examinations regarding her catastrophic impairment claim.

The Divisional Court issued a Rule 2.1 notice considering dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over interlocutory LAT orders.

The court resolved conflicting lines of authority, affirming that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory LAT orders, though judicial review is available in exceptional circumstances.

The court struck the Notice of Appeal but granted the appellant leave to convert the proceeding into an application for judicial review.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order dated January 28, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs of the leave motion were fixed at $2,500 on consent, payable at the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRBs) following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing the applicant's inability to work was due to injuries from a prior 2017 accident and a 2018 ankle injury.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was not working at the time of the subject accident and that her disability pre-dated it.

Medical evidence, including clinical notes and insurer's examinations, did not support that the subject accident caused a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment.

The application for IRBs, an award, and interest was dismissed.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while working as a personal support worker.

The respondent insurer argued the applicant was precluded from claiming statutory accident benefits because she opted out of WSIB benefits solely to claim accident benefits.

The Tribunal found the applicant had a bona fide intent to pursue a tort action and was not precluded under s. 61(2) of the Schedule.

However, the Tribunal concluded the applicant's impairments fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), rejecting her claims of chronic pain, mild traumatic brain injury, and psychological impairment due to a lack of objective medical evidence.

As the $3,500 MIG limit was exhausted and the insurer's denial notices were compliant with s. 38(8), the applicant was not entitled to the disputed treatment plans or assessments.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's claim for a dental assessment was statute-barred as it was filed beyond the two-year limitation period, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act to extend it.

The Tribunal determined that the applicant's left knee and right shoulder issues were pre-existing and not caused by the accident.

However, the applicant was entitled to a treatment plan for assistive devices (excluding a knee brace) because the insurer failed to provide proper medical reasons for its denial under s. 38(8) of the Schedule.

Claims for an in-home assessment and an ENT assessment were dismissed as the applicant failed to prove they were reasonable and necessary.

The request for an award for unreasonable delay was also dismissed.

The applicant sought various medical, rehabilitation, and attendant care benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the benefits, arguing that the applicant's needs stemmed from extensive pre-existing medical conditions, including Parkinson's disease and dementia, rather than the soft tissue injuries sustained in the accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed all claims, finding that the applicant failed to prove the requested benefits and assessments were reasonable and necessary or causally related to the accident.

Claims for interest and an award for unreasonable delay were also dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $1,000,000 action, the court determined the costs payable to the successful defendants.

The defendants had served an offer to settle for $5,000 which was not accepted.

Applying Rule 49, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing the total costs at $40,701.10 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion for a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend him against his daughter's negligent parenting claim.

The appellant was an occupant of a vehicle driven by an impaired driver at the time of the alleged injury.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was not covered under the automobile insurance policy because his liability did not arise from the use or operation of the automobile, but rather from his parenting decisions.

The plain language of section 239(1)(a) of the Insurance Act requires that an occupant's liability must arise from the use or operation of the automobile to be covered.

This costs endorsement follows a motion brought by House concerning the distribution of insurance proceeds, the application of the equitable doctrine of marshalling, and the garnishment of settlement funds.

The court had previously dismissed House's request for marshalling, ordered pro rata distribution of State Farm funds, and allowed House to garnish 20% of Baird's settlement.

Baird was deemed more successful than House on the garnishment issue and was entitled to costs.

The court awarded Baird $20,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, but excluded costs for an affiant who did not act as counsel or make submissions.