Kevan Wylie

The applicant, Charles Frederick Armstrong, challenged the constitutionality of the Township of Russell’s Sign By-Law, which restricted the display of municipal election signs.

The court found that the by-law violated Armstrong’s freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the violation was not justified under section 1.

The court also found that the Township was unjustly enriched by requiring Armstrong to pay $450 for the return of his signs, which had been removed under the unconstitutional by-law.

This decision concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendants, Trinitee Okoye and Olivia Singaye, seeking to stay or dismiss a defamation action by the plaintiffs, Reynolds Okoh, Axel Mensah, and 2357392 Ontario Inc. o/a The Palace Ottawa.

The court found that the impugned social media posts did not constitute expression on a matter of public interest within the meaning of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Even if the threshold were met, the court held that the action had substantial merit and the defences of justification and fair comment were unlikely to succeed.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant Million Dollar Round Table (MDRT) brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim against it for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, for dismissal due to delay.

The plaintiff alleged negligence against MDRT, a voluntary trade association, based on a fraudulent letter from a former member bearing the MDRT emblem.

The court found that the claim failed to plead sufficient material facts to establish a novel duty of care owed by MDRT to the plaintiff, particularly for pure economic loss.

Despite the defendant's delay in bringing the motion and having filed a statement of defence, the court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend, citing the futility of the claim, the plaintiff's inaction in advancing the case, and the principle of proportionality in simplified procedure actions.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence psychiatric examination over seven years after the motor vehicle accident and after the matter had been set down for trial.

The court found the defendants had delayed inordinately without adequate explanation, having known of the plaintiff's mental health issues since at least 2018.

The motion was dismissed as granting the relief would prejudice the plaintiff and jeopardize the upcoming trial date.

Following a personal injury jury trial where the plaintiff established liability but recovered zero damages due to the statutory threshold, the successful defendant sought costs.

The defendant also sought an order under Rule 57.07 that the plaintiff's lawyers personally pay the costs.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs, finding no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event.

The court dismissed the request for costs against the plaintiff's lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold of exceptional circumstances.

The court significantly reduced the defendant's claimed fees and disbursements, including expert witness fees and counsel's hotel expenses, ultimately fixing costs at $189,298.68.

The court issued an amended ruling on costs following a personal injury civil jury trial.

The plaintiff succeeded on liability but was awarded only $10,000 in general damages, falling below the statutory threshold, and his claim for loss of earning capacity was dismissed.

Neither party's Rule 49 offer triggered cost consequences.

The defendant was substantially successful and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing trial preparation hours and expert witness fees, and adjusting accommodation and meal expenses.

The defendant's motion for the plaintiff's lawyers to personally pay costs under Rule 57.07 was dismissed, as their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court also addressed the suspension of the plaintiff's third-party costs insurance policy.

Following a civil jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the judge considered whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff claimed the accident exacerbated his pre-existing severe osteoarthritis in his right shoulder.

The court found the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he suffered a permanent, serious impairment caused by the accident, noting his pre-existing condition, return to work, and lack of immediate injury complaints.

The plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages was dismissed.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to have the jury consider several heads of damages, including future housekeeping costs, future care costs, past loss of income, future loss of income, and loss of competitive advantage.

The defendant opposed putting these questions to the jury, arguing a lack of evidentiary foundation.

The trial judge reviewed the evidence and determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient economic, accounting, or medical evidence to support the claims for future housekeeping, future care, past loss of income, and future loss of income.

Consequently, those questions were not put to the jury.

However, the court found sufficient evidence, including expert medical testimony, to allow the jury to consider the claim for loss of competitive advantage.

During a civil jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff closed his case without entering his income tax returns into evidence.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case to introduce the returns to support a claim for loss of competitive work capacity.

The court found the omission was due to counsel's inadvertence, not tactical advantage, and that the defendant would not be irreparably prejudiced as the documents had been previously produced.

The motion was granted, allowing the plaintiff to be recalled solely to identify the tax returns.

The defendant brought a motion at the outset of a personal injury jury trial to preclude the plaintiff from adducing evidence contrary to a prior guilty plea for a Highway Traffic Act offence.

The plaintiff had pled guilty through a paralegal to disobeying a lane light following the motor vehicle accident.

The court held a voir dire and found that the guilty plea was not voluntary, unequivocal, or fully informed, as the plaintiff consistently maintained he had a green light and pled guilty only for convenience due to a new job.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that permitting the plaintiff to adduce evidence to the contrary would not constitute an abuse of process.