J.F. Lalonde

The applicant lender sought appointment of a court-appointed receiver over three parcels of vacant land owned by the guarantor to conduct a sale in satisfaction of a $10 million guarantee.

The respondent guarantor and first mortgagee resisted the receivership.

The court upheld the validity of the applicant's second mortgages despite the absence of the first mortgagee's consent, finding the consent requirement was not a true condition precedent and the authorization and direction was unconditional.

However, the court declined to appoint a receiver, finding it unnecessary given the limited nature of the assets and the absence of any business to operate or preserve.

The guarantor was permitted 90 days to effect a private sale, with the applicant retaining the right to return for further relief.

The applicant and respondent, two brothers, co-owned a poultry farm business.

Following a breakdown in their relationship, they entered into a consent order detailing a process for the applicant to sell his shares to the respondent, or alternatively, for the corporation's assets to be sold to third parties.

The applicant brought an application to enforce the order, arguing the respondent failed to purchase the shares in time and seeking to proceed with third-party asset sales.

The respondent brought a cross-application seeking to purchase the assets instead of the shares.

The court held that the consent order clearly contemplated a share sale, not an asset sale, and that the respondent failed to exercise his right of first refusal in accordance with the order.

The applicant was authorized to proceed with the third-party asset sales, with the net proceeds to be divided equally.

The respondent in an ongoing shareholder dispute brought a motion requesting that the presiding judge recuse himself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The moving party alleged that the judge's comments during a previous hearing regarding his illiteracy demonstrated prejudgment and ableism.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding that the comments were inquiries into the moving party's ability to complete complex commercial transactions and did not meet the objective test for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted leave to file new evidence regarding an updated agreement of purchase and sale.

A shareholder sought audited financial statements from a corporation spanning multiple years, arguing the corporation had failed to comply with its statutory obligations under the Business Corporations Act.

The respondents contended that the shareholder's demand was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision that the limitation period applies to compliance orders seeking enforcement of statutory obligations that correspond to shareholder rights.

The court rejected the argument that compliance orders are merely enforcement mechanisms without corresponding legal rights, holding instead that statutory obligations to provide audited financial statements create three-term legal relations where shareholders hold enforceable rights against the corporation.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment on a promissory note in the amount of $1,650,000 provided by the defendants as vendor takeback financing for the purchase of the plaintiff's company pursuant to a share purchase agreement.

The defendants are pursuing a separate Ontario action claiming rescission of the share purchase agreement and damages for alleged misrepresentations and non-disclosures.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding it inappropriate to grant judgment on the promissory note while the entire underlying transaction remains in dispute in the related proceeding.

The court ordered that the promissory note claim may be tried together with or consolidated with the defendants' counterclaim, or asserted as a cross-claim in the related action.

The applicant, Charles Frederick Armstrong, challenged the constitutionality of the Township of Russell’s Sign By-Law, which restricted the display of municipal election signs.

The court found that the by-law violated Armstrong’s freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the violation was not justified under section 1.

The court also found that the Township was unjustly enriched by requiring Armstrong to pay $450 for the return of his signs, which had been removed under the unconstitutional by-law.

This decision concerns a failed real estate transaction and a motion for summary judgment under the simplified procedure.

The plaintiffs, Robert Wayne Colley and Mary Jean Colley, sought damages after the defendant, Zekiye Yousuf Hammoe, failed to close on the purchase of their property.

The court found that there were irreconcilable factual disputes regarding who requested an extension of the closing date and whether both parties signed an amendment.

The court also found the record insufficient to fairly assess damages, particularly regarding mitigation efforts.

As a result, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to a summary trial.

This decision concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendants, Trinitee Okoye and Olivia Singaye, seeking to stay or dismiss a defamation action by the plaintiffs, Reynolds Okoh, Axel Mensah, and 2357392 Ontario Inc. o/a The Palace Ottawa.

The court found that the impugned social media posts did not constitute expression on a matter of public interest within the meaning of section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

Even if the threshold were met, the court held that the action had substantial merit and the defences of justification and fair comment were unlikely to succeed.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Henry Brent Shelp, brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action against GoSecure Inc. The main issues were the period of common law reasonable notice and the calculation of income loss, particularly entitlement to sales commissions during the notice period.

The court found the matter suitable for summary judgment and determined that the reasonable notice period was six months.

The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages including base salary, commissions, benefits, and cell phone allowance for the notice period, less mitigation income and amounts already paid.

The total damages awarded were $163,659.92 plus pre-judgment interest.

This is a costs endorsement following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to trial preparation and substantial indemnity for trial preparation and trial.

The defendants argued for a cap on costs, asserting the Small Claims Court Act should apply due to the damages awarded being below the Small Claims Court limit.

The court found that the action, brought under simplified procedure in the Superior Court, was not subject to the Small Claims Court Act's cost cap.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs for trial preparation and trial, and partial indemnity for earlier proceedings, due to the defendants' reprehensible conduct, including deliberate departure from approved building plans, failure to comply with interim court orders, and improper conduct during trial.

The total costs awarded to the plaintiff were $110,000.

The applicant sought a minor variance to permit a home-based personal training business occupying 29% of the dwelling's gross floor area, exceeding the 25% permitted by the Zoning By-law.

Neighbours opposed the application, citing adverse impacts including noise, traffic, and parking issues.

The Committee of Adjustment refused the application, finding that the expanded business would likely contribute to additional adverse impacts and did not fit well in the area.

The Committee concluded that the requested variance failed three of the four statutory requirements under subsection 45(1) of the Planning Act, as it was not minor, not desirable for the appropriate use of the land, and did not maintain the general intent and purpose of the Zoning By-law.

The appellants appealed an order requiring their corporation to conduct audits and produce financial statements for the past ten years under the Business Corporations Act.

They argued the order should be limited to the past two years due to the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a shareholder's application to enforce corporate duties is a 'claim' within the meaning of the Limitations Act.

The order was varied to require audits only for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022.

The plaintiff brought an action for nuisance and property damage under the simplified procedure (Rule 76), seeking mandatory and injunctive relief.

At the outset of the trial, the defendants argued that the action was improperly commenced under Rule 76 because it sought injunctive relief, and asked the court to strike those claims.

The court rejected the defendants' argument, holding that Rule 76 does not preclude claims for injunctive or mandatory relief provided the action otherwise complies with the rule.

The court affirmed its equitable jurisdiction to grant such relief in simplified procedure actions and noted the defendants suffered no prejudice.

The plaintiff sued his neighbours for nuisance and the tort in Rylands v. Fletcher due to water and debris migration from their property onto his.

The defendants had built their property in deliberate disregard of city-approved plans, leading to improper roof slope, downpipe placement, grading, and retaining wall construction.

The court found the defendants liable for nuisance, awarding the plaintiff compensatory damages for property repairs and general damages for loss of enjoyment.

A mandatory injunction was issued requiring the defendants to undertake specific remedial construction to abate the nuisance.

Punitive damages were denied as disproportionate given the injunctive relief.

The defendant, Felicia Georgina Zigiris, brought a motion for costs after the plaintiffs discontinued their action against her.

The plaintiffs had alleged conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intrusion upon seclusion.

The court found no bona fide cause of action against Ms. Zigiris, as the evidence presented (letters and an audio recording) did not substantiate the serious allegations of conspiracy or disclosure of health information.

The court struck inadmissible opinion and argument from the plaintiffs' affidavits.

Given the unsubstantiated and serious nature of the allegations, the court awarded costs to Ms. Zigiris on a substantial indemnity basis for the discontinued action and on a partial indemnity basis for the costs motion, rejecting the plaintiffs' prior settlement offer.

The Corporation of the Town of Renfrew sought costs after successfully obtaining declarations of ownership, injunctive relief against trespassing, and an order for the removal of encroachments and a non-compliant scaffolding.

The respondents, who were self-represented, opposed the costs request and sought their own costs.

The court awarded the applicant $8,500 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding that the respondents' conduct did not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The Corporation of the Town of Renfrew brought a motion seeking declarations of ownership over two properties (200 Stewart Street and the Ready Street road allowance), an injunction against the respondents for trespassing, an order for the removal of items and restoration of the properties, and an order for the removal of scaffolding from the respondents' property due to a by-law violation.

The respondents disputed ownership, claiming a by-law granted them rights, and raised various unrelated grievances.

The court found Renfrew to be the titled owner, confirmed the respondents were trespassing, and granted the requested declarations and injunctions, including the removal of items and scaffolding.

The respondents' arguments regarding adverse possession and by-law interpretation were rejected.

The moving party, previously declared a vexatious litigant, brought a motion under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside or vary an appeal decision, alleging fraud.

The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding no basis for the fraud claim.

The applicant shareholder brought an application under the Business Corporations Act to compel the respondent corporation to produce audited financial statements and appoint an auditor.

The respondents agreed to the appointment but argued the audits should only cover 2020 to present, claiming earlier years were barred by estoppel and the Limitations Act.

The court held that the right to audited financial statements is a mandatory statutory right not subject to the Limitations Act, as it is not a 'claim' for injury or loss.

The court ordered the production of audited financial statements from 2013 to present.

This appeal concerns the application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP provision, s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, in a defamation action arising from negative online reviews posted by a client against contractors.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the public interest in the expression outweighed the harm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by unduly focusing on SLAPP hallmarks, failing to adequately consider reputational harm, and not qualitatively assessing the value of the respondent's vitriolic expression.

The Court conducted a fresh analysis, concluding that the significant harm to the appellants' professional reputations outweighed the minimal public interest in the malicious and scurrilous statements, reinstating the defamation action.