Christopher McLeod

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As no bill of costs was provided, no costs were ordered.

The parties brought cross-motions arising from examinations for discovery in an action concerning a cancelled procurement process for visa application centres.

The defendant sought further financial documents from the plaintiff, which the court dismissed, finding the plaintiff had already produced all existing relevant documents.

The plaintiff sought answers to several refused questions.

The court ordered the defendant to disclose the name of its forensic accountant or undertake not to call them at trial, produce communications with third parties as common interest privilege did not apply, answer whether it could cancel the procurement at will, and produce a 2005 contract.

The court upheld the defendant's refusal to disclose the contract's Approval Value due to Cabinet confidence privilege.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's defamation claim arising from statements allegedly made at a conference in Montreal, arguing the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction.

They also moved to strike the remaining defamation allegations for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Montreal defamation claim under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the claim arose in Quebec.

The court also struck the remaining defamation claims without leave to amend, as the plaintiff failed to plead the necessary material facts to establish a prima facie case of defamation.

This decision addresses whether legal costs incurred to obtain a declaration that a debt survives bankruptcy under section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a ruling that its debt against a defendant survived his bankruptcy.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($50,000) for that prior motion, but disputed whether these costs were also non-dischargeable.

The plaintiff argued that the costs were an intrinsic consequence of the judgment.

The defendants contended that these were post-bankruptcy debts, separate from the original debt, and did not fall under BIA exceptions.

The court, distinguishing the case from those where bankruptcy had not yet occurred, held that it would be inequitable for the underlying debt to survive bankruptcy while the costs necessary to secure that declaration did not.

The court found the costs to be an intrinsic aspect of the judgment and therefore ordered that they also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

No costs were awarded for the present costs motion.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to declare that a default judgment debt owed by the defendant, a corporate director, survived his bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendant had breached the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act by allowing construction financing funds to be used for non-project purposes.

The court found that the defendant, as a fiduciary, misappropriated trust funds through willful blindness and failure to oversee the corporation's finances.

The court declared that the judgment debt of $181,133.23 plus costs survived the bankruptcy.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a binding settlement agreement reached on May 17, 2019, to resolve an oppression remedy and wrongful dismissal claim.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the defendants unilaterally modified a term regarding the share acquisition structure and failed to act in good faith.

The court found a legally binding agreement existed, which explicitly granted the defendants the prerogative to consider an alternative share acquisition structure and agree to it only if persuaded it was tax advantageous or neutral to them.

The court determined that the defendants had fulfilled their obligation by consulting their accountant and deciding against the alternative structure.

The court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the settlement and dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion, concluding the settlement was reasonable and just.

The defendant in a $195 million procurement dispute served summonses on three non-party witnesses for examination prior to a summary judgment motion.

The non-parties and plaintiffs moved to quash the summonses, arguing they were an abuse of process due to short notice, failure to provide relevant pleadings, and overly broad document requests.

The court agreed, finding the defendant's conduct in serving the summonses and refusing a brief postponement constituted an abuse of process.

The summonses were quashed, and the defendant's motion to compel answers to refusals was dismissed.

In an action concerning a procurement process for Visa Application Centre services, the parties sought to settle the terms of a confidentiality order governing the disclosure of Third Party Information.

The sole issue was the wording of a paragraph dictating the scope of submissions that affected Third Parties could make on a future motion to determine confidentiality.

The plaintiffs argued for a narrower scope, while the defendant and Third Parties argued for a broader scope.

The court adopted the plaintiffs' proposed wording, finding it addressed issues clearly relevant to the Third Parties without tying the hands of the judge hearing the future motion, but noted this did not necessarily preclude Third Parties from raising other issues.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to provide further affidavit of documents and permit additional examinations for discovery, eight years after the action commenced and after it was set down for trial.

The defendant opposed, arguing the plaintiff required leave and that the request was untimely and disproportional.

The court found that a pre-trial endorsement by Justice Doyle constituted leave.

It determined the requested documents, concerning other clients using the same IP address and related performance issues, were relevant to the plaintiff's negligence claim.

Despite the significant delay and potential for trial adjournment, the court ordered disclosure, with the plaintiff bearing the initial costs of retrieval, to mitigate proportionality concerns.

Costs for the motion were not awarded to the successful plaintiff due to the delay and non-compliance with case management orders.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for particulars and an extension of time to deliver a reply, achieving mixed success.

The court ordered the defendant to provide one critical particular regarding the value of a contract, while dismissing the other requests.

The parties could not agree on costs.

Given the mixed success and the early stage of the case-managed action, the court ordered that the costs of the motion be payable in the cause.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully responding to the defendants' unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.

The defendants argued for partial indemnity costs of $10,000.

The court found that while the defendants acted unreasonably in bringing their motion, the plaintiff's own evidence had deficiencies and they abandoned their request for summary judgment in their favour.

Consequently, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $21,966.36, after adjusting hourly rates, percentages, and disallowing certain disbursements.

No costs were awarded for the costs submissions due to deficiencies in both parties' filings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking particulars of allegations in the defendant's statement of defence and an extension of time to deliver a reply.

The defendant argued that pleadings were closed and that an affidavit was required to support the demand for particulars.

The court found that a demand for particulars could be made regardless of the status of pleadings and that an affidavit was not required if the allegations were "general and bald." The court ordered the defendant to provide particulars regarding the value of the contract (paragraph 9 of the statement of defence) as it was deemed a material fact and a "general and bald" denial.

However, the court denied the demand for particulars for the remaining ten allegations, finding them sufficiently detailed or within the plaintiffs' knowledge, and that an affidavit was necessary for those.

The plaintiffs were granted an extension to deliver their reply.

The defendants, Sarazen Realty Inc., Colin Sarazen, and Keith Sennett, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff Gerald McClelland's action for commission payment, unjust enrichment, and negligence related to a property sale.

The court found that McClelland's claims raised genuine issues requiring a trial, citing significant deficiencies and credibility issues in the defendants' affidavit evidence, including reliance on opinion evidence, hearsay, and improper "adoption" of evidence.

The court determined that these issues could not be resolved through the enhanced powers of summary judgment or a mini-trial.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to provide particulars for allegations in her statement of claim, specifically concerning breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The court emphasized that while oral discovery can clarify details, allegations of bad faith under Rule 25.06(8) require "full particulars" to enable the defendants to plead and to limit discovery issues.

The court also clarified that a supporting affidavit from the defendant is not strictly required when the plaintiff's allegations are so general that particulars are clearly necessary.

The motion was substantially granted, requiring the plaintiff to provide specific particulars regarding mismanagement, toxic work environment, detrimental consequences, bad faith, and reputational damage.

The plaintiff sued his insurance broker for negligence after his insurer denied coverage for a fire loss because the rental property had been vacant for over five years.

The defendant broker brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim.

The court found that the broker had discharged its duty of care by sending letters explicitly warning the plaintiff about the vacancy exclusion.

Furthermore, the property's uninhabitable state constituted an unreported material change in risk.

The court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding unpaid incentive compensation, the successful defendants sought costs of $140,005 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded due to the defendants' conduct causing delay, or alternatively, that the costs were excessive.

The court found that while there was some merit to the plaintiff's complaints about delay, it did not justify denying costs entirely.

The court fixed the costs at $60,000 all-inclusive, noting that the defendants' unaccepted offers to settle were relevant under Rule 57.01(1) despite not triggering Rule 49.10(2).

The plaintiff, Jacob Whiteley, sought summary judgment for $185,948 in unpaid bonuses under his employer Wipro's Sales Incentive and Large Deal Bonus Plan, related to a $119 million sales contract with Innovapost.

The central issue was whether the entire deal constituted a "contracted deal" and "committed order" by the fiscal year-end of March 31, 2014, as required by the Incentive Plan.

The court found that while a Master Services Agreement (MSA) and an amendment were in place, they did not contractually bind Innovapost to purchase services until specific Statements of Work (SOWs) were signed.

Only one SOW, valued at $19 million, was executed by the deadline, for which the plaintiff had already received payment.

The remaining SOWs were finalized after the plaintiff's departure.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that no further bonus payments were owing as the conditions for payment on the larger deal were not met by the relevant fiscal year-end.

Following dismissal of a $15 million civil claim, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to the successful defendant.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on allegations of bad faith litigation conduct and a rejected Rule 49 settlement offer of $250,000.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity for the entire proceeding but applied Rule 49 principles, awarding partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The court also addressed the effect of a special fee arrangement between the defendant and its counsel, holding that costs cannot exceed the client’s actual obligation under s. 20(2) of the Solicitors Act.

Costs were fixed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties and the scale of the litigation.

The defendant sought costs following a motion that combined a motion to strike the statement of claim and a motion for summary judgment.

The court had previously indicated the original pleading disclosed no viable cause of action and permitted the plaintiff to file a fresh amended statement of claim with costs thrown away.

The defendant claimed over $115,000 in costs, arguing the amended pleading introduced entirely new causes of action and rendered extensive preparation for the summary judgment motion wasted.

The court held that the costs relating to the summary judgment motion should be treated as costs in the cause because it was unclear whether the motion would ultimately have succeeded or whether it had been premature under the principles articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch.

Costs for the successful motion to strike were fixed and ordered payable immediately, while the balance relating to summary judgment was deferred pending the outcome of the action.

The applicants brought a motion within an application seeking an order that the respondent pay $3.0 million to their jointly owned corporation to cover outstanding tax liabilities and accounting fees, and for authorization to retain a new accounting firm.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to convert the application to an action and transfer the proceeding to Toronto.

The court declined to order the $3.0 million payment, finding no immediate urgency, but ordered both parties to pay $17,000 each to the original accounting firm to complete the tax returns.

The applicant was granted sole authority to instruct the accountants and deal with corporate shares to pay tax liabilities.

The cross-motion to transfer venue was dismissed, and the request to convert to an action was deferred.