Patrick R. Simon

Following a successful motion by the respondents declining to confirm an Assessment Officer's decision, the parties could not agree on costs.

The applicants argued costs should be in the cause as the matter was returned to a judge for determination.

The court rejected this argument, finding the respondents were presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party.

The court found the respondents' claimed costs of $30,749.59 excessive due to duplication of work by multiple timekeepers, and fixed costs at $15,000 all-inclusive.

The respondents brought a motion opposing the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision that reduced their legal accounts from $221,336.66 to $35,000.

The court found that the Assessment Officer failed to provide sufficient reasons for the drastic reduction, as she did not meaningfully analyze the Cohen factors or explain how she arrived at the reduced amount.

The court declined to confirm the assessment and directed that the matter be returned to the judge hearing the application.

The Ontario Land Tribunal heard four motions to implement settlements regarding appeals of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Comprehensive Official Plan.

The motions sought modifications to land use designations, mapping, and policies related to aggregate resources, agricultural lands, and natural heritage systems.

Based on uncontroverted expert planning and geotechnical evidence, the Tribunal found the proposed modifications consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement and good planning.

The Tribunal granted the motions and ordered the requested modifications to the Official Plan.

At a Case Management Conference, the applicant brought a motion to consolidate several appeals and referrals relating to the proposed Macleod Quarries.

The proceedings included appeals under the Planning Act regarding official plan and zoning by-law amendments, and a referral under the Aggregate Resources Act for a Class A licence.

With the consent of all parties, the Tribunal granted the motion to consolidate the proceedings to avoid inconsistent findings and ensure an expeditious resolution.

This decision addresses whether legal costs incurred to obtain a declaration that a debt survives bankruptcy under section 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a ruling that its debt against a defendant survived his bankruptcy.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($50,000) for that prior motion, but disputed whether these costs were also non-dischargeable.

The plaintiff argued that the costs were an intrinsic consequence of the judgment.

The defendants contended that these were post-bankruptcy debts, separate from the original debt, and did not fall under BIA exceptions.

The court, distinguishing the case from those where bankruptcy had not yet occurred, held that it would be inequitable for the underlying debt to survive bankruptcy while the costs necessary to secure that declaration did not.

The court found the costs to be an intrinsic aspect of the judgment and therefore ordered that they also survive the bankrupt's discharge.

No costs were awarded for the present costs motion.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an employee of the appellant who was driving his personal vehicle to a remote job site.

The employee had taken a short detour for coffee when the collision occurred.

The motion judge granted summary judgment finding the employer vicariously liable under the first branch of the Salmond test, as the travel and detour were authorized acts within the course of employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, upholding the finding that the employee was authorized to drive to the job site and take a short break, making the employer vicariously liable.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to declare that a default judgment debt owed by the defendant, a corporate director, survived his bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendant had breached the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act by allowing construction financing funds to be used for non-project purposes.

The court found that the defendant, as a fiduciary, misappropriated trust funds through willful blindness and failure to oversee the corporation's finances.

The court declared that the judgment debt of $181,133.23 plus costs survived the bankruptcy.

The appellant was successful in her appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $12,026.61.

The respondents argued against awarding costs despite the general rule that the successful party is entitled to them.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to depart from the general rule and awarded the appellant $10,000 in costs, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The costs of the underlying application were remitted to the application judge for determination.

The tenants entered into a commercial lease with the landlord.

The landlord served a notice of breach for failing to provide copies of insurance policies, and subsequently terminated the lease and re-entered the premises.

The application judge found the notice invalid under s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act because it lacked a demand for monetary compensation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a demand for monetary compensation is not mandatory and may be waived by the landlord if they do not intend to insist on recovery for damages compensable in money.

The plaintiff, Podogaetam Holdings Inc., brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendants, Stephane Langlois and Pierre Charron.

The plaintiff sought a finding that Langlois breached his contract, and initially that Charron was negligent and breached fiduciary duties.

At the outset, the plaintiff withdrew the negligence claim against Charron and acknowledged Langlois was not disputing the breach of contract claim, leading to judgment against Langlois on that basis only.

All claims against Christian Pilon were dismissed by agreement.

The core of the motion proceeded on the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Charron.

The court dismissed the motion for partial summary judgment, finding genuine issues of credibility and conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances of the loan, the plaintiff's reliance on Charron, and the plaintiff's acknowledgment of risks and waiver of independent legal advice.

The court also noted that the issue of fiduciary duty could not be readily bifurcated from other negligence claims, making partial summary judgment inappropriate and risking inconsistent findings.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application, the parties provided written submissions on costs.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the applicants came to court with unclean hands and adopted a retaliatory approach.

The court agreed, finding the applicants' conduct warranted elevated costs, and awarded the respondents $20,311.48 on a substantial indemnity scale.

The Applicants sought multiple mandatory and permanent injunctions against the Respondents concerning alleged encroachments (deck, fence, underground posts) on a common right-of-way and restrictive covenant.

The court first appointed a litigation guardian for one respondent suffering from dementia.

The court dismissed the application for injunctive relief, finding insufficient evidence of substantial interference with the right-of-way's purpose as a common walkway.

Furthermore, the court noted the Applicants did not come with clean hands, having previously restricted the right-of-way themselves and adopting a retaliatory approach.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful motion by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim and the dismissal of the defendant Kealey's motion to strike.

The plaintiff sought costs, arguing the motions were necessary due to the defendant's refusal to consent to amendments and that she had made a without-costs settlement offer.

The court found the plaintiff was the successful party and that her motion to amend was necessary.

The defendant Kealey was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs, fixed at $7,500.

The appellant corporation sought to overturn a lower court decision that dismissed its trespass claim and granted the respondent a declaration of title through adverse possession over encroachments created by a parking platform built on the respondent's land.

The platform's support timbers encroached onto the appellant's roadway and drainage area.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the respondent had established all three elements of adverse possession: actual possession for the statutory period, intention to exclude the true owner, and discontinuance of possession by the owner.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding a modified test for adverse possession in cases involving pre-existing easements and found that the encroachments were trifling and did not warrant injunctive relief.

The plaintiff, Dias, brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to substitute David Kealey for "John Doe" and to plead particulars of negligence.

Kealey opposed, arguing the proposed amendments introduced a new, time-barred cause of action and that the original pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against him.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, finding that the original statement of claim, read generously, contained a sufficient factual matrix to support a negligence claim against Kealey, particularly given allegations of his intoxication leading to injury.

The court dismissed Kealey's motion to strike and granted Dias's motion to amend.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the statement of defence filed by the defendant's brother.

The brother, who is not a lawyer, attempted to defend the action using a power of attorney for property, as the defendant resided in the UK and allegedly lacked mental capacity.

The court struck the statement of defence, holding that a power of attorney does not authorize a non-lawyer to conduct litigation on behalf of another person.

The court noted that if the defendant lacks capacity, he must be represented by a litigation guardian and a lawyer.

The applicant municipality sought an order terminating its commercial lease with the respondent cultural center, alleging the respondent breached the lease by refusing to accept a reduction in leased space.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the municipality's notice of breach failed to comply with the strict requirements of section 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act as it did not specify the alleged breach.

Furthermore, the court held that the municipality breached its duty of good faith in contractual performance by attempting to use its right to reduce the leased space to circumvent a negotiated six-month notice period for termination.

The appellant police officer appealed his conviction for Discreditable Conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal from the police service.

The officer had previously pleaded guilty to the disciplinary charge, which was based on a criminal conviction that was later overturned on appeal.

The Commission held that the subsequent overturning of the criminal conviction did not render the original, informed guilty plea a nullity.

The Commission further found that the penalty of dismissal was reasonable given the officer's disciplinary history and the serious nature of the misconduct, which involved violence and threats against members of the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

Police chiefs brought an application under s. 50 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to enforce arbitration awards ordering a police services board to pay contractual entitlements following the dissolution of a regional police service.

The respondent argued the Arbitration Act did not apply because the arbitration was conducted pursuant to the Police Services Act and that enforcement should be stayed due to a pending judicial review application.

The court held that disputes over remuneration and working conditions of a chief and deputy chief fall outside Part VIII of the Police Services Act, meaning the statutory exclusion of the Arbitration Act did not apply.

Because none of the statutory grounds in s. 50(3) for refusing enforcement were present, the court was required to enforce the awards.

Judgment was therefore granted enforcing the arbitral awards.