William Curtis Aaron Hunter

The appellant appealed two inspection orders issued by the Smith Falls Fire Department regarding multiple alleged Fire Code violations at a large, multi-building complex.

The parties settled most issues, leaving seven items for the Fire Safety Commission to determine.

The Commission confirmed the orders requiring a fire separation for the theatrical stage, repairs to ensure certain fire separation doors close and latch, the maintenance of standpipe testing records, and the installation of exit signage.

The Commission rescinded the orders regarding two sets of doors, finding they were not required fire separations because they did not open onto public corridors or were not originally built as fire separations.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an employee of the appellant who was driving his personal vehicle to a remote job site.

The employee had taken a short detour for coffee when the collision occurred.

The motion judge granted summary judgment finding the employer vicariously liable under the first branch of the Salmond test, as the travel and detour were authorized acts within the course of employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, upholding the finding that the employee was authorized to drive to the job site and take a short break, making the employer vicariously liable.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the jury notice and sever their action from a companion action arising from a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs argued that the case was too complex for a jury and that delay, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, warranted a judge-alone trial.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, finding insufficient evidence of case-specific prejudice or that an earlier trial date would be available for a judge-alone trial.

The court also dismissed the motion for severance, emphasizing the need to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings under section 138 of the Courts of Justice Act and noting common issues between the actions.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to vary an Order for Assessment of a series of legal accounts delivered to the applicant estate trustees over a 12-year period.

The law firm argued the accounts were final and paid, while the client argued they were interim and thus assessable.

The court held that the older accounts, which related to completed matters and had been paid years prior, were final and not liable to assessment.

However, the more recent accounts relating to ongoing litigation were deemed interim and remained liable to assessment.

The Order for Assessment was varied accordingly.

The plaintiff, Podogaetam Holdings Inc., brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendants, Stephane Langlois and Pierre Charron.

The plaintiff sought a finding that Langlois breached his contract, and initially that Charron was negligent and breached fiduciary duties.

At the outset, the plaintiff withdrew the negligence claim against Charron and acknowledged Langlois was not disputing the breach of contract claim, leading to judgment against Langlois on that basis only.

All claims against Christian Pilon were dismissed by agreement.

The core of the motion proceeded on the breach of fiduciary duty claim against Charron.

The court dismissed the motion for partial summary judgment, finding genuine issues of credibility and conflicting evidence regarding the circumstances of the loan, the plaintiff's reliance on Charron, and the plaintiff's acknowledgment of risks and waiver of independent legal advice.

The court also noted that the issue of fiduciary duty could not be readily bifurcated from other negligence claims, making partial summary judgment inappropriate and risking inconsistent findings.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order to compel the defendant municipality to issue adult entertainment establishment licenses, asserting a binding settlement agreement.

The municipality argued the settlement was not enforceable without a council resolution and that the plaintiff had lost its legal non-conforming use rights due to a 5.5-year cessation of operations.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the settlement agreement was not binding on the Town without formal adoption by a by-law or resolution of council, and that any legal non-conforming use rights under the zoning by-law had been extinguished due to the prolonged discontinuance of operations.

This endorsement addresses outstanding issues in an estate application, including relief sought by a respondent regarding garnishment, the applicant's request for additional costs, the requirement for a proper accounting of the estate and a trust fund, and the removal and appointment of estate trustees.

The court clarifies the need for Rule 74 accountings and affidavit evidence for a proposed successor trustee, and outlines future hearing dates for unresolved matters.

The testator's will directed his two children, appointed as co-executors and trustees, to set aside $100,000 in a trust fund for the benefit of their brother.

The brother was to receive $500 monthly, with the remainder to the testator's grandchildren.

The co-trustees transferred the funds to a non-registered investment plan in one trustee's name, who subsequently misappropriated the funds.

The application judge found both trustees jointly and severally liable for the breach of trust.

The appellant co-trustee appealed, arguing she had no active role in the misappropriation and should be relieved of liability under s. 35(1) of the Trustee Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a co-trustee cannot passively acquiesce to another trustee's actions and that her failure to ensure the trust was properly established constituted an unreasonable breach of fiduciary duty.

The applicant, Patrick Cahill, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis following a successful application regarding a trust fund.

The respondents, Kevin Cahill and Sheila Kehoe, opposed the scale of costs.

The court found that the applicant's offers to settle did not meet the requirements of Rule 49 for substantial indemnity costs, nor did Sheila Kehoe's conduct warrant such an award.

Kevin Cahill's disregard for the process was noted, but his personal circumstances mitigated against a substantial indemnity award against him.

The applicant was awarded partial indemnity costs for the main application, for which Kevin Cahill and Sheila Kehoe were jointly and severally liable.

Kevin Cahill was solely liable for partial indemnity costs related to a motion for substitutional service.

The appellant, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, settled a tort claim for $800,000.

His former and current law firms claimed over $422,000 in fees and disbursements.

Facing severe financial pressure and acting without independent legal advice, the appellant entered into fee agreements and a consent order releasing the funds.

He later applied to have the accounts assessed under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction due to the consent order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the consent order, and directed an assessment, finding that the application judge erred in law and that special circumstances demanded the fee agreements be reopened to protect the vulnerable client and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The testator's will appointed his daughter and son as executors and directed them to set aside $100,000 in a trust fund for the benefit of another son.

The executors transferred the funds to an investment account with the son as the annuitant and no named beneficiary.

The son subsequently misappropriated the funds for his own business.

The applicant sought payment of his entitlement and the removal of the executors.

The court found that the trust fund was never properly established and that both executors breached their fiduciary duties.

The daughter's passive reliance on her co-executor fell short of the standard of care required of an executor.

The executors were held jointly and severally liable for the dissipated funds.

On a Small Claims Court appeal, the appellants challenged dismissal of their claim concerning municipal water and wastewater base service charges after they removed several water meters from a mixed-use building.

The court upheld the deputy judge's conclusion that the claim was discovered by January 27, 2011 and was therefore statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

The court also upheld the municipality's interpretation of its by-law as authorizing both consumption-based charges and a base monthly service fee on a per-unit basis.

However, the appeal from the costs award was allowed because the additional punitive component beyond the 30% Small Claims Court cap was unsupported.

The total costs award was varied downward to $10,040.76.

Following earlier reasons enforcing minutes of settlement in family litigation concerning claims to a matrimonial home and alleged resulting trust, the court determined the parties’ entitlement to costs of multiple motions.

The applicant had been substantially successful on her motion to enforce the settlement and the respondent spouse’s conduct in refusing to comply with the settlement was found unreasonable, though not amounting to bad faith.

The added respondents (heirs of the registered owner of the property) sought substantial costs but were found not to have achieved clear success and their participation was closely aligned with the unsuccessful respondent spouse.

Considering Rule 24 of the Family Court Rules and fairness between the parties, the court declined to order costs against the applicant and instead ordered the respondents jointly and severally to pay the applicant’s motion costs.

The applicant wife brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement reached at mediation.

The respondent husband brought a cross-motion to set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, alleging failure to disclose, unconscionability, and undue influence by his own counsel.

The added respondents (heirs of the husband's father) sought to dismiss the application against them and requested occupation rent from the applicant.

The court dismissed the husband's motion to set aside the agreement, finding no failure to disclose, no unconscionability, and that issues with his own counsel did not constitute undue influence.

The court also dismissed the claim for occupation rent, finding it lacked a clear legal basis and was not equitable.

The Minutes of Settlement were upheld.

Following dismissal of a motion for an interim injunction in a defamation action arising from YouTube videos, the successful defendants sought full indemnity costs exceeding $17,000.

The court considered Rule 57.01 factors, the parties’ settlement offers under Rule 49, and whether the time claimed by counsel was excessive.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs but held that the defendants were entitled to partial indemnity costs up to January 25, 2013 and substantial indemnity costs thereafter because their offer to settle was better than the result obtained by the moving party.

The court also refused to refer the matter to assessment and declined to award costs for a self‑represented appearance lacking evidence of opportunity cost.

Costs were fixed at $10,500 inclusive.

The plaintiff, a municipal official, moved for an interlocutory injunction to force the defendants to remove YouTube videos and comments that he alleged were defamatory.

The defendants had posted videos criticizing the plaintiff's handling of their building permit and site plan requirements for a new business location.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the high threshold for an injunction in defamation cases, which requires showing that the words are so manifestly defamatory that a contrary jury verdict would be perverse.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, as any potential harm could be adequately compensated by damages.

The defendant municipality brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of an action alleging bad faith in cancelling a request for proposals for municipal garbage collection services.

The plaintiff bidder alleged that the municipality improperly relied on a privilege clause after negotiations with another bidder and after treating the plaintiff’s bid as the lowest based on a clarified unit price.

The court held that the municipality was contractually entitled to cancel the RFP pursuant to the privilege clause provided it acted in good faith and for legitimate municipal purposes.

Evidence showed the cancellation arose from legal concerns about the bidding process, bid compliance issues, and evolving municipal policy favouring waste diversion and recycling.

The court concluded there was no evidence capable of establishing bad faith and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The plaintiff alleged misuse of a joint bank account by his spouse and conversion of a workplace insurance care payment issued in his name.

The court rejected the claim relating to the spouses’ joint bank account, finding the account was managed consistently with the parties’ longstanding intention that the spouse handle household finances.

However, the court found that the spouse and her parents wrongfully converted a WSIB cheque issued to the plaintiff by concealing the payment and depositing it into an account in the mother’s name.

The defendants’ claim that the funds represented compensation for caregiving services failed due to lack of contractual consideration and the equitable doctrine of clean hands.

Judgment was granted for the amount of the cheque plus modest punitive damages.

The respondents brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary a previous judgment to include a declaration that the applicant had abandoned a portion of a right-of-way on the respondents' property.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing the relief was not pleaded at trial.

The court found that the issue of the applicant's use of the right-of-way was fully canvassed at trial and that it was in the interest of justice to provide finality.

The court varied the judgment to declare the right-of-way abandoned, but granted the applicant an easement over a narrow strip to allow for inspection of her garage.

The appellants appealed a judgment deciding a matter by way of application, arguing that disputed facts precluded this procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while peripheral facts were disputed, the facts necessary to dispose of the application were not.

The court also granted leave to appeal the initial costs award, reducing it based on the proportionality principle, and awarded costs for the stay application and the appeal to the respondent.