Cheryl Letourneau

The moving party brought a motion for directions in the context of competing applications for the passing of accounts, seeking extensive additional financial disclosure from the responding party regarding their late parents' real estate and financial assets.

The responding party opposed, arguing the requests were disproportionate and that the moving party was delaying court-ordered mediation.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering specific disclosure regarding a $300,000 line of credit and cooperation on the sale of a foreign property, but denied the broader requests as disproportionate and directed the parties to proceed to mediation and set a date for the passing of accounts.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for damages arising from a sexual assault that occurred on December 4, 2017.

The defendant was convicted of the offence in February 2023 and sentenced to six years imprisonment.

The plaintiff claimed general and aggravated damages for sexual assault and battery, breach of privacy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and pecuniary damages including loss of competitive advantage and future care costs.

The defendant did not file responding affidavit material and the parties agreed the case was suitable for summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff entitled to damages and assessed general and aggravated damages at $225,000, loss of competitive advantage at $25,000, future care costs at $7,500, and an OHIP subrogated claim of $687.

The court also awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The decision addresses an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act in a defamation action brought by Prasanth Tella against A.B., his former partner.

The allegedly defamatory statements were made primarily to the Ottawa Police Service’s Professional Standards Section and to a few other individuals.

The court finds that most of the statements at issue relate to a matter of public interest, but some do not.

The court concludes that the statements made to the Professional Standards Section are protected by absolute privilege and that the plaintiff has not met the burden to show there are no valid defences.

The action is dismissed, with leave to bring a new action regarding certain statements if desired.

The court also grants an anonymity order and a publication ban regarding the defendant’s identity.

This costs endorsement follows a trial between family members over a life interest in a home.

The court found that Herminia Bada retained a life interest in the property, despite having signed an Acknowledgment and Direction removing it from title, as she did not understand the implications.

The court considered the conduct of the parties, including Herminia’s dishonesty about signing the document, and fixed costs at $45,000 in fees plus HST and $7,000 in disbursements, rather than the higher amount sought.

The court emphasized the importance of truthfulness and the principles governing costs awards.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of Patricia Graham's application to invalidate a will.

Katherine Blais, the successful respondent, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed Ms. Blais's costs at $22,000, reducing the requested amount of $30,700.

The decision considered Ms. Graham's conduct in unnecessarily lengthening the proceeding, the reasonableness of hourly rates for counsel of differing experience, and the exclusion of fees for inadequately explained non-lawyer timekeepers.

This case involved cross-applications concerning the distribution of fire insurance proceeds following significant damage to a shared property.

Bonny Bunda sought the release of approximately two-thirds of the funds held in trust, while Andrew Carry requested all funds be paid into court and a reference for distribution.

The court granted Bonny Bunda's application, ordering a specific amount released to her and the remainder paid into court for resolution in Small Claims Court.

The court determined that an email from Andrew Carry's counsel, stating his claim amount, was not a without prejudice communication and could be relied upon.

The applicant, Patricia Graham, sought to invalidate her late sister Sheila Mary McNally's 2020 will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and suspicious circumstances.

The respondent, Katherine Blais (estate trustee and beneficiary), moved to dismiss the application, arguing the applicant failed to meet the minimal evidentiary threshold.

The court found that the applicant's evidence was largely speculation and suspicion, failing to meet the required threshold to call the will's validity into question.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the application was dismissed in its entirety, with costs awarded against the applicant.

The Applicants sought full recovery costs ($27,557) after successfully obtaining a prescriptive easement in a prior application.

The Respondents agreed to costs but argued for partial indemnity.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found no basis for elevated costs, as there was no offer to settle under Rule 49.10 nor any sanction-worthy conduct by the Respondents.

Despite the importance and moderate complexity of the case, the court determined that all-inclusive partial indemnity costs in the fixed amount of $14,300 were fair and reasonable, dismissing the Applicants' request for full recovery.

The mother and daughter entered into an agreement where the mother transferred her property to the daughter but retained a life interest.

The daughter later required financing to renovate the property, and the bank required the life interest to be discharged.

The mother signed an acknowledgment and direction discharging her life interest.

Years later, the relationship broke down, and the daughter attempted to evict the mother and sell the property.

The court found that the discharge of the life interest was invalid due to undue influence, as the mother did not fully understand the consequences and did not receive independent legal advice.

The mother's life interest was declared valid, and the daughter was ordered to provide an accounting for funds managed while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend their Amended Statement of Claim to add particulars of the defendant minor's past antisocial behaviors, arguing relevance to the negligent supervision claim against the minor's parents.

The defendants opposed, arguing the proposed amendments constituted inadmissible similar fact evidence that would unduly complicate the litigation, prolong discovery, and invade the minor's privacy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the probative value of the proposed amendments was outweighed by the significant prejudice, complexity, and privacy concerns they would introduce, converting the trial into an inquiry about multiple past events rather than the specific altercation.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend her Amended Statement of Claim to re-add claims for aggravated damages and unpaid overtime wages, which had been previously removed by consent of her former counsel.

The defendant opposed, arguing abuse of process and non-compensable prejudice due to the expiry of limitation periods.

The court denied the motion, finding that allowing the amendments would constitute an abuse of process by resiling from a binding agreement and would cause non-compensable prejudice as the limitation period for the claims had expired.

The plaintiff, a police officer, sued his neighbours for intentional infliction of mental distress, defamation, nuisance, trespass, harassment, and malicious prosecution, stemming from years of escalating disputes including surveillance, false complaints to his employer, and a baseless peace bond application.

The court found the defendants liable for defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of mental distress, awarding the plaintiff $25,000 in general damages.

The court emphasized the flagrant and outrageous nature of the defendants' conduct, particularly their deliberate and continuous recording of the plaintiff, knowing his history of PTSD, and their malicious use of legal processes.

The plaintiff, Khris Paquette, sought an interim order for occupancy of his deceased mother's property or, alternatively, interim support from her estate.

The deceased's will left no provisions for the plaintiff, naming her brother as the sole beneficiary and estate trustee.

The court found that while the deceased was not providing direct support immediately before her death, a moral obligation existed for the estate to provide support due to the plaintiff's disabilities and limited income.

The request for interim occupancy was denied due to the plaintiff's history of destructive behavior and inability to live alone, and the potential for dissipating the estate's main asset.

However, the court granted interim financial support of $200 per month, finding a demonstrated need despite the plaintiff's lack of specific evidence on the amount sought.

Nathan Juneau, as Estate Trustee for his deceased wife Tracey Irene Juneau, applied to the court for advice regarding the matrimonial home's sale proceeds.

Nathan sought a determination that he and Tracey, though separated, were joint tenants in the home and its proceeds, entitling him to the full amount by survivorship.

The court found that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to sell the property and divide the net proceeds equally, along with other contemporaneous evidence, demonstrated an intention to sever the joint tenancy and create a tenancy in common.

Consequently, the court ruled that the remaining sale proceeds should be distributed equally between Nathan in his personal capacity and Tracey's estate.

The plaintiff Trustee brought a motion for summary judgment to set aside a conveyance of property from the bankrupt defendant to a close family friend for $1.

The transfer occurred less than three months before the defendant filed for bankruptcy and shortly after she was ordered to pay costs in estate litigation.

The court found the transfer was made at undervalue to a non-arm's length party with the intent to defeat or delay creditors.

The motion was granted, and the conveyance was declared void under section 96(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Roger J. dated January 5, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay costs of $4,000 to the responding party.

This case involved motions to interpret a trust declaration concerning the deceased's house, executed the day before her death.

The declaration transferred title to two sons as joint tenants, acknowledging the deceased or her estate as the beneficial owner.

The dispute centered on whether the house sale proceeds should be distributed equally among heirs as per the trust (respondents' view) or form part of the estate and be distributed according to the will (applicant's view), which contained a specific condition for one heir.

The court upheld the trust's validity, rejecting arguments of it being a testamentary disposition or a sham.

However, it ruled that the proceeds belonged to the estate and must be distributed according to the will, as the trust declaration did not specify an alternative distribution method.

The plaintiff, Mary Ann Lalonde, brought a motion to strike portions of the defendant Canadian Blood Services' statement of defence, specifically references to the 'plaintiff’s husband’s law firm,' arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The defendant argued these facts were material to the issue of repudiation of the employment contract.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding the references immaterial to the claim or defence and serving no legitimate purpose other than to diminish the plaintiff's claim and cast her and her counsel in a negative light.

The court also ordered the removal of gratuitous underlining from the statement of defence by consent.

The applicant sought to remove the respondent as the sole estate trustee of the Estate of Mary Sullivan, primarily due to concerns regarding the authentication, evaluation, and sale of the "Sanders Portrait" a painting purportedly of William Shakespeare valued at USD $50,000,000.

The applicant alleged the respondent lacked expertise, acted diligently, and engaged in improper conduct.

The court dismissed the application, finding no compelling evidence that the respondent's administration endangered the estate, emphasizing that a testator's choice of trustee should not be lightly interfered with.

Costs were awarded against the applicant on a substantial indemnity basis due to unsubstantiated grave accusations.

The appellant appealed an order made by an application judge concerning guardianship and property disputes.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in law by failing to provide any reasons for his decision, which rendered it incapable of appellate review.

Furthermore, the application judge breached procedural fairness by making orders on matters that were not requested in the pleadings and that contradicted a prior consent order, thereby violating the principle of res judicata.

The matter was remitted to a different judge.