Cheryl Letourneau

The Applicant, successful in an oppression application under the Canada Business Corporations Act, sought substantial indemnity costs after recovering a modest $14,555.34.

The court assessed the Applicant's costs outline, which included two offers to settle.

The first offer was deemed invalid for costs consequences under Rule 49.11 as it was not made to all jointly and severally liable defendants and was not unilaterally controllable.

The second offer, while made to both respondents, was structured in a way that required an ad hoc assessment of costs, making it difficult to determine if the result was better than the offer.

Emphasizing proportionality given the modest recovery and the significant costs incurred by the Applicant (including multiple lawyers), the court awarded a proportionate sum of $20,000, all inclusive, payable jointly and severally by the Respondents, significantly less than the Applicant's claim.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of McLean J. dated May 27, 2021.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the moving parties, payable at the discretion of the appeal panel.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to vary an Order for Assessment of a series of legal accounts delivered to the applicant estate trustees over a 12-year period.

The law firm argued the accounts were final and paid, while the client argued they were interim and thus assessable.

The court held that the older accounts, which related to completed matters and had been paid years prior, were final and not liable to assessment.

However, the more recent accounts relating to ongoing litigation were deemed interim and remained liable to assessment.

The Order for Assessment was varied accordingly.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a closely-held corporation operating a minor hockey tournament, sought an oppression remedy against the two other shareholders.

The respondents, dissatisfied with the applicant's performance, attempted to force him to sell his shares and subsequently dissolved the corporation to exclude him while continuing the business through a new entity.

The court found that the respondents breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation and acted oppressively by dissolving the corporation for the improper purpose of eliminating the applicant.

The court awarded the applicant special damages based on the agreed valuation formula and general damages for the oppressive conduct.

This case concerned the validity of Annie Doris Wotton's 2010 will, challenged by her son's litigation guardian on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity.

The applicant, a beneficiary and alternate estate trustee, sought to validate the will.

The court found suspicious circumstances, shifting the onus to the applicant to prove capacity.

After weighing a retrospective neuropsychological assessment against the contemporaneous solicitor's notes and testimony, the court concluded that the testatrix possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

The 2010 will was declared valid, and the applicant was named Estate Trustee.

The applicants requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed their human rights applications against the City of Ottawa and several neighbours.

The original decision found that the timely allegations had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed the remaining allegations for delay.

The Tribunal granted the reconsideration request in part, finding that the original decision was in conflict with Tribunal procedure because the Vice-chair had orally ruled at the preliminary hearing that there was no issue with timeliness, but then dismissed the applications as untimely without hearing submissions on the issue.

The reconsideration was granted solely on the issue of the timeliness of the allegations preceding July 29, 2013.

The estate trustees brought a motion to appoint an independent solicitor as Special Trustee of a Henson Trust established for a beneficiary with severe autism, after the institutional trustee named in the will declined the appointment.

The beneficiary's father brought a cross-motion seeking to be appointed as Special Trustee.

The court found that the testator deliberately chose an institutional trustee over the father to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure professional expertise.

The court appointed the independent solicitor as Special Trustee and ordered no costs, finding the father acted in good faith.

This decision addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion brought by the defendants, the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers, against the plaintiff Deana Rotondo.

Rotondo's action for false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches had been dismissed.

The defendants sought partial indemnity costs for the entire action, including the summary judgment motion.

The court found no reason to deviate from the general rule that the successful party on a summary judgment motion is entitled to costs of both the motion and the action.

The plaintiff's arguments regarding unnecessary delay by the defendants and the relevance of a cited case were rejected.

The court awarded the defendants costs in the amount of $16,721.30 plus post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sued the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent investigation, and breaches of her Charter rights following her arrest for keeping a bawdy house.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the plaintiff based on their investigation of her massage parlour.

Although a criminal court had previously excluded evidence due to a s. 8 Charter breach regarding the search warrant, the court held that the exclusion of evidence and subsequent dismissal of criminal charges adequately fulfilled the functional objectives of the Charter, making an award of damages inappropriate.

The court assessed costs following successful summary judgment motions by Hydro One Network and Sarah McMillan and Andrew Cauty against the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for each of the two combined actions.

The court found the claims not excessive in principle but reduced the total amount to account for duplication of services across the two actions, which were treated as one.

Costs were assessed at $9,000 for Hydro One and $9,000 for McMillan and Cauty, to be split equally between the Datta and Khan plaintiffs.

The court noted that a complete indemnity award might have been considered had the plaintiffs' motives been argued, given the claims were entirely devoid of merit.

The defendants, Hydro One and two neighbours, brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' actions.

The plaintiffs had erected a fence on city property, which the city later ordered removed.

The plaintiffs sued Hydro One for negligence regarding the location of underground services and the neighbours for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of mental distress based on complaints made to the city.

The court granted the motions, finding the claim against Hydro One was statute-barred and lacked merit, and the claim against the neighbours was devoid of merit as there was no evidence of intent to cause harm or damages.

The appellant, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, settled a tort claim for $800,000.

His former and current law firms claimed over $422,000 in fees and disbursements.

Facing severe financial pressure and acting without independent legal advice, the appellant entered into fee agreements and a consent order releasing the funds.

He later applied to have the accounts assessed under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction due to the consent order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the consent order, and directed an assessment, finding that the application judge erred in law and that special circumstances demanded the fee agreements be reopened to protect the vulnerable client and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The defendant police board and officers brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for false detention, false arrest, negligent investigation, and breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The claims arose after a search warrant was executed at the plaintiffs' residence, leading to the discovery of cocaine and evidence of importing prohibited stun guns.

The criminal charges were previously dismissed after the search was found to violate section 8 of the Charter.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for false arrest, false detention, and Charter breaches, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the cocaine found, and that Charter damages were inappropriate as the exclusion of evidence in the criminal trial was a sufficient remedy.

However, the court dismissed the summary judgment motion regarding the negligent investigation claim, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial to determine whether the plaintiff bears the burden of proving factual innocence to recover damages.

The applicant sought declaratory orders against his neighbours regarding the maintenance of an artificially raised property grade and an encroaching fence.

The court refused to grant the declarations, finding that they would serve no practical purpose as they merely repeated existing law and legislation.

The request to relocate the fence was also dismissed as partially moot, given the respondents had already removed most of it and undertook to remove the remaining posts.

This was a costs decision following a motion to strike in an action alleging sexual assault, sexual harassment, vicarious liability, and negligence against an employer and an individual defendant.

The court held that success on the underlying motion was mixed, but that the plaintiff had been more successful overall because key claims in vicarious liability for sexual assault and negligence survived.

Applying the general principle that costs follow the event together with the discretionary factors under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the plaintiff reduced costs fixed at $3,000.00 payable forthwith.

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claims of vicarious liability and negligence arising from an alleged sexual assault by a co-worker at an unsupervised staff party.

The court struck the claim for the independent tort of sexual harassment, as it is ousted by the Human Rights Code.

However, the court declined to strike the claims for vicarious liability and negligence, finding it was not plain and obvious that they had no reasonable prospect of success given the employer's role in hosting the party and providing alcohol.

The appellant parent appealed the school board's decision regarding the special education placement of his 17-year-old child, who is identified with autism and a developmental disability.

The student had not attended school for over two years.

While both parties agreed that a Senior Education for Community Living (ECL) class was appropriate, they disagreed on the location, the transition plan, and the partial integration component.

The Tribunal found it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite the lack of a Special Education Appeal Board decision, as the school board had failed to convene one.

The Tribunal ordered that the student be placed in a full-time congregated special education class (either ECL or Developmental Education) without mandatory partial integration at this time, following an expedited transition process.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for damages arising from a severe neural tube defect allegedly caused by exposure to TCE.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellants' expert theory of causation, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court confirmed that the exceptional material contribution test for causation from Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke did not apply, as the evidence established no association between TCE and the defect.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the dangerous driving conviction, including the appellant's speed and a prior warning from police not to drive.

The court also upheld the over 80 conviction, finding that a voluntary breath sample provided reasonable grounds for a search warrant to seize blood samples at the hospital.

The appeal was dismissed.