Christopher P. Morris

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment to recover $2.26 million ($2 million plus HST) owed under a promissory note arising from a share purchase agreement for a construction and development corporation.

The defendants opposed, asserting set-off defences and an $8.5 million counterclaim alleging breach of contract, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation related to cost overages on a construction project.

The court found no genuine issue for trial on the plaintiff's claim, holding the promissory note obligation was discrete and readily separable from the counterclaim.

Partial summary judgment was granted but execution was stayed on condition the judgment amount be paid into court within 45 days pending adjudication of the counterclaim.

The court considered an application by police officers Justin Lafleur and Rodney Degray to quash subpoenas issued by M.D. in the context of a mandamus application seeking to compel the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) to lay charges.

The court found that M.D. had not established that the officers were likely to have relevant, material, and admissible evidence for the judicial review.

The application to quash the subpoenas was granted, as the evidence sought did not fall within the recognized exceptions for admitting new evidence on judicial review.

The court considered the appropriate costs order following an application in which the applicant, Kristine McGinn, obtained injunctive relief against the respondents, including Stephen Bleeker and Assurance Home Care.

The court determined that costs should be payable forthwith on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the applicant’s request for substantial indemnity costs and her request that costs be awarded against Mr. Bleeker personally.

The court fixed costs at $47,769.39, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid within 30 days.

The court granted the motion of Sicotte Guilbault LLP and Joseph Marcel Denis Sicotte to strike the statement of claim against them, without leave to amend, and dismissed the action.

The plaintiff, Dean Henderson, alleged fraudulent conveyance, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment in relation to the transfer of assets from Amega Holdings (Barbados) Inc. and Aubrey de Young to the Sicotte defendants.

The court found that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the Sicotte defendants, as the pleadings were bald, conclusory, and lacked material facts.

The court also found that the statutory causes of action under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Assignments and Preferences Act could not be made out against the Sicotte defendants, and that the conspiracy and unjust enrichment claims were not properly pleaded.

Leave to amend was denied.

The applicant, Kristine McGinn, sought an interim injunction to restore her status as an employee, officer, and director of Assurance Home Care Inc., and to refer her claims against the respondents to arbitration.

The respondent, Stephen Bleeker, had unilaterally terminated McGinn's employment and sought to remove her from the board, revoking her access to company resources.

The court found it had jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in aid of arbitration and determined the injunction sought was prohibitive.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding Bleeker's authority to terminate McGinn unilaterally, and that McGinn would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted, as it would diminish the prospect of a shotgun/buy-sell order remedy.

The balance of convenience favoured preserving the status quo prior to the alleged breach.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit statements made by the defendant, Moesha Woodley, during police interactions on February 25, 2021, and following her arrest on March 25, 2021, in a human trafficking investigation.

The court applied the voluntariness rule, considering factors such as threats, promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

The court found that the statements from both dates were made voluntarily and were admissible, dismissing the defence's arguments regarding inadequate caution, alleged trickery, inducements, and the defendant's health concerns.

This motion concerned the disclosure of documents from a solicitor's file related to an estate, with the defendants claiming solicitor-client and litigation privilege.

The plaintiff sought disclosure or court inspection to determine the validity of the privilege claims.

The court ordered certain documents to be produced for judicial inspection, specifically those where the claim for privilege was dubious or where the parties' interests might not have been adverse at the time of creation.

However, the court upheld the privilege claims for other documents, finding that the parties were clearly adverse in interest when those communications were made, thus dismissing the balance of the plaintiff's motion for those documents.

The applicant sought a declaration that his mother and sister were not appointed directors of the respondent corporation in 2005, and that his mother did not purchase shares during a corporate restructuring.

He also sought rectification of corporate documents under s. 250 of the OBCA.

The court dismissed the application, finding that despite missing and unexecuted documents, the parties' subsequent conduct and other documentary evidence established a valid share transfer and director appointments.

The applicant failed to meet the test for rectification, as he could not prove a prior agreement that differed from the existing corporate records.

The moving party was defrauded of $318,235.80 when a fraudulent email directed payment owed to a contractor into a new bank account.

After obtaining an initial Norwich order and freezing funds at a bank, the moving party traced the remaining funds to additional bank accounts.

The moving party brought an ex parte motion for a further order freezing the traced funds and requiring the target financial institutions to disclose information about the transfers.

The court granted the targeted freezing order and Norwich order, noting the funds appeared to be the property of the moving party.

This anti-SLAPP motion sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim by Iron Horse Corporation and Robin St. Martin in the "Yates Action" and a separate action (the "St. Martin Action") for malicious prosecution and defamation against Robin Yates and Larry Yates.

The court found that the Yates' expressions related to matters of public interest, including gendered harassment by a powerful individual and the functioning of the justice system.

While the defamation counterclaim in the Yates Action was found to have substantial merit and was not dismissed due to the ongoing litigation, the St. Martin Action was dismissed.

The court concluded that the St. Martin Action lacked substantial merit, particularly the malicious prosecution claims, and was primarily strategic, with the public interest favoring its dismissal.

The applicant sought to remove the respondent as the sole estate trustee of the Estate of Mary Sullivan, primarily due to concerns regarding the authentication, evaluation, and sale of the "Sanders Portrait," a painting purportedly of William Shakespeare valued at USD $50,000,000.

The applicant alleged the respondent lacked expertise, acted diligently, and engaged in improper conduct.

The court dismissed the application, finding no compelling evidence that the respondent's administration endangered the estate, emphasizing that a testator's choice of trustee should not be lightly interfered with.

Costs were awarded against the applicant on a substantial indemnity basis due to unsubstantiated grave accusations.

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence imposed on the respondent for various drug offences, including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge made fundamental errors in sentencing.

These errors included misidentifying the sentencing range for mid-level cocaine traffickers, erroneously comparing it to fentanyl, misapprehending the gravity of the offence, and overemphasizing the mitigating effect of the guilty plea.

The appellate court emphasized that fentanyl is a more dangerous drug requiring higher penalties and that the weight of a guilty plea varies by case circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to six years.

This is a costs decision following an application where the applicant largely succeeded in obtaining declaratory relief regarding an unrestricted right of way, despite overreaching in other claims.

The respondents' unreasonable legal position necessitated the application.

The court found that costs should follow the event, entitling the applicant to costs, but declined to award substantial indemnity due to the applicant's overreaching and abandoned claims.

Costs were fixed at $20,000.00, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable by the respondents.

This case involved a dispute between neighbours over the use and scope of a registered right of way over the respondents' laneway, which provided access to the applicant's property.

The applicant sought declaratory relief to affirm her rights, while the respondents sought to limit the right of way's use and alleged overburdening.

The court clarified that the right of way was a general right of access for the owner and authorized guests, not personal, and that neither party could unreasonably obstruct it.

Damages were denied due to insufficient evidence and both parties having taken unreasonable positions.

This summary trial addressed the plaintiff landlord's claim for damages following the defendant tenant's wrongful repudiation of a commercial lease.

The court determined whether the landlord took reasonable steps to mitigate his losses after the tenant vacated the premises early and calculated the damages owed.

The court found that the landlord's mitigation efforts were reasonable given the local market conditions and awarded damages for unpaid rent, the present value of the rent differential with a new tenant, and interest.

Capcorp Planning (2003) Inc. sold a health and welfare plan (HWP) that provided coverage for health, dental, vision, and hearing care, as well as protection against income loss due to illness or accident.

The plan was particularly attractive to owner-managers of small businesses who could not obtain equivalent coverage through traditional insurance due to pre-existing medical conditions.

The Minister of Revenue assessed Capcorp for failure to collect and remit retail sales tax (RST) on amounts paid by employers under the HWP, imposing a penalty of $278,625.31 including interest.

The Superior Court of Justice quashed the assessment, finding that the HWP was not subject to RST because participants could not obtain equivalent insurance coverage.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the HWP constitutes an "unfunded benefits plan" under the Retail Sales Tax Act and is therefore subject to RST.

The court found that the statutory definition focuses on whether protection against risk "could otherwise be obtained" through insurance generally, not whether specific individuals could obtain such coverage.

This motion for judgment involved a landlord's claim for damages following a tenant's early vacation of premises.

The landlord sought rental arrears and prospective losses.

The tenant argued a material breach by the landlord due to inadequate parking.

The court found the tenant wrongfully repudiated the lease, entitling the landlord to agreed-upon rental arrears.

However, the landlord's claim for lost future rent was deemed to require a summary trial due to insufficient evidence on present value, actual rental value, and mitigation efforts.

No costs were awarded due to divided success.

The accused pleaded guilty to careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario.

While operating a minivan in a residential area near a park and children's playground, the accused failed to stop at a red light and stop bar at the intersection of McRae Drive and Millwood Road in Toronto.

The accused struck and killed a six-year-old pedestrian who had the right of way in the crosswalk.

The court imposed a non-custodial sentence of a $2,000 fine, a two-year driving prohibition, and two years of probation with 200 hours of community service, balancing the grave consequences of the offence against the accused's reduced moral culpability for careless (rather than dangerous) driving.