Alyssa Tomkins

The applicants challenged the validity of powers of attorney and wills executed by their elderly parents in April and December 2017, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the respondent son.

The court found that while the parents did not lack testamentary capacity, the December 2017 wills were procured through the respondent's undue influence.

The evidence demonstrated a pattern of coercion, isolation, and manipulation by the respondent, who controlled access to the parents and fabricated allegations against the applicants.

The December 2017 wills were set aside, and the respondent was ordered to pass his accounts for the period he acted as attorney for property.

The applicants sought interim relief in an estate dispute, including leave to pass accounts for an attorney for property, production of bank records, and permission to visit Michael Dawson (101 years old).

The respondents opposed some relief and sought to strike an exhibit from an affidavit.

The court, through extensive discussion, facilitated the parties' agreement on most interim issues.

The court ordered the amendment of the title of proceeding to properly constitute Josephine Dawson's estate, granted leave for the applicants to bring a motion to pass accounts, ordered the production of bank records, and permitted the applicants to visit Michael Dawson under supervision.

The court also struck an exhibit from Sheila Dawson's affidavit and adjourned the motion to strike related paragraphs.

The court emphasized the need for parties to resolve procedural matters collaboratively and warned about the costs of estate litigation.

The appellant, a judgment creditor, appealed the dismissal of its application seeking a declaration of fraudulent conveyance and damages for unlawful conduct conspiracy against the respondents.

The appellant alleged that the transfer of shares by the debtor to Capital Dentistry Group Limited was a fraudulent conveyance and part of an unlawful conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no fraudulent intent, noting that the transaction was initiated by an arm's length party, structured consistently with past deals, and occurred as part of a larger acquisition.

As fraudulent intent was not established, the essential element of unlawful conduct for the conspiracy claim failed.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator breached procedural fairness by applying the doctrine of res judicata to prevent a limitation defence against a particularized counterclaim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found that the arbitrator's decision was a substantive legal one, not a procedural unfairness, and that the arbitration agreement precluded appeals on questions of law.

The application to set aside the award was dismissed.

Five non-rights holder parents applied to the Minister to exercise discretion to admit their children to a French first language education program in the Northwest Territories, with the support of the francophone school board.

The Minister denied each application, finding the parents did not meet the categories established in the ministerial directive.

The SCC held that the Minister was required not only to consider s. 23 of the Charter but to conduct a proportionate balancing of the values underlying that provision — including preservation and development of the minority language community — against the government's interests.

Applying the Doré framework, the Court found the decisions unreasonable because the Minister gave disproportionate weight to consistency and cost, and insufficient weight to pedagogical requirements and the remedial purpose of s. 23.

The appeal was allowed and the Court of Appeal orders set aside.

This anti-SLAPP motion sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim by Iron Horse Corporation and Robin St. Martin in the "Yates Action" and a separate action (the "St. Martin Action") for malicious prosecution and defamation against Robin Yates and Larry Yates.

The court found that the Yates' expressions related to matters of public interest, including gendered harassment by a powerful individual and the functioning of the justice system.

While the defamation counterclaim in the Yates Action was found to have substantial merit and was not dismissed due to the ongoing litigation, the St. Martin Action was dismissed.

The court concluded that the St. Martin Action lacked substantial merit, particularly the malicious prosecution claims, and was primarily strategic, with the public interest favoring its dismissal.

The applicant, a judgment creditor owed over $1.5 million by the respondent dentist, brought an application alleging that the respondent and others conspired to fraudulently convey his interest in several dental practices to a third-party corporation.

The applicant sought damages and a declaration that the sale was a conspiracy by unlawful means.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the sale was initiated by an arm's-length purchaser prior to the judgment, the consideration was consistent with standard industry practices, and there was no intent to defeat, hinder, delay, or defraud the applicant.

The respondents (Xus) brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the applicant's (Morven Construction) defamation application.

Morven sought an interim and permanent injunction against the Xus for defaming their quarry operation through signs, social media, and flyers.

The court found that Morven successfully met both the "substantial merit" and "no valid defence" hurdles, and that the public interest in allowing the defamation proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the Xus' expression, which was based on minimal investigation and characterized as strongly held personal opinion presented as fact.

The motion to dismiss was denied, allowing Morven's defamation lawsuit to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought a declaration that a right of first refusal (ROFR) on her property was extinguished and an order for its removal from title.

The ROFR was triggered by a third-party offer, which the respondent exercised but then failed to complete.

The court interpreted the ROFR clause and common law principles, concluding that the ROFR was extinguished once exercised, even if the transaction was not completed, as the clause did not provide for reinstatement in such circumstances.

The application was granted, and the ROFR was ordered removed from title.

The moving party brought an urgent motion for the production of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) under Rule 30.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was referred to in the responding party's affidavits.

The underlying application sought to extinguish a right of first refusal held by the moving party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the APS was not incorporated by reference into the affidavits.

Furthermore, the court exercised its discretion to deny production, concluding the APS was not relevant to the core issue of the application and its disclosure could prejudice the responding party due to commercial sensitivity.

The City of Brockville appealed an application judge's order that set aside three arbitral awards and appointed a new arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by characterizing questions of mixed fact and law as extricable questions of law and by misapplying procedural fairness principles under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court emphasized the narrow basis for setting aside arbitral awards and the caution required in extricating questions of law from contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed, reinstating the arbitrator's original awards.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a dispute between appellant investors and a respondent trustee in bankruptcy of a failed financial company involved in a Ponzi scheme.

The main appeal was dismissed, and the trustee's cross-appeal was allowed in part.

The trustee sought $85,000 in partial indemnity costs, citing case complexity and novelty of arguments.

The appellants argued this was excessive, proposing $30,000.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court considered the trustee's partial success on the cross-appeal and the disparity in costs, ultimately awarding the trustee $40,000, all inclusive.

The appellant law society brought disciplinary proceedings against a member lawyer in 2012, resulting in a finding of guilt on four charges and disbarment in 2019.

The respondent applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of inordinate delay amounting to an abuse of process; the Hearing Committee dismissed the application but the Court of Appeal granted the stay, setting aside the penalty.

The Supreme Court clarified the three-step test from Blencoe for determining whether administrative delay constitutes an abuse of process: the delay must be inordinate, it must have directly caused significant prejudice, and a final assessment must find the delay manifestly unfair or otherwise bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court also held that in statutory appeals, questions of procedural fairness and abuse of process are subject to appellate standards of review, not the correctness standard applicable on judicial review.

Applying these principles, the majority found no palpable and overriding error in the Hearing Committee's conclusions that the delay was not inordinate and that no significant prejudice was established, and accordingly allowed the appeal.

The trustee in bankruptcy of a company that operated a Ponzi scheme brought actions against investors to recover usurious interest and commission payments.

The trial judge ordered repayment of preferences and usurious interest, finding the investors knew or ought to have known the returns were too good to be true.

On appeal, the investors argued the claims were statute-barred and that the corporate attribution doctrine should impute the fraudster's knowledge to the company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that public policy grounds justified exercising discretion not to apply the corporate attribution doctrine, as doing so would perversely allow fraudsters to benefit at the expense of legitimate creditors.

The trustee's cross-appeal was allowed in part, including findings that referral agreements were illegal contracts at common law and that certain defendants were not entitled to dividends until other creditors were satisfied.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for the appeal and the proceeding below.

The respondent disputed the amount claimed for disbursements, specifically the fees of the appellant's experts.

The Court of Appeal held that expert fees are subject to a reasonableness test and reduced the claimed disbursements, noting the experts were not called to testify and their fees were significantly higher than those of the respondent's experts.

The court awarded the appellant fixed costs for both the appeal and the proceeding below.

The City of Ottawa appealed a trial judgment that found it liable for negligent misrepresentation to Charlesfort Developments Limited.

Charlesfort claimed the City failed to accurately inform it about a water main in an easement during a rezoning process, leading to significant project delays and increased costs for a condominium development.

The Court of Appeal allowed the City's appeal, holding that the City did not owe Charlesfort a private law duty of care.

The Court clarified that the City's undertaking in processing a rezoning application was to fulfill its statutory duty in the public interest, not to protect the developer's economic interests or assure project viability.

The McKillips, successful defendants in a motion to strike, sought substantial indemnity costs against the plaintiff Trustee in Bankruptcy.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis for the period when fraud allegations were pleaded and partial indemnity thereafter, totaling $42,836.

The court found the fraud allegations, even if later clarified, warranted enhanced costs due to their serious nature and the Trustee's recklessness in pleading them without sufficient particulars.

The court also ruled that the costs should be paid by the Estate, or personally by the Trustee if the Estate lacked funds, rejecting the Trustee's argument for set-off against amounts owed by Susan McKillip in a separate unjust enrichment action.

The defendants brought a second motion to strike the plaintiff's re-amended statement of claim in an action arising from a Ponzi scheme.

The court found that the plaintiff had addressed the deficiencies identified in a previous decision regarding the damages claimed against most defendants.

However, the court struck the claim against two defendants (the McKillips) without leave to amend, finding no material facts were pleaded to establish a duty of care.

The court also held that the defendants were precluded from raising new arguments about the duty of care that they could have raised on their first motion to strike, as serial attacks on a pleading constitute an abuse of process.

The moving party sought costs following a successful motion to be appointed as her husband's litigation guardian.

She sought substantial indemnity costs against two respondents due to their counsel's failure to communicate, and partial indemnity costs against the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) for opposing the motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs against the respondents, finding their counsel's conduct unprofessional but not warranting an elevated scale.

The court also awarded partial indemnity costs against the PGT, rejecting its argument for presumptive immunity as a statutory agency and finding it had pursued meritless arguments.

The moving party sought to be appointed as the litigation guardian for her husband, whose capacity was at issue in a proceeding challenging the validity of powers of attorney and wills.

The Public Guardian and Trustee opposed the appointment, arguing that section 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 rendered a litigation guardian unnecessary.

The court held that section 3 counsel and a litigation guardian serve complementary roles, and that appointing a litigation guardian was appropriate to safeguard the husband's legal interests.

The moving party was appointed as litigation guardian, as she had no disqualifying conflict of interest.