Gary W. Tranmer

The offenders, a mother and father, were convicted of multiple offences against their children.

Both were convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against their young daughter.

The mother was also convicted of one count of assault against a son.

The father was convicted of 10 counts of physical assault and one count of uttering a threat against five of the children.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The mother was sentenced to a global term of 6 years' imprisonment.

The father was sentenced to a global term of 8 years' imprisonment.

Ancillary orders including DNA, weapons prohibitions, SOIRA, and s. 161 orders were also imposed.

Following a summary judgment motion with divided success between the plaintiff and Sun Life, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The court awarded costs to CHEO on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $20,000 plus HST and disbursements, finding the hours claimed to be excessive.

No costs were awarded between the plaintiff and Sun Life as both parties failed on their respective summary judgment motions.

The plaintiff sued her former employer and long-term disability insurer, alleging they negligently misrepresented her options and wrongfully induced her to resign rather than continue her disability benefits.

The employer and insurer both brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted the employer's motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the plaintiff's resignation and termination of employment, which fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the collective agreement's arbitration provisions.

However, the court dismissed the insurer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the insurer improperly maintained a singular focus on returning the plaintiff to a workplace environment that caused her disability.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit similar fact evidence across multiple counts in a multi-count indictment involving allegations of physical and sexual abuse by parents against their children.

The court reviews the legal principles governing similar fact evidence, including the need for the Crown to clearly articulate the evidence, issues, and purposes for which such evidence is proffered, and the requirement that its probative value outweigh any prejudicial effect.

The court also considers the timing and form of the Crown's application, the potential for collusion or inadvertent tainting among witnesses, and the appropriate instructions to the trier of fact.

Ultimately, the court finds that the probative value of the similar fact evidence is high and the prejudice is low, granting the Crown's application to admit the evidence across counts.

The court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a personal injury action arising from a 2015 motor vehicle collision.

The defendant argued the action was statute-barred, but the court found the limitation period did not begin to run until the plaintiff received a diagnosis in July 2020 that clarified the severity and cause of her injuries.

The court held that the plaintiff acted diligently and that there was not a sufficient body of evidence to support a claim until the feedback session with Dr. Day.

The action was therefore commenced in time.

This costs decision in an estate litigation matter addresses the modern approach to costs in estate proceedings.

The court reviews the principles from Sawdon Estate v. Watch Tower and Salter v. Salter Estate, emphasizing that costs are generally to be paid by the unsuccessful party, with the estate indemnifying the estate trustee for any shortfall.

The court finds that both parties acted reasonably in litigating the issue of a holograph will, and orders that all parties' costs be paid out of the estate, balancing fairness, proportionality, and access to justice.

The applicant sought to validate a purported holograph will that bequeathed the deceased's home and contents to her, effectively disinheriting her other children, contrary to previous wills.

The court found suspicious circumstances, including the complete lack of evidence regarding the will's creation, the significant change from prior wills, and the deceased's declining cognitive function.

The applicant failed to discharge the onus of proving the deceased's testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval of the document.

The application was dismissed.

This decision concerns a voir dire on the admissibility of an expert report in an application to determine the validity of a holograph will.

The applicant sought to validate a 2016 holograph will, while the respondents argued the deceased lacked testamentary capacity, asserting a 2012 lawyer-prepared will was the only lawful one.

The respondents retained a geriatric psychiatrist, Dr. Hermann, to provide an opinion on the deceased's testamentary capacity and susceptibility to undue influence.

The applicant challenged the report's admissibility under the Mohan test, arguing it was not necessary and that Dr. Hermann was not qualified or impartial.

The court found the report necessary to understand complex medical concepts and that Dr. Hermann was qualified and impartial, ruling the expert report admissible.

The Crown brought a voir dire application under R. v. Khan to admit an audio recording of a child, M., disclosing alleged sexual abuse by her parents.

The court found that while the necessity criterion for hearsay admissibility was met, the reliability criterion was not.

Factors undermining reliability included the absence of confirmation of M.'s understanding of the importance of telling the truth, the inability to assess her demeanor (audio only), lack of contemporaneous cross-examination, incomplete disclosure of prior statements, and evidence of potential influence or motive to lie.

The court also exercised its discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial value outweighing its probative value, given that other reasonable inferences could be drawn from the child's statement.

The application was dismissed, and the audio recording was deemed inadmissible.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion brought by the defendant.

The court considered the defendant's reasonable offer to settle (Rule 49.10) and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) for fixing costs.

Despite the defendant's success, the court found the hours claimed by defence counsel to be excessive for a non-complex matter.

Balancing the indemnity principle with access to justice, the court fixed costs at $3500.00 plus HST and disbursements, with a deduction for a retainer already paid by the plaintiff.

The applicant, Kasheen Wilson, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging violations of his Section 8 (unreasonable search) and Section 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The Crown conceded a breach of the Section 10(b) right due to a significant delay in facilitating access to counsel at the police station.

The court found the Section 10(b) breach to be moderate to serious but its impact on the accused's interests minimal, as no evidence was elicited during the delay and he eventually spoke to counsel.

Regarding the Section 8 claim concerning a strip search, the court found no breach, concluding that the search was conducted with reasonable grounds and minimal deviation from guidelines.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application to exclude evidence, finding that its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the serious nature of the charges (fentanyl trafficking, weapons) and the minimal impact of the Charter breaches on the accused's rights.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff had sued the lawyer for breach of contract, false advertising, and breach of privilege after the lawyer withdrew his services regarding provincial offences charges.

The court found it plain and obvious that the claims could not succeed, as the lawyer had good reason to withdraw under the retainer agreement and gave ample notice.

The court also found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the plaintiff's history of similar proceedings against justice sector participants.

The statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed without leave to amend.

The Crown brought a mid-trial application (voir dire) to determine the admissibility of observations made by S.O., an aunt/caregiver, regarding the behaviour of four child complainants (M., G., L., and H.).

These observations were made months after the children were removed from their parents' care and after the father's arrest.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to allow the court to draw common sense inferences confirming the children's accounts of abuse.

The defence opposed, arguing the observations lacked a temporal nexus to the alleged abuse, were inadmissible hearsay/expert evidence, and were not relevant as narrative.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the observations were inadmissible as they lacked a sufficient temporal connection to the alleged abuse and did not qualify as narrative evidence without expert testimony to establish a causal link.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.

The offender had pleaded guilty to criminal harassment, defamatory libel, and other offences against a former domestic partner.

The court found that the offender's conduct constituted a serious personal injury offence and that he posed a threat to the mental well-being of others due to a pattern of repetitive behaviour that he was unable to restrain.

The court concluded that the offender's risk was intractable and that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment.

The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (Dominion) sought equitable contribution from Bay of Quinte Mutual Insurance Company (BOQM) for defence costs in an underlying claim.

The underlying claim involved allegations of negligent construction (covered by Dominion's policy from 2010-2013) and negligent misrepresentation by the vendors (covered by BOQM's homeowner's policy from 2020-2021).

Dominion had undertaken to defend the construction claims but explicitly excluded vendor-related allegations and property damage outside its policy period.

The court dismissed Dominion's application, finding that Dominion had no right to equitable contribution because its defence coverage was limited to claims within its policy period, and the risks covered by the two insurers were distinct and did not overlap in a manner that would trigger equitable contribution.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion where the Defendants were wholly successful and beat their offer to settle under Rule 49.

The court found the Defendants' claimed hours excessive for a straightforward, non-complex motion and fixed costs at $3,750.00, inclusive of HST, payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendants.

The decision emphasizes proportionality and reasonableness in costs awards.

The Crown sought to admit 17 video-recorded police statements from 7 child complainants under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a sexual assault, assault, and threatening trial.

The defence objected on grounds of unreasonable delay, lack of description of acts, and suggestive questioning leading to tainting.

The court reviewed the purpose of s. 715.1, the "reasonable time" requirement, and factors affecting admissibility, including the "Archer principle" for prolonged abuse.

The court admitted some statements in part, but excluded others, particularly the 2021 statements concerning sexual misconduct, due to concerns about tainting from third-party influence (relatives, CAS) and highly leading/suggestive police questioning that undermined the truth-seeking function and proper administration of justice.

The plaintiff, a franchisee, brought an urgent motion seeking a stay of a prior decision denying injunctive relief and a mandatory injunction to restore possession of the franchise premises, pending leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The franchisor had locked out the plaintiff after the initial injunction motion was dismissed.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, determining that the Divisional Court, as the court to which leave to appeal was being sought, was the proper forum for such interim orders under section 134(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The court issued a costs endorsement following a determination of claims and counterclaims.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and access to justice, and considering Rule 57 factors, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants.

The court found the defendants' claimed hours and rates excessive compared to the plaintiff's counsel, fixing fees at $30,000 plus HST and disbursements at $3957.74, payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend her Statement of Claim to proceed under Simplified Procedure, limiting her claim to $200,000.

The primary issue on the motion was whether the defendants were entitled to costs thrown away due to the amendment, and if so, the timing and quantum of such costs.

The court found that Rule 76.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandated the payment of costs unnecessarily incurred by the opposing party up to the date of the amendment.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants $8,000 all-inclusive for costs thrown away, calculated on a substantial indemnity basis, and declined to defer the decision to the trial judge.