Gary W. Tranmer

The applicant, Timothy Allan Wood, challenged the decision of the acting Warden of Joyceville Institution to reclassify him to medium security risk and involuntarily transfer him to Collins Bay, a medium security institution, via an application for habeas corpus.

The court found a critical inconsistency between the correctional authorities' claim of relying on "believed reliable source information" and testimony that no reliability assessment was conducted for inmate sources.

Citing *Mission Institution v. Khela*, the court determined that the record did not meet the principles for reliable evidence, rendering the reclassification and transfer decision unlawful.

The application was granted.

The applicant, identifying as Grand Chief of the Kinakwii indigenous people, brought a habeas corpus application seeking to stay ongoing Criminal Code proceedings and discharge his bail recognizance.

He argued that due to a broader indigenous land claim, he is not subject to the laws of Canada.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the pending land claim does not negate the jurisdiction of the Criminal Code over alleged criminal activity in Canada, and the Crown met its onus to prove the deprivation of liberty was lawful.

The applicant, an inmate, challenged the Warden's decision to reclassify him from medium to maximum security and involuntarily transfer him, via an application for habeas corpus.

The applicant argued the decisions were unreasonable and procedurally unfair due to insufficient disclosure and improper gisting of information under s. 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and Commissioner's Directive 701.

The court reviewed a sealed affidavit and found that the prison authorities strictly complied with disclosure obligations and procedural fairness principles as outlined in Mission Institution v. Khela.

The court also found the reclassification and transfer decision to be reasonable, falling within the range of acceptable outcomes and supported by the record, deferring to the expertise of prison authorities.

The application for habeas corpus was dismissed.

Braebury Development Corporation appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding two issues: the proration of an insurance premium and the validity of a steel audit report used to justify a price reduction in a purchase agreement.

The appeal court dismissed both grounds of appeal.

It found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision to prorate the insurance premium.

On the steel audit issue, the court affirmed that the "Christmas Steel Report" did not constitute a "thorough audit" as required by the purchase agreement, and therefore, Braebury was not entitled to the claimed price reduction.

The court determined the issue of costs following a decision on spousal support where the applicant secured support for a further seven years and the respondent secured an end date.

Finding this to be a case of divided success where neither party achieved an outcome more favourable than their offer to settle, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The Crown applied to have the respondent designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration following his convictions for sexual assault, fraudulent personation, and multiple breaches of a long-term supervision order.

The respondent conceded that he met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation but argued for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order, relying on his recently discovered Aboriginal heritage and the availability of culturally sensitive programming.

The court found that the respondent's Aboriginal heritage did not impact his moral blameworthiness and that there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public given his high risk to reoffend, his history of deception, and his poor response to past treatment.

The respondent was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration.

The plaintiff moved for leave to deliver and file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim to add the Ottawa Police Services Board as a defendant and expand on allegations against the RCMP.

The defendants opposed the amendment and alternatively moved to strike portions of it for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted leave to amend the claim, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

However, the court struck several paragraphs of the proposed amended claim, including a statute-barred claim against the police board and Charter claims unsupported by pleaded facts, while allowing claims for negligent investigation and harassment to proceed.

The appellant appealed her summary convictions for assaulting her two children.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred by admitting a letter she wrote to her daughter, by applying different standards to the credibility assessments of the accused and the complainant, and by misapplying the W. (D.) test.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the trial judge applied the correct test for admitting the letter, did not apply different standards to credibility, and correctly applied the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the totality of the evidence rather than treating the case as a mere credibility contest.

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, brought an application for habeas corpus to challenge his involuntary transfer from Bath Institution to Collins Bay Institution.

The transfer occurred after prison authorities discovered he was involved in an inappropriate relationship with the prison chaplain.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that the transfer between two medium-security institutions constituted a significant reduction in his residual liberty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80', arguing his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police failed to facilitate contact with his lawyer of choice at the roadside.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by focusing solely on the appellant's due diligence without first determining whether the police had fulfilled their initial implementation duties under s. 10(b).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

This decision addresses costs following a successful motion by the defendants.

The defendants sought costs, but their Rule 49 offer was not strictly compliant with timing requirements.

The court found the time expended by the defendants' counsel to be excessive.

Ultimately, the court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, fixed at $3,300.00 for fees plus HST and $507.66 for disbursements, emphasizing the importance of reasonable expectations and a fit and just award.

The applicant, Steven Forster, sought a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid and relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, challenging the validity of his 1988 dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued jurisdictional errors by the trial court, including lack of notice, unlawful psychiatric remand, absence from court, and the trial judge's failure to exercise discretion.

The respondent, Attorney General of Canada, moved to strike the application, arguing it was a collateral attack on a decision previously appealed and that the court should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction where an appellate route was available.

The court found that the challenges raised by the applicant were available to him during his 1995 appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had upheld the indeterminate sentence and implicitly the dangerous offender finding.

Distinguishing the case from precedents like *R. v. Gamble* and *Gallichon v. Canada*, where applicants challenged ongoing deprivation of liberty due to changes in law, the court concluded that Forster's application was an attempt to circumvent appeal rights already exercised.

The respondent's motion to dismiss the application was granted.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship for adoption of the child A.P.E. The mother, as appellant, presented fresh evidence of improved parenting and a new support plan.

The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to apply the full two-pronged test for summary judgment as outlined in Hryniak v. Mauldin, and by not considering less disruptive alternatives to Crown wardship.

The appeal was granted, the Crown wardship order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The court also directed the Children's Aid Society to renew access and engage in concurrent planning.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, arguing it failed to disclose a cause of action for ownership or vesting of cottage land.

The court found the statement of claim did not sufficiently plead the requirements for a gift, nor did it allege trust, proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment, or detrimental reliance.

Given the pleadings, particularly the deceased's stated intention not to convey due to tax liability, the court concluded it was plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiffs' claims could not succeed as pleaded.

The defendants' motion was granted.

The appellant, Ming Ning Karl Zhao, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault.

He raised three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's psychological state, and an unreasonable verdict for unlawful confinement.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that while the trial judge's comments were at times inappropriate, they did not demonstrate bias.

The court also concluded there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the evidence supported the unlawful confinement conviction.

The defendant employee moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff employer's claim seeking to enforce a Confidentiality, Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement.

The employee argued the agreement was unenforceable due to lack of consideration and duress, and that the non-competition clause was overly broad.

The court granted the motion, finding that the employer provided no fresh consideration when it required the employee to sign the agreement years after his employment began.

The court also found the non-competition clause to be an unreasonable restraint of trade due to its broad temporal and spatial features.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for general damages, a catastrophic impairment designation, and income replacement benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for general damages and catastrophic impairment, finding no evidence to support the bad faith claim and no expert evidence establishing that the plaintiff met the statutory definition of catastrophic impairment.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding income replacement benefits, finding that conflicting medical evidence about whether the plaintiff's seizure disorder and cognitive decline were caused by the accident or a pre-existing condition created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff, a former insurance producer, sued DLK Insurance Brokers Ltd. and its partners for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, claiming he was promised an ownership interest in the business.

The defendants denied any such agreement and counterclaimed for a deficit in the plaintiff's commissions and damages for soliciting clients after his resignation.

The court found the plaintiff not credible, dismissed his claims for lack of a proven contract or unjust enrichment, and also dismissed the defendants' counterclaims for the commission deficit (due to forgiveness) and lost business (due to insufficient evidence of solicitation by the plaintiff alone).

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court considered disputed counts arising from an accused's conduct while subject to a long term supervision order at a community correctional centre.

The Crown proved that the accused used multiple cell phones and text-message deception to impersonate a real person known to the complainant, thereby inducing her to agree to sexual intercourse she would not otherwise have permitted.

The court also accepted the complainant's evidence that she was drugged and sexually assaulted in a hotel room, and that additional non-consensual sexual touching occurred during a later arranged sexual encounter whose scope had been strictly limited.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the principle that delayed disclosure does not undermine credibility, the court convicted on the disputed counts and confirmed guilt on the conceded supervision-order breaches.

The court issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent on appeal sought costs of $8,218.80.

The court noted that the respondent's offer to settle was reasonable and less favourable than the final outcome.

However, balancing this with the reasonable expectations of the parties and the factors under Rule 57, the court found the claimed amount excessive.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $6,500 for fees, plus HST and disbursements.