Jennifer Bond

The applicant brought a Charter challenge against s. 163(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, which gave the Parole Board 90 days to review a suspended statutory release.

For offenders with less than six months remaining on their sentence, this timeframe could result in incarceration beyond their newly calculated statutory release date.

The court granted the applicant public interest standing and found that the provision violated s. 7 of the Charter by arbitrarily and disproportionately depriving offenders of their liberty.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1.

The court remedied the violation by reading in language requiring the Parole Board to render its decision before the offender's new statutory release date.

Following a three-week trial where the plaintiff's action for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation was dismissed, the successful defendants sought costs of over $523,000.

The defendants relied on an offer to settle for $100,000.

The court found that the defendants' fees were disproportionate and that the federal government had failed to meet its document production obligations, which unnecessarily lengthened the trial.

Balancing the defendants' success and offer to settle against their improper conduct regarding document disclosure, the court fixed costs at $100,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiff sued for damages totalling approximately two million dollars, alleging negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and defamation against the Attorney General of Canada and a contract manager, Paul Piché.

The claims arose from the plaintiff's participation in a 2007 Request for Standing Offer (RFSO) where his bid was largely prepared by a competitor, leading to a bid-rigging investigation and charges (later stayed).

The plaintiff argued that negligent answers to RFSO questions induced his actions and that Piché's statements to the Competition Bureau were defamatory.

The court dismissed all claims, finding no duty of care owed by the defendants to provide legal advice on the Competition Act, no negligent misrepresentation or breach of standard of care, and no malice in the defamation claim.

The court also determined that the plaintiff's reliance was unreasonable and that his alleged damages were unproven and too remote, largely attributable to his own contributory negligence.

The court considered the defendant's request for costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interim injunction.

The plaintiff, acting in person, resisted costs, claiming to be a "pauper." The court applied the principles of indemnity and access to justice, noting that the plaintiff's motion was unmeritorious and not brought in the public interest, especially given the imminent passage of the Cannabis Act.

The court found the defendant's requested costs of $3,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable, despite the defendant's actual costs being higher.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $3,000 in costs.

The plaintiff, a minister of the Assembly of the Church of the Universe, sought an interim injunction to prevent prosecution under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act, arguing that such prosecutions infringed his right to freedom of religion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, particularly in light of the recent legalization of cannabis for personal use.

The plaintiff, a self-represented minister of the Church of the Universe, sued the Attorney General of Canada for damages and an injunction after being acquitted of possessing cannabis, which he claimed was a religious sacrament.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment, and the defendant moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion as premature.

The court granted the defendant's motion to strike the claims for Charter damages, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and negligence, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend his claim for a constitutional exemption under s. 2(a) of the Charter.