3 total
John Howard Society granted leave to intervene on terms in habeas corpus applications regarding prison transfers.
The John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party in three joined habeas corpus applications.
The applicants, who are inmates, challenged the denial of their requests to transfer to minimum-security institutions.
The JHSC sought to intervene on the threshold question of whether such a denial constitutes a deprivation of liberty.
The court granted the motion on terms, finding that the JHSC had a genuine interest and could make a useful contribution regarding the constitutional and practical context of transfer decisions.
However, the court restricted the JHSC from participating in the development of the evidentiary record to avoid duplication and prejudice.
Section 163(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations violates s. 7 of the Charter and is remedied by reading in.
The applicant brought a Charter challenge against s. 163(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, which gave the Parole Board 90 days to review a suspended statutory release.
For offenders with less than six months remaining on their sentence, this timeframe could result in incarceration beyond their newly calculated statutory release date.
The court granted the applicant public interest standing and found that the provision violated s. 7 of the Charter by arbitrarily and disproportionately depriving offenders of their liberty.
The infringement was not saved by s. 1.
The court remedied the violation by reading in language requiring the Parole Board to render its decision before the offender's new statutory release date.
Conviction set aside where judge improperly inferred pre‑accident drinking from breath readings.
The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous driving following a trial where he was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to a one-year driving prohibition and a fine.
The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning post‑accident alcohol consumption and improperly relied on Intoxilyzer readings to infer alcohol consumption before the accident.
The appellate court held that where there is intervening or "bolus" alcohol consumption, it is generally unsafe to infer pre‑incident drinking without expert evidence or other strong proof establishing the amount consumed.
The trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to post‑accident alcohol consumption.
The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered because there remained evidence capable of supporting a dangerous driving conviction even without the alcohol inference.
