John Paul Provart

Two federal inmates serving indeterminate sentences applied for reclassification from medium- to minimum-security facilities.

Despite recommendations from their case management teams and wardens, administrative decision-makers denied the reclassifications.

The appellants sought habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid, challenging the denials as unlawful deprivations of their residual liberty.

The majority held that a decision to deny a lower security reclassification constitutes a deprivation of liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus, as it has the qualitative effect of restricting liberty without requiring proof of a change in status quo or a pre-existing legal entitlement to the less restrictive state.

The dissent maintained that habeas corpus is only available where an inmate has acquired a legal entitlement to the lower security classification, consistent with the framework in Dumas.

As both appellants had been reclassified and transferred by the time the appeal was heard, the Court allowed the appeal on the moot legal question of public importance.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied their applications for habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's refusal to reclassify and transfer them to lower-security institutions.

The application judge found that these denials did not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty reviewable by habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld the application judge's finding, concluding that a refusal to reclassify an inmate to a lower security level, without a change in the conditions of detention or an entitlement to greater liberty, does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty for the purposes of habeas corpus.

The Court affirmed that the existing grievance procedure and judicial review in the Federal Court are the appropriate avenues for such challenges.

The dissenting judge argued that an unlawful reclassification refusal could crystallize an initially lawful deprivation of liberty into an unlawful one, making it reviewable by habeas corpus.

This appeal concerned the jurisdiction of a provincial court judge to hear references under s. 74 of the Firearms Act.

The respondents, firearms owners, initiated these references after receiving letters from the RCMP/Registrar stating their firearm registration certificates were "automatically nullified" due to new regulations (SOR/2020-96).

The Attorney General of Canada argued these letters were merely informational and did not constitute a "revocation" triggering s. 74 jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney General's appeal, holding that the nullification of registration certificates occurred by operation of law (the new regulations), not by an individualized decision or revocation by the Registrar.

Consequently, the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction under s. 74 of the Firearms Act, and the disclosure order issued by the reference judge was invalid.

Mohamed Mahjoub, subject to a security certificate and deportation order, sought habeas corpus in the Superior Court to challenge the indefinite conditions of his release, arguing Charter breaches.

The Minister moved to stay the application, citing lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, the existence of an adequate appeal route and the comprehensive nature of the IRPA security certificate scheme (Peiroo exception).

The motion judge granted the stay.

Mahjoub appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the IRPA's security certificate review process, with its specialized Federal Court judges and special advocate system, constitutes a comprehensive and advantageous scheme for reviewing detention conditions, thus precluding habeas corpus, even though the motion judge erred regarding the adequacy of the appeal route.

This decision addresses a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the Ontario Court of Justice's jurisdiction to hear reference cases under the Firearms Act.

The proposed intervener, J.P., sought to join the appeal, arguing his unique procedural journey in a similar s. 74 application would offer an additional perspective.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the intervention, contending J.P.'s perspective would not be distinct from the existing respondents and could unduly expand the litigation's scope.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while J.P. had an interest, his position was not meaningfully different from other similarly situated individuals, and granting intervention would expand the record and present evidentiary problems.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the availability of habeas corpus to challenge the refusal of prisoner transfers to lower security institutions.

The appellants, Frank Dorsey and Ghassan Salah, sought to overturn a lower court's denial of their habeas corpus application.

The Court of Appeal granted intervention to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Black Legal Action Centre, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, and the Canadian Prison Law Association, finding that the appeal raises issues of constitutional and public importance.

The court determined that the proposed interveners offered distinct and useful perspectives, and that their participation would not cause injustice to the parties, even if aligned with the appellants' position.

The Court of Appeal addressed the status of an intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC), in an appeal.

The JHSC had been granted party intervener status in the court below.

While the appellants and respondent consented to the JHSC's continued leave to intervene as an added party, they disagreed on the scope of its participation.

The court clarified that interveners granted party status in the lower court generally expect to continue as parties on appeal without needing a fresh motion, unless there are intervening events or exceptional circumstances.

The JHSC's status as an added party intervener was confirmed, with the terms of participation to be determined later.

The applicants, federal inmates, sought a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) refusal to reclassify them to minimum security, which prevented their transfer to lower-security institutions.

The core legal question was whether such a refusal constitutes a "deprivation of liberty" reviewable by habeas corpus.

The court, applying the principle of judicial comity and reviewing extensive jurisprudence, concluded that maintaining an existing security classification does not amount to a deprivation of liberty, as it does not impose new or additional constraints on residual liberty.

Consequently, habeas corpus was not an available remedy, and the applications were dismissed.

The John Howard Society of Canada (JHSC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party in three joined habeas corpus applications.

The applicants, who are inmates, challenged the denial of their requests to transfer to minimum-security institutions.

The JHSC sought to intervene on the threshold question of whether such a denial constitutes a deprivation of liberty.

The court granted the motion on terms, finding that the JHSC had a genuine interest and could make a useful contribution regarding the constitutional and practical context of transfer decisions.

However, the court restricted the JHSC from participating in the development of the evidentiary record to avoid duplication and prejudice.

The applicants, federal inmates, applied for habeas corpus seeking transfers to minimum-security institutions.

The respondent, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to summarily dismiss the applications as frivolous, arguing that a refusal to transfer to a lower security classification does not constitute a deprivation of liberty.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that jurisprudence is divided on whether such a refusal amounts to a deprivation of liberty, and therefore the applications were not clearly frivolous or abusive on their face.

The applicant, detained for nearly seven years under an immigration removal order, brought a habeas corpus application challenging the legality of his continued detention.

The court found that while the detention was of significant duration, it was reasonable and Charter-compliant given the applicant's persistent refusal to cooperate in establishing his true identity and obtaining necessary travel documents.

The court emphasized that the applicant's lack of cooperation was the primary cause of the prolonged detention, and the administrative review process was fair.

The application was dismissed, but without prejudice to future reconsideration if progress towards obtaining travel documents stalled.

Landmark decision reforming the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions.

The Court established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review, rebuttable where the legislature has indicated a different standard (including by providing a statutory appeal mechanism) or where the rule of law requires correctness review on constitutional questions, general questions of central legal importance, or jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies.

The Court also provided extensive guidance on conducting reasonableness review.

On the merits, the Registrar's decision to cancel the respondent's citizenship certificate was found unreasonable, as the statutory exception denying citizenship by birth to children of foreign government employees was intended to apply only to individuals whose parents had been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The Attorney General of Canada sought a second extension of the suspension of a declaration of invalidity regarding sections 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The application judge had found these provisions infringed section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the absence of meaningful independent review within five working days of administrative segregation placement.

The court granted a conditional extension to June 17, 2019, requiring implementation of an independent fifth-day review of administrative segregation decisions, rather than the unconditional extension to November 30, 2019 that the Crown sought.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association challenged the constitutionality of sections 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, which authorize administrative segregation (solitary confinement) in federal penitentiaries.

The applicant sought declarations that these provisions violate sections 7, 11(h), and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal found that prolonged administrative segregation (more than 15 consecutive days) violates section 12 of the Charter as cruel and unusual treatment and cannot be justified under section 1.

The court rejected arguments regarding inmates aged 18-21 and those with mental illness due to insufficient evidence, and dismissed the section 11(h) claim.

The court declared sections 31-37 of no force and effect to the extent they authorize prolonged administrative segregation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by the Attorney General of Canada to extend the suspension of a declaration of constitutional invalidity regarding sections 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The lower court had found that the "fifth working day review" for administrative segregation violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the lack of meaningful independent review.

The respondent sought an extension to allow Parliament to enact Bill C-83, which would replace administrative segregation with "structured intervention units." The court granted the extension to April 30, 2019, finding that immediate effect would pose unacceptable danger to correctional personnel and inmates, despite expressing concern about Canada's delay in addressing the constitutional infirmity and the absence of interim measures or adequate explanation of how the proposed legislation would remedy the breach.