Yavar Hameed

The defendant, Samantha Robinson (carrying on business as Postering Ottawa), brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by Diffusart International and Marc Agostini.

The court found that while Robinson’s expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs’ claim had substantial merit and Robinson did not have valid defences.

The court concluded that the harm to the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting Robinson’s expression, and dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion without costs.

This costs endorsement addresses the quantum and entitlement to costs following the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim for delay.

The Defendant, John Akpata, sought costs after successfully striking the Plaintiff’s claim.

The court considered the conduct of the parties, offers to settle, the reasonableness of the costs claimed, and the Plaintiff’s ability to pay.

The court fixed costs at $19,000, finding this amount fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action, commenced in 2015, on grounds of inordinate and inexcusable delay pursuant to Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff opposed, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and insufficient funds as reasons for the nine-year delay.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, resulting in substantial prejudice to the defendant's ability to secure witnesses and recollect events, and dismissed the action.

The plaintiff's explanations for the delay were deemed insufficient.

Mohamed Mahjoub, subject to a security certificate and deportation order, sought habeas corpus in the Superior Court to challenge the indefinite conditions of his release, arguing Charter breaches.

The Minister moved to stay the application, citing lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, the existence of an adequate appeal route and the comprehensive nature of the IRPA security certificate scheme (Peiroo exception).

The motion judge granted the stay.

Mahjoub appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the IRPA's security certificate review process, with its specialized Federal Court judges and special advocate system, constitutes a comprehensive and advantageous scheme for reviewing detention conditions, thus precluding habeas corpus, even though the motion judge erred regarding the adequacy of the appeal route.

The plaintiff, Margaret Godard, sought partial indemnity costs after settling her claim against Intelcom Courier Canada Inc. for $70,000, four days before trial.

The court was tasked with fixing costs, applying Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Rule 58, as the parties had agreed to have costs fixed by a judge.

The court considered the principle of indemnity, reasonable expectations, and proportionality.

It found the plaintiff's costs claim to be reasonable overall, with a minor deduction of $497.17 for expert travel expenses that were not incurred.

The court fixed costs at $70,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, finding this amount struck an appropriate balance given the circumstances, including Intelcom's late acceptance of the settlement offer and its conduct during litigation.

This appeal concerned an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant, a medical resident, sued an investigation firm and its investigator for defamation based on executive summaries of a workplace harassment investigation.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the summaries related to a matter of public interest, were protected by qualified privilege, and lacked evidence of malice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming that the expressions related to public interest due to the nature of the educational institution, media attention, and public safety concerns, and were protected by qualified privilege.

The appellant, a dental school graduate, appealed the dismissal of his application for an injunction to compel the National Dental Examining Board of Canada to grant him a "Special Appeal" of his failed written exams.

The motion judge had struck the application, finding no reasonable cause of action as the Board's by-laws did not provide a substantive right to a "Special Appeal" for written exam failures.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the by-laws, when read as a whole, did not establish such a right, and therefore, the application for injunctive relief failed.

The defendants, an athlete and a national sports organization, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from alleged harassment and assault.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff had already pursued a complaint under the organization's internal disciplinary code, making the civil action an abuse of process or collateral attack.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the internal disciplinary process did not have the authority to award compensatory damages for tortious conduct, and therefore did not oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from a motion judge's decision to dismiss an Anti-SLAAP motion.

The appellate court found no error in the motion judge's application of the relevant factors under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, noting that her approach was consistent with the Supreme Court's framework in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, despite not having the benefit of that decision at the time.

The motion judge correctly limited her evidentiary review to the threshold requirements of the Anti-SLAAP motion, leaving deeper factual findings for later stages.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendant, Michael Bueckert, and a cross-motion by the plaintiff, Michele Di Franco, to strike Mr. Bueckert's affidavit.

The court found no reason to depart from the statutory presumption against awarding costs on the anti-SLAPP motion, as it was not frivolous and the expression related to a matter of public interest.

However, on the motion to strike the affidavit, the court awarded Mr. Bueckert $3000 in partial indemnity costs against Mr. Di Franco, after considering factors under Rule 57.01(1) and discounting the amount for work that may have future utility.

Michael Bueckert brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by Michele Di Franco.

Di Franco also brought a cross-motion to strike Bueckert's affidavit.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that Di Franco's defamation claim had substantial merit and Bueckert's defenses of fair comment and justification might not succeed.

The court also found that the harm to Di Franco's reputation, particularly as a law student, was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting Bueckert's expression, especially given the vitriolic nature of some of the statements.

The defendant police board brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and breaches of ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights, stemming from his 2004 arrest and charges.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing issue estoppel based on a prior criminal ruling that excluded evidence due to a s. 8 Charter breach.

The court found that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and charges at the time, despite the subsequent exclusion of evidence in criminal proceedings.

It determined that the prior Charter remedy (exclusion of evidence and dismissal of charges) was sufficient and no further monetary damages were appropriate, especially given the plaintiff likely committed the offences.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's claims were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a contempt of court order finding them in breach of a restoration order issued by Lahaie J. The appellants had been convicted under the Conservation Authorities Act for interfering with and removing material from wetlands.

The restoration order required them to rehabilitate and restore the wetlands to conform with guidelines set by the Mississippi Valley Conservation Authority within six months.

The appellants argued the order was ambiguous and did not clearly specify what they were required to do.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, holding that the order was sufficiently clear when read in context with the judge's reasons, and that the appellants deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the order rather than being unable to comply with it.

The defendant, B’nai Brith Canada, brought a motion under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action initiated by the plaintiff, Alexander Dimitri Lascaris, as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff claimed damages for an article and tweet published by the defendant.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (the conflict in the Middle East and the BDS movement).

The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate substantial merit, no valid defence, and that the harm outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court concluded that the plaintiff could not overcome the defence of fair comment, as it was arguable that a person could honestly believe the plaintiff's actions constituted support for terrorists, even if unreasonable.

Consequently, the defendant's motion was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The applicants sought to vary a sealing order under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to obtain access to the Information to Obtain search warrants executed at two residences.

They argued that, as non‑accused persons affected by the search, they had a presumptive right to access the materials in order to assess potential Charter s. 8 violations.

The Crown opposed, arguing that a non‑accused must first present some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully before a court will review sealed materials.

The court adopted the approach from Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General) and R. v. Schmidt, requiring a preliminary evidentiary basis before varying a sealing order.

Because the applicants filed no evidence suggesting unlawful authorization of the warrants, the application was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a civil action alleging assault, battery, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches arising from an incident at the Senate of Canada.

The plaintiff relied solely on reasons from a prior criminal trial in which he had been acquitted of charges related to the same incident, arguing that relitigation would constitute an abuse of process under the principles in Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79.

The court held that the defendants had not been parties to the criminal proceeding and had not had the opportunity to defend themselves or advance defences such as parliamentary privilege.

The court found that allowing the defendants to defend the civil claim would not amount to an abuse of process and that genuine issues requiring a trial remained.

A not‑for‑profit organization sought an interlocutory injunction preventing a bank from terminating its banking relationship pending trial or the outcome of related Federal Court of Appeal proceedings.

The bank had provided approximately four months’ notice of termination after the organization’s charitable status had been revoked by the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court held that banks may terminate banking relationships without cause provided reasonable notice is given and that reasonableness should be assessed in ordinary circumstances rather than based on the plaintiff’s regulatory difficulties.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court found the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, failed to prove irreparable harm, and did not satisfy the balance of convenience.

The request for mandatory injunctive relief was therefore refused.

The applicant sought declarations that operational policies adopted under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act were unconstitutional and contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine the matter by application or whether it had to proceed as a judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The court held that the impugned policies constituted the exercise of statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Because the applicant sought only declarations regarding the legality of those policies and no civil action was pending, the matter properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court by way of judicial review.