Lise G. Favreau

The appellant, a tobacco manufacturer on the Six Nations reserve, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of the Minister of Finance's demand for security under section 12(2)(f.1) of the Tobacco Tax Act.

The appellant manufactured tobacco for export and for sale on First Nations reserves, neither of which were subject to Ontario's tobacco tax.

The appellant argued the Minister's interpretation of the security requirement was unreasonable and that the provision was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on exported goods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding the Minister's interpretation reasonable and the provision constitutionally valid as incidental to a valid direct taxation scheme.

A group of farmers brought an application seeking a declaration that a Crown corporation administering agricultural support programs was bound by the two‑year basic limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 when attempting to recover program overpayments.

The applicants argued that, as a Crown agent rather than the Crown itself, the corporation could not rely on the statutory exemption from limitation periods applicable to Crown claims related to economic programs.

The court held that references to the Crown in s. 16(1)(j)(i) of the Act include Crown agents acting within the scope of their statutory authority.

As the debt claims arose from government economic programs administered by the corporation as a Crown agent, the exemption applied and the two‑year limitation period did not bar recovery proceedings.

The application was dismissed with costs.

In a health care cost recovery action brought by the Crown against tobacco companies under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009, a defendant moved to strike portions of the statement of claim referencing alleged misrepresentations made by tobacco companies before parliamentary committees.

The court considered whether statements made to House of Commons and legislative committees could be relied upon in a civil action.

It held that parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech, protects statements made during parliamentary proceedings and committee appearances, including by non‑members who participate as witnesses.

Because the privilege is absolute and prevents courts from questioning such statements, the impugned pleadings referencing those presentations could not stand.

The motion to strike those paragraphs was therefore granted.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.