Stephen Whitzman

The appellant appealed her conviction for impaired driving, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the trial judge's Charter rulings.

She claimed her trial counsel failed to advise her of the option to testify only on the voir dire, leading her to make damaging admissions during the trial proper.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's strategic decisions did not fall below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal judge also upheld the trial judge's decisions to deny a stay of proceedings for lost video evidence and to admit the police officers' observations despite Charter breaches.

The accused was tried for second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased 28 times following a meeting arranged online.

The accused admitted to the killing but claimed she acted in self-defence or, alternatively, was provoked by an unwanted sexual advance and a threat with a knife.

The court rejected the accused's version of events due to significant credibility and reliability issues, finding the response entirely disproportionate to any potential threat.

The court concluded the Crown proved the requisite intent for murder and disproved both self-defence and provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80', arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application.

The appellant contended that an 8-minute delay at the roadside before being informed of his right to counsel, and the police officer's decision to delay access to counsel until arriving at the station, violated his rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the brief delay to secure the scene and the decision to wait for a private environment at the station were reasonable.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The applicant, a 19-year-old charged with second degree murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds, emphasizing the tertiary ground given the gravity of the charge.

The court found that the proposed plan of strict house arrest, constant supervision by the applicant's parents as sureties, and GPS ankle monitoring sufficiently mitigated the risks under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court granted release but increased the proposed monetary pledge from $25,000 to $150,000 to ensure the sureties and the applicant had sufficient financial incentive to comply with the strict conditions.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had found that the police officer lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion that the respondent had operated his vehicle within the preceding three hours when she made an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach and exclusion of the breath evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the circumstantial evidence of the time of driving was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.

Although the trial judge erred in her analysis of the second Grant factor by not following binding precedent, a re-weighing of the factors still supported exclusion due to the seriousness of the officer's systemic misunderstanding of her legal obligations.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against a child, brought pre-trial applications alleging a section 7 Charter breach for lost evidence and seeking to adduce third-party suspect evidence.

The accused argued that police failed to preserve evidence by not searching his recreational vehicle at the time of the initial complaint, which would have revealed the absence of sex toys.

The court dismissed the lost evidence application, finding the existence of such evidence was speculative and the police decision not to search was reasonable.

The court also dismissed the third-party suspect application, ruling that the complainant's alleged prior statement about her father lacked sufficient connection to the specific crimes to be probative.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability against a developmentally challenged male.

The court applied the Kienapple rule to conditionally stay the sexual assault conviction but upheld the two exploitation convictions.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for the severe breach of trust and invasive abuse, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years in the penitentiary for sexual exploitation and a concurrent 3 years for sexual exploitation of a person with a disability, along with ancillary orders.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on the respondent for a sexual assault committed while highly intoxicated.

The respondent had briefly groped the victim over her clothing at a university banquet.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing intoxication as a mitigating factor, relying on distinguishable case law, and failing to properly weigh general deterrence and denunciation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the high degree of deference owed to sentencing judges.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after running a red light and striking another vehicle, causing devastating injuries to two victims.

The offender had a blood-alcohol content more than twice the legal limit and was severely sleep-deprived.

The court sentenced the 72-year-old offender to 3 years in the penitentiary, a 10-year driving prohibition, and a secondary DNA order, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter after a 14-month-old child in her care died.

The Crown sought to admit several statements made by the accused to police officers.

The court found the accused was detained by the first responding officer without being advised of her rights, rendering subsequent statements to that officer inadmissible.

Statements made during a videotaped interview and a walk-through with a detective were found voluntary and admissible, except for a phone call to her husband which breached her right to privacy in seeking counsel.

Statements made to a third officer after the child's death were excluded as involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics, including ignoring repeated assertions of the right to silence, denying adequate warmth, and exploiting the accused's emotional distress.

The accused, a daycare provider, was charged with manslaughter following the death of a 14-month-old child in her care.

The child suffered a severe skull fracture and subdural hematoma.

The court found that the accused momentarily lost her patience and intentionally assaulted the child, causing the fatal injuries.

Alternatively, the court found that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of life by delaying calling 911 for over an hour after observing the child was unresponsive and limp, which significantly contributed to the child's death.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.