R. v. Britton, 2026 ONCA 585

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

CITATION: R. v. Britton, 2026 ONCA 585[1]

DATE: 20260814

DOCKET: COA-25-CR-1263

Coroza, Favreau and Pomerance JJ.A.

Leo Adler and Christine Rose, for the appellant

Jeremy Tatum, for the respondent

Heard and rendered orally: August 12, 2026

On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice Clayton Conlan of the Superior Court of Justice on September 10, 2025.

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The appellant pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual assault with a weapon. He received a total sentence of eight years for both offences. He seeks to appeal his sentence only.

[2] The first sexual assault occurred in 1987. The appellant was unknown to the complainant. The appellant entered the complainant’s apartment at night and sexually assaulted her at knife point. At the time, the complainant was in bed next to her sleeping infant daughter, and her husband was sleeping in another room with her two other children.

[3] Six years later, in 1993, the appellant assaulted a second complainant. He grabbed this complainant when she was walking outside under a bridge. He pulled her into an alcove, removed her clothes and held his hands around her neck while he sexually assaulted her.

[4] The police connected the two sexual assaults through DNA evidence, and ultimately identified the appellant as a suspect through DNA in 2023. The appellant pleaded guilty to both sexual assaults. The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of five years for the first sexual assault and three years for the second sexual assault. The sentencing judge also imposed a 20-year SOIRA order.

[5] The appellant submits that the sentence is excessive and that the sentencing judge overemphasized denunciation and deterrence given the exceptional circumstances of this case. Specifically, the appellant says that he came from an abusive background, that he demonstrated remarkable rehabilitation and remorse, that he is now over 60 years old and in poor health, and that he has a very close relationship with his son who is in his early 20s.

[6] This court owes significant deference to a sentencing judge’s decision. The court will only intervene where: (1) the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit; or (2) where the sentencing judge committed an error in principle, failed to consider a relevant factor or erroneously considered an aggravating or mitigating factor, and it appears from the decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 44, 51; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28. On appeal, the court is not to interfere with a sentencing decision because the appellate court would have imposed a different sentence or weighed relevant factors differently: R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655, 169 O.R. (3d) 68, at para. 26.

[7] We see no error in the sentence imposed on the appellant. The sentencing judge noted the seriousness of the sexual assaults and that the appellant’s moral blameworthiness was very high. The sentencing judge stated that he nevertheless tempered the sentences on each count to take account of the totality principle and the mitigating circumstances, and that the sentences he imposed for each offence were relatively low given the seriousness of the offences. The sentencing judge expressly adverted to the appellant’s personal circumstances, including the relationship with and support of his son. We are satisfied that he considered these factors in tempering the sentence as he did. The sentencing judge accordingly did not overemphasize deterrence and denunciation, and in fact took account of the significant mitigating circumstances. We agree with the sentencing judge that the sentences were relatively low given the very serious nature of the offences. The sentencing judge committed no error in principle and the sentences he imposed were fit.

[8] In his factum the appellant also sought to challenge the 20-year SOIRA order. He advised that he abandoned this aspect of the appeal during argument.

[9] We grant leave to appeal the sentence but dismiss the appeal from sentence.

“S. Coroza J.A.”

“L. Favreau J.A.”

“R. Pomerance J.A.”