Jeffery Elder Couse

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two complainants who attended the same special education program.

At trial, the judge dismissed a similar fact evidence application due to concerns about inadvertent tainting between the complainants and another witness.

However, the trial judge subsequently convicted the appellant without explaining why those same tainting concerns did not affect his assessment of the complainants' credibility and reliability on the trial proper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to address the potential tainting in the credibility assessment was a reversible error, particularly given the witnesses' intellectual disabilities and memory issues.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge impermissibly relied on the complainant's religious beliefs to reject the defence theory that she had a motive to fabricate the allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that evidence of religious motives was admissible to explain the timing of disclosure and rebut the fabrication theory.

The court found no error in the trial judge's treatment of demeanour evidence or his assessment of investigative gaps.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on a charge of transmitting sexually explicit material to a child for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault or indecent exposure under s. 171.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and substituted a conviction, finding the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the appellant's conduct as merely flirtatious and by conflating the mens rea of the enumerated offence with that of the charged offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the conviction, confirming that to establish the inchoate offence under s. 171.1(1)(b), the Crown need only prove the accused transmitted sexually explicit material for the purpose of facilitating a listed offence, not that the accused intended to commit that offence.

The Court affirmed that facilitating includes grooming a child by reducing inhibitions or exploiting immaturity.

The Court added that characterizing an adult's sexualized conduct toward a child as flirtatious is a serious mischaracterization with no place in criminal justice proceedings involving sexual violence against children.

The Crown appealed acquittals on firearms charges following a Charter breach finding.

Police executed a general warrant to seize a cellular device associated with a specific phone number during a murder investigation.

The respondent was a victim/witness to the murder.

During execution, police seized three phones and discovered firearms in a hidden door compartment.

The application judge found the search exceeded the warrant's scope, violating s. 8 of the Charter, and excluded the firearms under s. 24(2).

The majority (Miller and Wilson JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding no s. 8 violation and that the firearms should be admitted.

Pomerance J.A. dissented, agreeing with the application judge that the police exceeded the warrant's terms and that exclusion was appropriate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for serious sexual offences committed in 1986 against two women.

The Crown's similar-fact application was granted at trial.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings regarding lost evidence, arguing that the loss of the Murdock investigative file constituted unacceptable negligence and that the trial judge failed to adequately address the integrity of the justice system regarding conceded negligent loss of evidence in the English file.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the governing legal framework, made findings supported by the record, and exercised her remedial discretion judiciously.

The court held that the trial judge's conclusion that the purging of the Murdock brief in accordance with retention policy was not unacceptable negligence was reasonable, and that even if error existed, it was harmless as the trial judge proceeded to a full remedial analysis.

Regarding the English file, the court found the trial judge adequately addressed the integrity issue and that proportionate alternatives to a stay of proceedings were appropriate.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his confession, obtained during a 13-hour police interrogation using the Reid Technique, should have been excluded.

The appellant and an intervener argued for a new common law rule creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness for confessions elicited via the Reid Technique.

The Court of Appeal declined to amend the confessions rule, finding the existing framework sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to assess the cumulative effect of the prolonged, aggressive questioning and by making a palpable and overriding error of fact in concluding the appellant had not fallen asleep during the interrogation.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of a vehicle he was driving.

At trial, the appellant brought applications alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 11(b) Charter rights, which the trial judge dismissed by largely adopting the Crown's submissions without providing independent analysis or factual findings.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons on both Charter applications were insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possessing proceeds of crime after a trial judge admitted evidence despite a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The police delayed the appellant's access to counsel for nearly ten hours, based on an operational plan to secure search warrants first.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by underestimating the impact of the breach on the appellant's security of the person.

The Court concluded that the breach was serious and deliberate, outweighing society's interest in admitting the evidence, and ordered the exclusion of the gun and cash, leading to acquittals.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism and appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's testimony, finding it illogical and inconsistent, consistent with the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

The court also rejected the appellant's submissions regarding an alleged mistaken inference about the complainant's age and its relation to consciousness of guilt, and a ground concerning the materiality of a photograph's date.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The appellant, George Nnane, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional judgment, specifically by failing to adequately cross-examine a key witness, projecting disbelief of the appellant's testimony during examination-in-chief, and delivering an ineffective jury address.

Despite a strong Crown case, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of counsel's conduct undermined the fairness of the trial.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The sentence appeal was not addressed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual interference involving two child victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, specifically regarding the admission of cross-count similar act evidence and the consideration of unconscious collusion between the complainants.

The appellant also argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the second prong of the R. v. W.(D.) test for reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or application of legal principles, noting that the similar act evidence was used only in the alternative and the trial judge's reasons were clear and owed deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and breach of a court order, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's physical attributes based on Zoom observations and erred in criticizing the defence's "sure of guilt" submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the application of the burden of proof.

The court affirmed that trial judges can rely on common sense in assessing testimony and that the term "sure" is not a necessary component of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

The appellant, Najib Amin, appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting "bad act" evidence (murder advice given to an undercover officer) and failing to provide proper jury warnings.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge incorrectly applied the Handy and Hart tests for admissibility of bad act evidence and confessions from undercover operations.

The murder advice, used to prove identity, lacked sufficient similarity to the actual killing to be admissible under Handy's identity rule.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury about the dangers of misusing this highly prejudicial evidence, creating a real risk of wrongful conviction based on character rather than proof.

The Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Kalen Schlatter, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case included strong circumstantial evidence, DNA, and testimony from undercover officers and a jailhouse informant.

The defence argued a 'third party suspect' and challenged the trial judge's rulings on witness questioning, jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, after-the-fact conduct, and admissibility of undercover agent testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's control of witness questioning, jury instructions, or the Vetrovec warning.

The court also upheld the admissibility of the undercover officers' testimony, finding no breach of the appellant's Charter rights.

The appellant was convicted of various firearms offences.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for drug trafficking, which led to an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search incident to arrest, and that the evidence (a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition) should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court emphasized that the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds proceeds from a holistic consideration of all facts, including prior surveillance of a suspected drug trafficker, a drug overdose in the hotel room, and the suspicious conduct of the appellant and his associate, Ms. Gaspari.

The court found the trial judge's reasoning for the arrest was sound, making it unnecessary to address the s. 24(2) Charter argument.

The appellant, Quinnton Drake, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to multiple violent offences, including robbery with a firearm, and had a lengthy criminal record.

At sentencing, he conceded dangerous offender criteria but sought a long-term supervision order instead of an indeterminate sentence, arguing the judge failed to adequately consider his remorse and willingness to participate in treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly applied sentencing principles, including public protection as primary, and properly weighed the appellant's evidence against expert testimony indicating a very poor prognosis for treatment success and high risk of reoffending.

The appellant, Jennifer Pyne, appealed her convictions on several drug-related charges and sought leave to appeal her sentence, contending an error on the warrant of committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the location of discarded drugs.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, determining that while the sentencing judge made a minor calculation error in her oral reasons, the warrant of committal accurately reflected the imposed sentence, thus requiring no rectification.

The appellant, Rachard Holder, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related firearm offences, and his life sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instruction on prior identification statements, arguing they were not sufficiently close in time to the incident.

The Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that the "entire identification process" is probative, consistent with R. v. Tat.

The sentence appeal alleged errors in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and future dangerousness.

The Court held that the trial judge properly applied R. v. Shah, using lack of remorse to indicate lack of insight and future dangerousness for deterrence, not as an aggravating factor.

Both appeals were dismissed.