Michelle Campbell

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and breach of a court order, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's physical attributes based on Zoom observations and erred in criticizing the defence's "sure of guilt" submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the application of the burden of proof.

The court affirmed that trial judges can rely on common sense in assessing testimony and that the term "sure" is not a necessary component of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude DNA and fingerprint evidence, arguing that police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching a public genetic genealogy database (GEDmatch) and seizing cast-off DNA without judicial authorization.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public database search results.

Furthermore, applying horizontal stare decisis, the court held it was bound by prior decisions establishing that the seizure of discarded items for DNA analysis does not violate s. 8.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and failing to comply with a court order, applied for bail pending the appeal of his convictions.

He had been sentenced to three years in custody for sexually assaulting a 70-year-old personal support worker in his home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court held that the applicant posed a serious risk to public safety due to his history of breaching court orders, and that public confidence required immediate enforcement of the sentence given the seriousness of the offence and the weakness of the appeal grounds.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed on June 5, 2012 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 6 months less one day due to potential immigration consequences that were not known during the original sentencing process.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his conviction appeal to pursue orders for production of records not produced at trial and to advance a ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment and authorized limited counsel under section 684 of the Criminal Code to investigate the ineffective assistance of counsel ground and the records sought.

The Court noted that Legal Aid Ontario had previously denied funding for a conviction appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel in 2014.

The Court determined it was inadvisable to hear the sentence appeal before the conviction appeal and ordered that the sentence appeal remain in the regular appeal stream and not be rescheduled until the conviction appeal was disposed of.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of his 14-year-old niece on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge found that the appellant touched the complainant for a sexual purpose, despite his denial.

The appellant argued that trial counsel failed to explore the complainant's difficult relationship with her mother and failed to cross-examine the complainant's sister regarding potential bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the ineffective assistance test, as neither issue would have addressed the critical question of whether touching occurred.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding no error in principle in the five-month sentence imposed.

The appellant was charged with making available and possession of child pornography following a lawful search of his residence and computer that revealed over 3,900 unique images, with 750 immediately accessible and evidence of active sharing through file-sharing software.

The appellant pleaded guilty to making available child pornography and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody, plus probation and ancillary orders.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction and sentence on three grounds: (1) abuse of process arising from the Crown's election to proceed by indictment rather than summarily; (2) improper treatment of a Notice of Constitutional Question; and (3) unreasonable delay in breach of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no abuse of process, no valid constitutional question, and that the delay, while substantial at approximately 38 months, was reasonable under both the transitional Morin framework and the new Jordan framework, given the complexity of child pornography investigations, the appellant's own conduct causing delay, minimal prejudice, and the seriousness of the offence.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, disguise with intent, dangerous driving, and failure to stop arising from a bank robbery.

The sole issue at trial was identity—whether the appellant or his brother committed the robbery.

A police officer identified the appellant from a photo lineup.

The trial judge designated the appellant a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three grounds regarding the conviction: eyewitness identification instructions, police officer reliability, and Crown opening address prejudice.

On sentence, the appellant challenged the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed following his conviction for intimidation, criminal harassment, and two counts of assault.

The appellant did not challenge the validity of the dangerous offender designation but contested the trial judge's decision to impose an indeterminate sentence rather than a long-term supervision order.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence regarding treatment refusal, misapprehension of evidence regarding burnout in aging offenders, application of the wrong test for manageability in the community, and an unfair burden placed on the defence to demonstrate immediately available resources.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the indeterminate sentence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code based on 55 images found in the temporary Internet files on a shared computer.

The trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding how images are automatically cached in temporary Internet files, incorrectly concluding the appellant had deliberately downloaded the images.

The summary conviction appeal judge similarly misapprehended the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that accessing child pornography is not a lesser included offence of possession, and that amending the information to charge accessing would prejudice the appellant.

The Crown appealed an acquittal resulting from the exclusion of evidence of child pornography under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

Police seized a family computer from the home co-owned by the respondent and his common-law spouse without a warrant, based on the spouse's consent.

The computer was retained for four months without judicial authorization before a warrant was obtained to search it.

The application judge found multiple Charter violations and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the application judge erred in finding the spouse could not consent to the seizure, and conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, ultimately admitting the evidence and ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining a detention order.

The appellant argued the Board erred in concluding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and that detention remained the least restrictive measure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding the expert evidence established the appellant suffered from schizophrenia with persistent delusional beliefs related to the index offense (assault of her mother), lacked insight into her condition, and would discontinue treatment if discharged.

Although the appellant had been placed in supervised community accommodation since the appeal was filed, the court found this did not undermine the Board's conclusion that conditional discharge would be inadequate to manage the risk.

The detention order was necessary to enable the hospital to approve and supervise the appellant's community placement.

The appellant applied for an order assigning counsel to act on his behalf on appeal under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown acknowledged he lacked sufficient means to retain legal assistance.

The court considered whether it appeared desirable in the interests of justice that the appellant should have legal assistance.

The appellant faced a conviction appeal on a multi-count sexual assault indictment.

The court found merit in the argument that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance to the jury in assessing credibility, which was central to the case.

The court rejected arguments regarding propensity reasoning and the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The court also found no merit in the sentence appeal ground.

The court ordered that counsel be assigned to advance the credibility ground only.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a drive-by shooting, arguing that the trial judge's factual findings were unreasonable.

Specifically, he challenged the findings that the stolen vehicle apprehended in a church parking lot was the same vehicle involved in the shooting, and that he was in the vehicle during the incident, citing differing evidence on the number of occupants and insufficient fingerprint and saliva evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably relied on a constellation of direct and circumstantial evidence to support his conclusions and eliminate alternative inferences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, which included a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the proceedings and in assessing future risk and the predicate offence for the dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings regarding the stay.

The Court also upheld the dangerous offender designation, noting the trial judge properly relied on the appellant's criminal record, expert clinical assessment of high risk for violent recidivism, and history of breaching release conditions.

The predicate offence of robbery at knifepoint was found to constitute an act of serious personal violence.

The appellant, convicted of five counts of robbery, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his appeal.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in admitting a police officer's lay opinion evidence identifying the appellant's shoes in video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal issues straightforward enough to be argued as an inmate appeal and noting that case law permits such lay opinion evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an alleged domestic assault.

At trial, the judge sought corroboration for the complainant's testimony and relied on the opinion evidence of an investigating police officer regarding the complainant's demeanour and injuries, as well as the complainant's prior consistent statements to her daughter and police.

The Court of Appeal held that the officer's evidence improperly ventured into expert opinion and was used to shore up the complainant's credibility.

Furthermore, the prior consistent statements were improperly used for their truth.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge failed to make a finding of causation regarding whether the complainant's wounds were caused during a swarming in a parking lot or by flying glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the inescapable inference from the trial judge's reasons was that the wounds were caused during the parking lot assault, consistent with the Crown's theory and the complainant's accepted testimony.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, assault, intimidation, and uttering death threats following an altercation with his girlfriend's landlord and the building caretaker.

He appealed only the criminal harassment conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider all necessary elements of the offence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant's conduct was harassing, that he possessed the requisite mens rea, and that the elderly complainant's fear for her safety was objectively reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault of a young child.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the first incident occurred in his truck and that this error tainted the credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the trial judge erred regarding the location of the first incident, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process or taint the overall credibility assessment.