Court of Appeal for Ontario
BEFORE: Laskin, Sharpe and Huscroft JJ.A.
BETWEEN
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
and
Kevin Ransdell
Appellant
COUNSEL:
Diane Condo, for the appellant
Michelle Campbell, for the respondent
Heard and released orally: October 25, 2016
On appeal from the conviction entered on November 8, 2011 and the sentence imposed on November 9, 2012 by Justice J. David Wake of the Ontario Court of Justice.
ENDORSEMENT
1The appellant raises two grounds of appeal:
(1) the trial judge erred in refusing to stay the proceedings; and
(2) the trial judge erred in designating the appellant a dangerous offender.
2On the first ground the appellant challenges the trial judge’s findings of fact and credibility. He acknowledges the significant appellate deference given to these findings. Justice Wake gave extensive reasons for his findings and these findings appear well supported by the evidence. Thus, we have no basis to interfere with his refusal to grant a stay.
3On the second ground of appeal, the appellant makes two submissions. First, the trial judge erred in his assessment of future risk; second, the predicate offence did not meet the test described by Justice Marshall in R. v. Norman: “one last act of serious personal violence”.
4We do not accept these submissions. On the appellant’s first point, at p. 63 of his reasons, Justice Wake set out the three grounds why the appellant met the standard of future risk within the provisions of s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code.
First is the history of the offender’s criminal record of inflicting injury which increases the risk and he would do so again.
Secondly, and probably most importantly, is Dr. Pollandi’s conclusion that the accused is at a high risk for violent recidivism as a result of his clinical assessment, which must be given considerable weight.
And third, the accused has committed violent offences while on different forms of release and so far has not demonstrated an ability to be deterred by court orders or restrictions placed on him, particularly as part of federal release orders in the past.
5These three reasons show that the standard of future risk was met. Dr. Pollandi’s evidence in particular, as summarized at para. 44 of the Crown’s factum, supported the trial judge’s conclusion on future risk.
6On the appellant’s second point, in our view the predicate offence was hardly a meaningless offence. It was one last act of serious personal violence. The victim was robbed at knife point and then had to drive the appellant a considerable distance before he got out of the car. We accept that this robbery did not have the violence associated with the appellant’s previous robbery of the taxi driver. But to constitute one last act of serious violence, the predicate offence need not be more serious than the previous offences in the pattern. It is sufficient that the predicate offence was an act of serious personal violence. This predicate offence met that test.
7Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
“John Laskin J.A.”
“Robert Sharpe J.A.”
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”