Michelle Campbell

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for assault, seeking to convert the remainder to a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge overstated the seriousness of one incident, the custodial sentence was justified given the appellant's previous record for assault, the seriousness of the current assault, and the serious injuries caused to the victim.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed a conviction under s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code involving a paint-gun.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the paint-gun was a 'firearm' under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge erred in law by applying a negligence standard instead of the correct standard of 'a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances' for s. 86(1).

The Court declined to apply the proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly examined the identification evidence, which was supported by circumstantial evidence, and did not misapprehend the evidence or fail to address discrepancies in witness descriptions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to break and enter dwelling houses and assault with intent to steal, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding unsavoury witnesses was adequate and the review of the defence position was sufficient.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's trial testimony as an aggravating factor and failing to consider his first-offender status.

The sentence was reduced to 10 years' imprisonment, and the order delaying parole eligibility was set aside.

The appellant pleaded guilty to breach of probation, theft over, and possession over, receiving an effective sentence of two years and two months.

On the same day, he pleaded guilty to unrelated charges of breach of probation and robbery, receiving a consecutive three-year sentence.

The appellant appealed the three-year sentence, arguing it should be reduced to two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the totality principle and the appellant's aboriginal status.

The sentence for the robbery and breach of probation was reduced from three years to two years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample.

He was stopped for a burnt-out headlight, smelled of alcohol, and provided thirteen unsuitable breath samples into a screening device by giving short, quick puffs despite instructions.

The trial judge found he intentionally refused to provide a proper sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were adequate and properly considered the evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which had upheld his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in concluding that the trial judge acted reasonably in denying an adjournment to the unrepresented appellant.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's reasons without basis and failed to consider the importance of counsel given the Charter issues and the appellant's intention to testify.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by treating his task as merely choosing between the evidence of the appellant and the police officer.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder after confessing to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his section 7 Charter right to silence and should have been excluded at common law.

He also argued the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence on false confessions and failing to adequately warn the jury about the unreliability of his statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to silence is not engaged when a suspect is not detained, the police conduct would not shock the community, the expert evidence was unnecessary, and the jury instructions were sufficient.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police officers improperly made a blood demand instead of a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the officers had reasonable and probable grounds to believe a breath sample was impractical because the appellant was in the hospital being treated for a serious bleeding head laceration and was belligerent.

The young person appealed her sentence for her involvement in a home invasion assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider mitigating circumstances for the young person, despite doing so for her four co-accused.

Given the young person's compliance with strict bail conditions, her stable living environment, and fresh evidence of her pregnancy, the appeal was allowed and her sentence was reduced to time served.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by concluding she was prohibited from comparing the respondent's evidence to the complainant's evidence, misconstruing the W. (D.) framework.

The trial judge also erred by making a blanket statement that it is dangerous to draw conclusions from demeanour, thereby overstating the cautions relating to demeanour evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.