J. Sandy Tse

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

The primary issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.

Two Crown witnesses gave conflicting evidence: one victim initially denied recognizing the shooter but later identified the appellant at trial, while the appellant's former co-accused initially identified the appellant but later testified that he himself was the shooter.

The trial judge admitted the co-accused's preliminary inquiry testimony for its truth under the principled exception to hearsay.

The trial judge failed to provide a W.(D.) instruction regarding the exculpatory identification evidence of both witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury required proper instruction on how to use the conflicting exculpatory evidence in assessing whether a reasonable doubt existed.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's case was that during a camping trip, the appellant used his cellphone to record the complainant changing into her bathing suit.

The appellant denied intentionally recording.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's reasoning regarding the intentional nature of the recording, arguing the trial judge engaged in speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The trial judge had made clear findings that the appellant's conduct—including plugging in the phone as a pretext, positioning it to record, and the series of steps required to activate the video function—demonstrated intentional conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a cocaine dealer, was arrested in possession of a loaded semi-automatic Ruger pistol, cocaine, and cash.

He was convicted of firearm and drug-related offences after a trial by judge alone.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on Charter grounds, arguing that police violated his rights to be free from arbitrary detention and unreasonable search when they entered a private backyard without permission.

The majority (Doherty and Brown JJ.A.) upheld the convictions, finding the police entry lawful under the implied licence doctrine and the detention justified by reasonable suspicion.

Lauwers J.A. dissented, finding the police entry unlawful and the detention arbitrary, and would have excluded the evidence and acquitted the appellant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting statements he made to police at the scene, claiming they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act or made while detained without access to counsel.

He also argued the breathalyzer results should have been excluded because the arresting officer forgot to make a breath demand at the scene, and the demand was instead made later by a breath technician at the station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the roadside statements were voluntary and made before detention crystallized.

The Court also held that the breath technician's demand satisfied the requirements of s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, as it was made as soon as practicable after the technician formed his own reasonable grounds.

The Crown sought certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent on various firearms, ammunition, and drug offences.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by repeatedly assuming the role of the trier of fact, weighing evidence, drawing factual inferences, and failing to consider the circumstantial evidence cumulatively.

The preliminary inquiry judge had discounted individual pieces of evidence and failed to assess whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict.

The Superior Court quashed the discharge and ordered the preliminary inquiry judge to commit the respondent to stand trial on the specified charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs and guns found in his girlfriend's apartment.

He challenged two pre-trial Charter rulings.

First, he argued that evidence from the apartment should have been excluded under s. 24(2) after the motion judge found a s. 8 breach due to the search warrant being executed at night without proper authorization.

Second, he argued his arrest was unlawful because the police lacked reasonable grounds, making the seizure of keys during the search incident to arrest unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the s. 8 breach was inadvertent and did not impact privacy interests, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was in joint possession of firearms.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for sexual offences committed against parishioners while he was a pastor.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying a change of venue, delivering an unbalanced jury charge regarding vitiating consent, and that the split verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors and that the verdicts were reconcilable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly prioritized denunciation and deterrence given the breach of trust.

The appellant appealed a three-year total sentence for domestic assault, mischief, and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider mitigating factors, including the appellant's guilty plea, rehabilitative steps, and expressed insight.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years' imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm found under his passenger seat during a traffic stop.

He appealed, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights, was racially motivated, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the trial judge reasonably concluded there was no racial bias, and the verdict was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was abandoned and dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the appellant should receive credit for pre-sentence custody on a 1.5 to 1 basis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal and varied the sentence to 68 months less 24 months credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, a young person convicted of manslaughter, challenged the constitutionality of s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied legal aid and state-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 684 is an ameliorative, case-specific mechanism that does not infringe the equality guarantee in s. 15 and does not violate ss. 7, 10(b), or 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that where liberty interests are engaged, state-funded appeal counsel may be constitutionally required only when necessary to make the right of appeal meaningful and effective.

Requiring an indigent appellant to demonstrate an arguable appeal for appointment of counsel to present the appeal is not unfair.

The appellant appealed his effective three-year sentence for a lengthy spree of offences committed in an organized and professional manner across southwest Ontario.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence exceeding the Crown's position of two years less a day without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge should have afforded counsel the chance to make submissions, the sentence imposed was fit.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on firearms charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding a statement the respondent made to another prisoner while in police cells.

The trial judge found a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel because the police officer delayed contacting counsel to interview another person and eavesdrop on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that no s. 10(b) breach had occurred at the exact moment the statement was overheard, as the officer had not yet had any opportunity to comply with the request for counsel.

The acquittals were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for child pornography offences and possession of a prohibited weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting two statements he made to police.

He claimed he was psychologically detained during the first statement at his workplace without receiving s. 10 Charter warnings, which tainted his subsequent warned statement at the police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the Grant framework and reasonably concluded the appellant was not detained during the initial questioning.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a judge and jury.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question regarding the evidence.

The trial judge had not reviewed the evidence in his charge and failed to identify critical parts of the evidence, such as identification evidence, when answering the jury's question.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error, particularly because it was not a strong Crown case.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for offences related to the illegal possession of a loaded handgun.

He argued that the handgun evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that under the Grant framework, the officer acted in good faith, the breach had minimal impact, and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious offences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the appellant's lengthy record and multiple weapons prohibitions.

The offenders were convicted of multiple counts of mortgage fraud involving 11 properties and 27 mortgages over a 7-year period.

They used stolen identities, forged documents, and false powers of attorney to obtain mortgage financing, resulting in over $1 million in losses to financial institutions and the CMHC.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds.

Each offender was sentenced to 4 years in a penitentiary.

The court also ordered fines in lieu of forfeiture totaling $495,535.04 and a joint and several restitution order in the same amount payable to the CMHC.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences arising from an intended armed robbery.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on his evidence regarding an innocent association, failing to instruct the jury on the knowledge element of the section 95 charge (knowing the gun was loaded), and failing to stay the section 94 conviction based on the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any error regarding the innocent association evidence was of no consequence, the omission of the knowledge element caused no substantial wrong given the context of an intended armed robbery, and the trial judge correctly concluded that Kienapple did not apply.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The trial judge properly concluded the proposed sentence was contrary to the administration of justice, as the appellant committed the current offence against the same victim while serving an intermittent sentence for a previous offence against them, making specific deterrence an overwhelming consideration.