J. Sandy Tse

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder after confessing to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his section 7 Charter right to silence and should have been excluded at common law.

He also argued the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence on false confessions and failing to adequately warn the jury about the unreliability of his statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the right to silence is not engaged when a suspect is not detained, the police conduct would not shock the community, the expert evidence was unnecessary, and the jury instructions were sufficient.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and related offences arising from an attack at an ATM.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness identification by the victim, who identified the appellant outside the courtroom at the preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury about the highly problematic nature of the out-of-court identification.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by refusing to allow defence counsel to cross-examine the victim about a conversation he had with his father during a break in his cross-examination.

The appellant appealed multiple sexual offence convictions arising from allegations by three young complainants, challenging the constitutionality of the anal intercourse counts, the jury charge on reasonable doubt, expert evidence on child sexual abuse disclosure patterns, the absence of a clear and sharp Vetrovec warning, and the admission of similar fact evidence.

The court quashed the three s. 159 convictions because the provision had been declared unconstitutional.

The remaining grounds failed: the charge as a whole did not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted on an improper standard, the expert evidence was necessary to explain inconsistent disclosures and recantations, no mandatory strong Vetrovec warning was required, and the similar fact ruling attracted deference.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a firearms offence.

He argued the police lacked articulable cause to detain and search him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the officers had a reasonable suspicion based on a detailed and compelling tip from an identified complainant, justifying a pat-down search.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed due to the seriousness of the offence, though a stay was entered on one count due to the rule against multiple convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence of 6.5 years' imprisonment (including pre-sentence credit).

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on s. 41 of the Criminal Code and in allowing the Crown to cross-examine a witness on a prior statement under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions benefited the appellant and the jury understood the limited use of the prior statement.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the jump to a 6.5-year sentence was an error in principle given the appellant's record.

The sentence was reduced to 3 years (5 years total with 2 years' credit).

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction and a nine-month custodial sentence arising from brief acts of sexual intercourse where consent was the sole live issue.

The court held that the trial judge's findings, including the appellant's own admissions, confirmed a lack of consent in relation to the second sexual act.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, given the appellant's youth, lack of record, family support, the short duration of the acts, and the absence of a need for probation, the sentence was found excessive and reduced to six months.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual intercourse with a female under 14 and indecent assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting a line of evidence he sought to adduce.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the admission of the evidence was a matter within the trial judge's discretion and there was no basis to interfere with the exercise of that discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea and sought to withdraw the plea, arguing it should not stand.

The court accepted trial counsel's affidavit that the plea was fully informed and voluntary and made in the face of an overwhelming Crown case.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence and challenged the refusal of a conditional sentence for offences involving a large quantity of counterfeit travellers cheques, forged identification, embossing plates, a criminal record, and commission of the offences while on probation.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a second degree murder conviction arising from the shooting death of his former partner after the end of their relationship.

He argued that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to stand aside prospective jurors for potential partiality, and further alleged errors in the jury charge relating to motive evidence and the treatment of potentially confirmatory evidence for a suspect witness.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 633 permits a trial judge to stand aside jurors for suspected partiality as part of the flexibility built into the jury selection process, although the timing of the stand-asides before names were drawn was erroneous but cured without prejudice.

The court also held that no limiting instruction was required for threat evidence admitted as motive evidence and that the charge on supporting evidence for the impugned witness was consistent with the common-sense approach mandated by Vetrovec.

The appeal was dismissed.