Anthony De Marco

The applicant, Ramone Campbell, sought to exclude evidence in his trial for robbery and sexual assault, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that police violated the applicant's reasonable expectation of privacy by obtaining cellphone subscriber information and pinging data without judicial authorization or exigent circumstances, and further violated his right to counsel by delaying the advisement and questioning him before he had the opportunity to consult counsel.

These violations led to an invalid search warrant for his room.

Applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct, coupled with the significant impact on the applicant's privacy and right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

Consequently, the court granted the application, excluding clothing, a cellphone, and an imitation firearm found in the applicant's room.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and interfering with a body.

The court found that while the accused appreciated the nature and quality of his acts and knew they were legally wrong, his schizophrenia rendered him incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

Based on expert psychiatric opinions and other evidence, the court concluded that the accused met the burden of proof for the Not Criminally Responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR-MD) defence under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder for the 1983 killings of two women.

The murders remained unsolved for decades until genetic genealogy identified the offender.

The Crown sought a 22-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 18 years.

The court considered the extreme gravity of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the brutal nature of the killings, alongside Gladue factors and the offender's guilty pleas.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 21 years.

This criminal trial addressed charges of possession of a restricted handgun.

The court first heard a blended Charter application, alleging violations of sections 9 (unlawful arrest due to lack of reasonable and probable grounds) and 8 (unreasonable search incident to arrest).

The court found no Charter violations, determining that police had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on extensive wiretap evidence and that the search incident to arrest was lawful.

Subsequently, the court proceeded to the trial on the merits, finding the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a restricted firearm with knowledge, largely relying on circumstantial evidence, including the interpretation of intercepted communications.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought 6 to 9 months of custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The offender suffered from severe, poorly controlled schizophrenia and committed the offence while abstinent from his medication.

The court found that the offender's mental illness significantly reduced his moral culpability and that real incarceration would likely cause his health to deteriorate.

Applying the principle of restraint, the court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence followed by 2 years of probation.

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of sexual assault and choking.

At sentencing, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The court found the provision violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force and effect.

Applying Gladue principles, the court considered the offender's severe childhood trauma, intergenerational trauma, and alcoholism, which reduced his moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a blended sentence of a 2-year less a day conditional sentence for the sexual assault and a concurrent 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the choking.

The accused, R.S., charged with sexual assault, brought an application to introduce text messages and an email between himself and the complainant, L.H., under ss. 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court partially granted the application, admitting the text messages.

These messages, exchanged proximate to and after the alleged assaults, were deemed relevant to L.H.'s credibility regarding consent and the narrative of events, possessing significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice, and crucial for the defence's right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized a holistic consideration of factors under s. 278.92(3) and rejected stereotypical interpretations of victim behaviour.

However, the email, which described an erotic dream of L.H. involving R.S. and was sexual in nature, was found to fall under s. 276(4) as sexual activity.

As no s. 276 application was brought for its admission, and it would have been dismissed on the merits for relying on a proscribed inference about consent, the email was deemed inadmissible.

During a trial for sexual assault, the accused brought a renewed application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant.

The application was renewed after the complainant testified in-chief.

The court partially granted the application, finding that the evidence was necessary to provide context to specific text messages and statements made by the complainant regarding their platonic relationship.

The court held that admitting the evidence for this limited purpose did not rely on twin-myth reasoning and its probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice.

R.S., charged with sexual assault and choking, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce evidence of three prior consensual sexual encounters with the complainant, L.H. The defence argued this evidence was relevant to establish an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and/or to challenge L.H.'s credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that R.S.'s belief was based on a mistake of law ("No" means "No") and not a mistake of fact.

The court emphasized that prior sexual activities, especially those where consent was vitiated by an expressed lack of agreement, could not form the basis of a defence of honest but mistaken belief, nor could they be used to infer consent or attack credibility without engaging in prohibited "twin myths." The evidence lacked significant probative value and was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice and the complainant's dignity and privacy.

The defendant was charged with assault following a physical altercation with a teenage girl on a downtown Toronto street.

The defendant had directed offensive words at the girl and two of her friends, both of whom were wearing hijabs.

The Crown alleged the defendant initiated both the verbal and physical confrontation.

The defendant claimed the physical altercation was a consensual fight that began when the complainant punched him first.

The court found that while the defendant's credibility was questionable, his evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to who first applied force.

The court concluded the incident constituted a consensual fight rather than an assault and acquitted the defendant.

The accused were charged with possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and money laundering following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession of large quantities of cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, and psilocybin, as well as significant amounts of cash.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including keys, documents, and debt lists, overwhelmingly established that both accused were in possession of the narcotics and that the cash was derived from trafficking.

Both accused were found guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought applications to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The police obtained search warrants for a condominium and a vehicle based on information from a confidential informant.

Prior to executing the warrants, police discovered the accused's vehicle at a different condominium, arrested him, and made a warrantless exigent entry into the unit to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The court found the initial warrants were validly issued and that the exigent entry was lawful under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court also dismissed challenges to a strip search and an alleged delay in facilitating the right to counsel.

The applications were dismissed.

The offender, suffering from untreated schizophrenia, attacked a police officer from behind with a sledge hammer in a police station lobby, attempting 'suicide by cop'.

He was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and weapons offences.

The court weighed the severe psychological impact on the victim and the unprovoked nature of the attack against the offender's mental illness and remorse.

The court sentenced the offender to 18 months in custody, in addition to 45 months of pre-sentence custody credit, followed by three years of probation with strict treatment conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He also argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to credibility and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment fair and balanced, the fresh evidence incapable of affecting the verdict, and trial counsel's performance competent.

The accused applied to exclude cocaine discovered in a vehicle following his arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and that the warrantless vehicle search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that police had reasonable and probable grounds based on surveillance, confidential source information linking the co‑accused to trafficking, and the observation of a hand‑to‑hand drug transaction through the passenger window of the vehicle the accused was driving.

The arrest was therefore lawful and the vehicle search was valid as a search incident to arrest.

Even if a Charter breach had occurred, the court held the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery while armed with a firearm and one count of being disguised with intent.

The robberies occurred over a six-day period in June 2010, targeting four convenience stores in Toronto.

The accused participated in the robberies as part of a group, though he did not handle the firearm or directly participate in the violence.

The court imposed a sentence balancing denunciation and deterrence against the accused's youth, remorse, cooperation with police, and rehabilitation prospects.

The offenders were convicted of multiple counts of mortgage fraud involving 11 properties and 27 mortgages over a 7-year period.

They used stolen identities, forged documents, and false powers of attorney to obtain mortgage financing, resulting in over $1 million in losses to financial institutions and the CMHC.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale frauds.

Each offender was sentenced to 4 years in a penitentiary.

The court also ordered fines in lieu of forfeiture totaling $495,535.04 and a joint and several restitution order in the same amount payable to the CMHC.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, gross indecency, and sexual exploitation of a young relative, as well as his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or reliance on corroborative evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the trial judge correctly identified the minimum three-year range for sexual offences against a child by an adult in a position of trust, and appropriately weighed mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing a bank employee to testify to facts referred to in a 1994 letter and that the jury charge contained errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary ruling based on past recollection recorded or refreshing memory.

Furthermore, the hearsay concerns were moot because defence counsel had agreed to admit the evidence for its truth for tactical reasons.

The court also found the jury charge to be balanced and fair.

The appellant was convicted of assault and uttering a death threat against his wife.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed his appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to give sufficient reasons for his decision.

The trial judge did not explain why he believed the complainant despite inconsistencies in her evidence, nor did he reference the W.D. test or the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.