Kelvin Ramchand

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown’s appeal from a stay of drug charges entered under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The Crown argued that the trial judge should have deducted 92 days as a discrete exceptional circumstance due to a co-accused’s discharge of counsel.

The Court found no error in the trial judge’s approach or conclusion, holding that the Crown could have proceeded separately against the respondent, as it had with other co-accused.

The stay was upheld.

The applicant, having been convicted of drug trafficking and weapons offences and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed bail on the public interest ground, citing the seriousness of the fentanyl trafficking offences.

The motion judge granted bail, finding that the applicant was not a flight or safety risk, and that his appeal grounds—alleging the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by failing to consider s. 8 and s. 10 breaches holistically—were of moderate strength.

Balancing the reviewability and enforceability interests, the court concluded that public confidence in the administration of justice favoured release.

The appellant, Akshay Prasad, sought to reopen his appeal from conviction for cocaine trafficking, based on fresh expert evidence concerning the unreliability of digitally enhanced audio recordings and transcripts due to "priming" and listener bias.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding the proposed expert evidence inadmissible at trial as it was not necessary and usurped the trier of fact's role.

The court also found the evidence not cogent and that due diligence was not met for its admission as fresh evidence on appeal, concluding there was no clear and compelling case of a miscarriage of justice to warrant reopening the appeal.

Brian Aguiar pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for trafficking and unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm.

Police found significant quantities of drugs and a Glock handgun in hidden compartments in vehicles registered to him.

The Crown sought a 9-year consecutive sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or a maximum of 3 years further imprisonment.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the sophisticated nature of the trafficking, the dangerous combination of drugs and a firearm, and greed as a motive.

Mitigating factors included the offender's difficult past, positive character references, and guilty pleas, which were particularly mitigating due to serious police violations of solicitor-client privilege during wiretap interceptions.

The court credited 397 days of pre-sentence custody at 2:1 due to harsh conditions, and also applied "Downes credit" for strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years imprisonment for the cocaine conviction and 2 years concurrent for the firearm conviction, resulting in a net sentence of 950 days (approximately 2.6 years) from the date of sentencing, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and Downes credit.

The court declined a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for the serious nature of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by treating proximity and the appellant’s customary use of the bedroom where the drugs were found as a proxy for possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge carefully reviewed the evidence and provided clear reasons for concluding possession was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting other possibilities as unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit murder, brought an application to exclude evidence seized during multiple warrantless searches.

The court found the warrantless entry at 10 York Street was justified by exigent circumstances to prevent a planned shooting.

The warrantless entry at 88 Harbour Street and the seizure of a vehicle breached section 8 of the Charter, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

However, the search of a bedroom at 15 Danum Road involved egregious Charter breaches, including a violation of the right to counsel and an invalid consent, leading the court to exclude the drugs and cash found there.

The appellant, Michael Weber, failed to surrender into custody as required by a court order and did not appear in court for his appeal.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed his appeal as abandoned.

The offender, an aviation mechanic, was convicted of attempting to import cocaine and possessing proceeds of crime after participating in a police sting operation.

He used his airport security clearance to retrieve a package he believed contained one kilogram of cocaine from an airplane panel.

The court found his moral culpability was significantly higher than a mere courier due to his breach of trust and planning.

He was sentenced to a net term of 4 years and 11 months in custody.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking cocaine.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission and use of audio recordings and transcripts, the expert evidence relating to cocaine, and the conviction on an alternative theory of liability not explicitly advanced by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the audio recordings and transcripts, nor in the reliance on expert evidence to link drug lingo to cocaine.

Regarding the alternative theory, the court found no prejudice to the appellant, as the indictment's language covered the "offer to traffic" which was completed on an earlier date than specified for delivery, and this was part of a continuous chain of events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police during the execution of a general warrant and upon his arrest.

The court previously found that the applicant's Charter rights were breached.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found that the police conduct was serious, noting that the lead investigator provided misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) regarding the necessity of a general warrant.

Although the evidence was reliable and essential to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the serious state misconduct.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded.

The applicant brought an application to quash a general warrant and exclude evidence obtained during a covert entry and search of his residence.

The police had obtained a general warrant that authorized them to enter the applicant's unit once identified, provided they determined there were reasonable and probable grounds to believe evidence of drug trafficking was inside.

The Superior Court of Justice found the general warrant invalid on two grounds: it impermissibly delegated the judicial function of determining reasonable and probable grounds to the police, and it violated s. 487.01(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the police could have obtained a standard search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act once the unit was identified.

The applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were breached, and a subsequent hearing was ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant, Rajin Sunda, abandoned his appeal from conviction but appealed his sentence for drug trafficking and possession.

The parties jointly proposed a resolution for the sentence appeal, suggesting the remaining custodial sentence be stayed and replaced with a one-year probation period.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence, agreeing with the joint proposal.

The court emphasized the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress, including addiction treatment and compliance with release conditions, finding that re-incarceration would be detrimental to his rehabilitation and contrary to public interest.

The appellant was arrested while attempting to facilitate a drug transaction with an undercover officer.

He claimed to be acting as a police agent under the direction and control of a detective.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's O'Connor application for third-party police records, found no air of reality to the police agent defence, and refused to leave it with the jury.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on the O'Connor application, the air of reality finding, the jury instructions, and the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal raised two grounds: (1) that the conviction was unreasonable given the inconsistency with a co-accused's acquittal, and (2) that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding trial delay.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable, as the co-accused testified and was believed while the appellant's witness was rejected as untruthful.

The trial delay of 27 months fell within the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The sentence of ten years was upheld as fit given the large quantity of cocaine involved and the appellant's prior conviction for the same offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal, hearing the appeal concurrently with a co-accused's similar appeal, found no unreasonable delay, agreeing with the trial judge's calculation of 27 months net delay.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The accused, Carlos Silva, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants and an arrest, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown brought a cross-application to admit certain police notes and reports as hearsay evidence.

The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful, and that no Charter rights were violated.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, admitting property reports and an exhibit list, but excluding an officer's notes due to reliability concerns stemming from the officer's fentanyl overdose death shortly after the seizure.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, noting it was a transitional case.

The total delay, calculated from the date the information was sworn to the anticipated end of trial, was 28 months and 12 days, which was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The defence conceded 14 days of delay.

The court rejected the defence's argument to include pre-charge delay in the s. 11(b) calculation and found no actual prejudice to the right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) due to pre-charge delay or missing evidence.

The court found the defence took meaningful steps to expedite, but the proceedings did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused were charged with possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and money laundering following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession of large quantities of cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, and psilocybin, as well as significant amounts of cash.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including keys, documents, and debt lists, overwhelmingly established that both accused were in possession of the narcotics and that the cash was derived from trafficking.

Both accused were found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and related weapons offences, as well as his five-year sentence for trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his presence in the bathroom and possession of the cocaine, that the verdict was unreasonable due to unexplained contradictions, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because a key witness was not called.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the evidence and owed deference, that fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance did not meet the Palmer test, and that the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking offences, brought applications to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The police obtained search warrants for a condominium and a vehicle based on information from a confidential informant.

Prior to executing the warrants, police discovered the accused's vehicle at a different condominium, arrested him, and made a warrantless exigent entry into the unit to prevent the destruction of evidence.

The court found the initial warrants were validly issued and that the exigent entry was lawful under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court also dismissed challenges to a strip search and an alleged delay in facilitating the right to counsel.

The applications were dismissed.