Reid Rusonik

The applicant challenged CDSA search warrants, his arrest, and the ensuing searches on the basis that the Information to Obtain relied on a single confidential informant whose information was not shown to be credible, compelling, or meaningfully corroborated.

The court held that the ITO amounted to an unverified generalized tip and failed on all branches of the Debot framework, such that the warrants could not have issued and the arrest lacked reasonable grounds.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the state conduct serious, the impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests considerable, and concluded that admission of the firearms evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute notwithstanding the strong societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

The firearms and associated items seized from the applicant and his vehicle were excluded.

The Crown brought a forfeiture application pursuant to section 771 of the Criminal Code following the accused's breach of his recognizance of bail.

The accused had pled guilty to three serious drugs and weapons charges and was released on strict conditions, including wearing a GPS monitoring bracelet and residing with his surety.

The accused knowingly removed his GPS bracelet and absconded from his surety.

The court found the accused's conduct constituted a flagrant disregard for the terms of release and ordered forfeiture of the full $200,000 pledged by the accused and the full $50,000 pledged by the surety.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The applicants were charged with serious drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The total delay from charge to the date of hearing the application was 38.5 months.

The Crown argued that certain periods constituted defence delay, which would reduce the net delay below the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the defence delay attributable to the applicants was approximately 5.7 to 5.85 months, resulting in a net delay of 32.65 to 32.8 months, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The Applicant, Zhong Zhang, faced charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and cocaine.

He brought three Charter applications: a Section 11(b) application for unreasonable delay, a Section 8 Garofoli challenge to judicial authorizations, and a Section 7 application alleging a failure by the affiant to make notes.

The court dismissed the 11(b) application, finding the delay was attributable to the defence's late and voluminous filings.

For the Section 8 challenge, the court, applying R. v. Maric, limited the Applicant's standing to only two December 29 ITOs where he had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and found no Section 8 violation as the affiant made full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The Section 7 application was also dismissed, as the court found the affiant complied with note-taking duties and no Charter breach was established.

All applications were dismissed.

The applicants, charged with drug and firearm offences, sought an order under the Criminal Code and Charter to access $186,269 seized during their arrest to pay for reasonable legal expenses.

The Crown opposed, arguing a third party had an interest in the funds and that the applicants had not been refused Legal Aid.

The court granted the application, finding the applicants established a possessory interest, demonstrated no other person had a valid claim (as the co-accused had absconded), and that applying for Legal Aid would be futile given the circumstances and complexity of the case.

The court also found the proposed legal fees reasonable for senior counsel.

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

This ruling addresses a Garofoli application brought by the defendant, Kingslee Christie, challenging the facial validity of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The defendant argued that the heavily redacted ITO, which protected confidential informer (CI) identities, lacked sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for searching his residence.

The court reviewed the Garofoli six-step procedure, particularly step six, which permits reliance on redacted material through judicial summaries.

The court found that the defendant was able to meaningfully challenge the redacted information and that the CI information met the "credible, compelling, and corroborated" criteria.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the ITO contained sufficient information to establish reasonable grounds for the search warrant, and therefore, the application to quash the warrant was dismissed.

The court rendered a sentencing decision for Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, who were found guilty of eight firearms, drug, and proceeds of crime offences.

The judge accepted the joint sentencing submission from counsel, imposing a nine-year penitentiary sentence for Puentes-Reed and an eight-year penitentiary sentence for Yousuf, less time served.

The decision emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, acknowledging the severe societal harms caused by drug trafficking and the associated violence, while also considering the offenders' prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused, Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, were jointly charged with multiple offences including possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine and marijuana for trafficking, and various firearm offences.

They were found asleep in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay containing large amounts of cash, drugs, and firearms.

The defence argued lack of possession and knowledge, with Puentes-Reed claiming he was intoxicated and inadvertently brought to the residence.

The court rejected the defence's explanations, finding them incredible and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the nature of the "safe house" operation.

Both accused were found guilty on all remaining charges, as the Crown proved constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceedings, alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court analyzed the delay, including a 'gap period' where the Crown had temporarily stayed the charges under section 579 of the Criminal Code to protect a larger ongoing investigation.

The court found that the Jordan clock did not run during this gap period, as the stay was not an illegitimate end-run around the presumptive ceiling.

After deducting 90 days for the exceptional discrete event of the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay was calculated at 13 months and 7 days, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit murder, brought an application to exclude evidence seized during multiple warrantless searches.

The court found the warrantless entry at 10 York Street was justified by exigent circumstances to prevent a planned shooting.

The warrantless entry at 88 Harbour Street and the seizure of a vehicle breached section 8 of the Charter, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

However, the search of a bedroom at 15 Danum Road involved egregious Charter breaches, including a violation of the right to counsel and an invalid consent, leading the court to exclude the drugs and cash found there.

The accused pled guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Prior to sentencing, he brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging that police officers stole $45,000 from him during his arrest.

The court found the accused to be a credible witness and rejected the evidence of the arresting officer, concluding on a balance of probabilities that the money was stolen while in police custody.

The court held that the police misconduct, combined with the officer misleading the court, seriously undermined the integrity of the justice system.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the only appropriate remedy.

The accused, Malcolm Dennis Edwards, pleaded not guilty to multiple charges including failing to stop, obstructing a peace officer, assault with a weapon, and various firearm possession offences.

The trial addressed Charter allegations regarding the validity of an arrest warrant and the admissibility of seized evidence, as well as the identity of the driver in a separate incident.

The court found the arrest warrant lawfully obtained and the firearm admissible.

While the accused conceded guilt on the August 7 driving allegation, the Crown failed to prove identity for the June 10 charges, leading to an acquittal on those counts.

The accused was convicted on the August 7 charges.

The accused, John, David, and Jonathan Pham, brought a Charter application under section 11(b) for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was nearly 28 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to an "exceptional circumstance" related to their post-ruling investigation into surveillance evidence.

The court found that the Crown's decision to investigate and introduce new evidence after a section 8 ruling (which found police misrepresentations) was not a reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable event, as the issues were central to the litigation from the outset.

Therefore, the delay was not attributable to an exceptional circumstance, and the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded without justification.

The accused brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude intercepted communications obtained under a Part VI wiretap authorization issued during a large‑scale police investigation into alleged fraud and violence within the Greater Toronto Area tow‑truck industry.

They argued the authorization was facially invalid, that the Information to Obtain failed to establish reasonable grounds, that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations, and that confidential informant summaries were inadequate.

The court conducted both facial and sub‑facial review of the ITO, including amplification based on cross‑examination of the affiant.

It held that any drafting defects could be addressed through severance and that the ITO, viewed holistically, established a credibly‑based probability that a criminal organization associated with the Paramount Group engaged in fraud and violence.

The court also found no deliberate misconduct by the affiant and ruled the judicial summaries provided a meaningful basis to challenge informant evidence.

Barrington Grant brought an application under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to challenge the validity of a search warrant for a rental vehicle he was driving and to exclude a firearm found therein.

The court addressed whether Grant had standing to challenge the warrant and whether the Information to Obtain (ITO) properly disclosed reasonable probable grounds for the search.

The court found that Grant did have standing but concluded that the ITO, when read holistically, established the necessary reasonable grounds, despite some conditional language used by the affiant.

Consequently, the application to invalidate the search warrant failed, and the firearm was deemed admissible at trial.

The applicants, charged with offences related to a tow truck turf war, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) that supported a wiretap authorization.

The applicants argued that the affiant made material omissions and misrepresentations regarding witness statements and other evidence.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant on three specific topics where omissions or misstatements could potentially undermine the preconditions for the authorization, while denying leave on other topics that merely challenged reasonable inferences drawn by the affiant.

The accused was tried for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police obtained judicial authorizations based on information from a confidential informant and an 'address of interest' identified through invalid production orders for Health Canada records.

The court found that the production orders were unconstitutional as they did not disclose an offence, and the information derived from them had to be excised.

The remaining information from the confidential informant lacked credibility and corroboration, failing to provide reasonable grounds for the authorizations.

The court found a serious violation of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights and excluded the seized drugs under s. 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The applicant, charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 24 months, but after deducting defence delay and delay caused by the exceptional circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic, the net delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the remaining delay was reasonable and that the justice system took appropriate mitigating steps during the pandemic.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a motion for disclosure of application materials related to two British Columbia production orders and the date the RCMP was advised by the Crown that those orders were invalid.

The defence sought this disclosure to support a section 8 Charter challenge to authorizations obtained in Ontario.

The court granted the application, finding that the materials were part of the investigative file, relevant to the Charter challenge, and that the date of the Crown's advice was not protected by solicitor-client privilege.