Erryl Jane Conover Taggart

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.5 metric tonnes of cocaine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking, receiving a 16.5-year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by anchoring his sentence to the 19-year sentence imposed on the scheme's organizer pursuant to a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the co-accused's sentence as a starting point and failing to adequately account for the appellant's subordinate role, lack of prior record, and cognitive limitations.

The sentence was reduced to 12 years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of Damodar Arapakota on a charge of bribing a foreign public official contrary to section 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA).

The respondent had paid for a family vacation in Orlando, Florida for a Botswana government official in exchange for letters confirming the government's intention to award a contract to the respondent's company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that the Crown had failed to prove that the respondent received a material business advantage in return for the trip and that there was insufficient nexus between the trip and the letters.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in requiring proof of a specific act or omission, this error did not affect the outcome because the trial judge correctly found that the respondent received no meaningful business advantage.

Justice Monahan dissented, arguing that the trial judge's interpretation of "as consideration for" was unduly narrow and that the acquittal should be set aside for a new trial.

The accused was convicted after trial of possession of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown and Defence reached a joint submission for a sentence of 7.5 years, less credit for pre-trial custody and jail conditions mitigation, resulting in a net sentence of 7 years.

The court accepted the joint submission as fit, considering the gravity of the offences, the accused's personal circumstances including systemic disadvantage and social context, immigration consequences, and mitigating factors including harsh pre-trial incarceration conditions at Maplehurst.

The decision addresses the admissibility and weight of evidence in a drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on the negligent loss of a police entry video documenting the state of the apartment before a search.

The court finds a breach of section 7 of the Charter due to unacceptable police negligence but declines to exclude the evidence, instead giving reduced weight to the testimony of the officers responsible.

The accused is found guilty on the drug trafficking counts but acquitted on the proceeds of crime count.

This decision addresses a constitutional challenge to section 9(5)(a)(i) of the Cannabis Act, which prohibits discharges for indictable offences of possession of cannabis for the purpose of distribution.

The court upholds the constitutionality of the provision, finding that the infringement on liberty is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad, does not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence, and does not create a distinction based on race in its impact.

The court sentences the accused, Rene Smith, to a fine of $7,500 and makes several ancillary orders.

The accused, Rene Smith, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was over 31 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court found no defence delay but identified two exceptional circumstances: the court's loss of disclosure (4 months and 10 days) and a mistrial (11 days), which were beyond the Crown's control.

The appointment of an amicus was not deemed exceptional as the need was foreseeable.

After subtracting the exceptional delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that the remaining delay was not unreasonable, despite the applicant's efforts to expedite proceedings, as his conduct made the case more complex.

The offender pled guilty to conspiracy to export cannabis, possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing proceeds of crime, and breaching a weapons prohibition order.

During his arrest, police used excessive force by unjustifiably tasering him, resulting in a section 7 Charter breach.

The Crown sought a 5-year sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the gravity of the offences, including the large quantities of drugs and sophisticated conspiracy, against mitigating factors such as the guilty pleas, house arrest bail, and the Charter breach.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years imprisonment.

This ruling addresses a Garofoli application brought by the defendant, Kingslee Christie, challenging the facial validity of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The defendant argued that the heavily redacted ITO, which protected confidential informer (CI) identities, lacked sufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for searching his residence.

The court reviewed the Garofoli six-step procedure, particularly step six, which permits reliance on redacted material through judicial summaries.

The court found that the defendant was able to meaningfully challenge the redacted information and that the CI information met the "credible, compelling, and corroborated" criteria.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the ITO contained sufficient information to establish reasonable grounds for the search warrant, and therefore, the application to quash the warrant was dismissed.

The applicant, Dean McAlpine, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of ss. 7 (excessive force during arrest) and 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found that the police used excessive force by deploying a taser drive stun after the applicant was compliant, breaching his s. 7 rights.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, as the applicant was offered a call to duty counsel when he could not provide his chosen counsel's full details, and privacy was afforded.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence, finding that a sentence reduction would be the appropriate remedy for the s. 7 breach.

The appellants, Daye, Isaac, and Saunders, appealed their drug-related convictions.

Isaac also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals from conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings regarding Charter breaches (s. 10(b), s. 9, s. 11(b)), refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant, or the issuance of search warrants.

The court also found Saunders' conviction for constructive possession reasonable.

However, Isaac was granted leave to appeal his sentence, and his six-year global sentence was reduced to four years, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider his de facto guilty plea.

The defendant, Aziel Bailey, was charged with possessing over 30g of cannabis for distribution, contrary to s. 9(2) of the Cannabis Act.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the large quantity of cannabis found in the residence he fled.

The court assessed the credibility of police witnesses and the defendant.

The defendant's testimony, which attempted to explain his presence in the residence and his flight, was rejected as implausible and untruthful.

Based on the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's flight, the contents of his satchel, the presence of drugs in adjoining residences, the smell of cannabis, and his non-compliance with police commands, the court concluded that the defendant was fully aware of and maintained control over the cannabis.

The court found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in his vehicle during the execution of a search warrant.

The accused brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing the search warrant was improperly issued and his right to counsel was delayed.

The court found the search warrant for the vehicle was valid, but the warrant for the residence was invalid.

The court also found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a systemic police practice of delaying access to counsel until after a search warrant is executed.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence seized from the vehicle and the accused's statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, a first-time Black offender, was found guilty by a jury of simple possession of 95.6g of cocaine, having been acquitted of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought an 18-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered the significant quantity of cocaine as an aggravating factor, and the accused's lack of criminal record, compliance with bail, employment, and the impact of anti-Black racism as mitigating factors.

The court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence with strict house arrest conditions, followed by 24 months of probation and 100 hours of community service.

This addendum clarifies the payment deadline for fines imposed in the main appeal decision (2021 ONCA 665).

The respondent requested clarification, and the court ordered that the fines be paid within seven days of the release of this addendum.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that reduced fines and eliminated a custodial sentence for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellate judge that the sentencing judge erred in principle by comparing the case to one involving deliberate environmental harm, thus upholding the elimination of the custodial sentence for the individual respondent.

However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the reduction of fines, finding no error in the original sentencing judge's imposition of separate fines for each count, and restored the original fines for both the corporate and individual respondents.

The appellant, Nigel Lewis, appealed his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and sought leave to appeal his three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence.

The convictions arose from a controlled delivery of cocaine hidden in a package.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's inference of the appellant's knowledge and control of the drugs to be reasonable, dismissing the conviction appeal.

Regarding the sentence, the court found the three-and-a-half-year sentence to be within the appropriate range for the amount of cocaine (132 grams), distinguishing it from cases involving guilty pleas and emphasizing that sentencing is not a mathematical calculation.

The court upheld the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order on charges including possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the proposal of new, closer sureties and the resolution of numerous outstanding breach charges.

Applying the principles from R. v. Zora, the court considered the applicant's history of bail breaches in the context of his drug addiction.

The court concluded that a strict house arrest plan with electronic monitoring and substantial sureties adequately addressed the secondary and tertiary grounds, and granted the applicant's release.

The individual and corporate accused appealed their sentences for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, involving the failure to safely dispose of PCBs and comply with an environmental protection compliance order.

The sentencing judge had imposed significant fines and an intermittent jail term on the individual.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on a precedent involving a much higher degree of moral culpability and actual harm, whereas the present case involved passive negligence and potential harm.

The appeal court vacated the jail sentence for the individual and reduced the fines for both accused, emphasizing the principle of restraint in regulatory sentencing and the distinction between actual and potential harm.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after 1.44 kilograms of the drug were found in a hidden compartment of his luggage upon arrival at Pearson International Airport from St. Lucia.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge of the drugs.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, as documentary evidence and testimony established that the accused's bag had been lost for two days in St. Lucia, raising the reasonable inference that third parties planted the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought pre-trial motions seeking the exclusion of evidence discovered during a vehicle search and utterances made to police.

The applicant alleged violations of her rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, as well as racial profiling and involuntary statements.

The court found the utterances were voluntary and dismissed the racial profiling claim.

While the court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a six-minute delay in providing the right to counsel, it held the initial detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and the subsequent search of the vehicle and purse was authorized under the Liquor Licence Act.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.