Melanie J. Webb

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding her dismissal for discreditable conduct and insubordination.

The charges stemmed from her failure to attend internal investigations and her use of a personal Twitter account to make inappropriate comments about the Chief of Police and others.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness and accommodation for her post-traumatic stress disorder, and that her dismissal infringed her Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the hearing officer reasonably accommodated her and properly proceeded in her absence.

The Court also upheld the Commission's finding that sections 7 and 15 of the Charter were not engaged, and that her dismissal was a proportionate limit on her freedom of expression under section 2(b).

The applicant, C.G., sought release on bail pending his conviction appeal for two counts of sexual assault, for which he is serving a six-year custodial sentence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court applied the three-part test under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code, requiring the applicant to establish that the appeal is not frivolous, he will surrender into custody, and his detention is not necessary in the public interest.

While the "not frivolous" threshold was met, the applicant failed to satisfy the court that he would surrender, given his history of non-compliance with immigration orders and the increased incentive to abscond due to potential removal from Canada and the lengthy sentence.

Furthermore, the court found that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest, concluding that the enforceability of the judgment outweighed reviewability due to the gravity of the sexual offence, the breach of trust involved, and the perceived weakness of the appeal grounds.

Consequently, the motion for release on bail was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The application judge had included a six-month period during which the respondent pursued a good faith application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in the delay calculation.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found this to be an error.

The court held that a good faith defence appeal period, being outside the Crown's control, constitutes an "exceptional circumstance" and should be deducted from the total delay.

With this deduction, the total delay was well below the Jordan presumptive ceiling, and thus not unreasonable.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The appellant, a police officer on leave with PTSD, was found guilty of insubordination and discreditable conduct for refusing to attend interviews, harassing another officer, and making numerous offensive and derogatory posts about the police service on Twitter.

The Hearing Officer ordered her dismissal.

On appeal, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the Hearing Officer's decisions to deny the appellant's requests for an indefinite adjournment and to proceed in absentia.

The Commission found no procedural unfairness and upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of dismissal.

The Commission also conducted a Doré analysis and concluded that the disciplinary action was a proportionate limit on the appellant's Charter right to freedom of expression.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and three counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 401.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's prolonged inattention constituted a "marked and substantial departure" from the standard of care.

However, the Court granted the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from seven years to five years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit due to an overemphasis on denunciation and general deterrence, and insufficient consideration of the appellant's positive personal circumstances and low risk of recidivism.

This is a sentencing decision for Raphael Fortune, who was found guilty after trial of fraud over $5,000 and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The fraud involved a sophisticated scheme where the accused defrauded the complainant of over $300,000 CAD through a fake diamond investment opportunity.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned and deliberate nature of the fraud, the large scale of the loss, and the significant impact on the victim, balanced against mitigating factors including the accused being a first offender, his age (55), and his caregiving responsibilities.

The Crown sought 24-30 months imprisonment, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence or 12-18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment, followed by one year probation, a restitution order of $303,059.75, a fine in lieu of forfeiture, a prohibition order from managing others' property, and a DNA order.

The court emphasized the need for general deterrence and denunciation in large-scale fraud cases, concluding that a conditional sentence would not adequately address these principles.

The appellant, G.H., appealed convictions for sexual assault and related sexual touching charges, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The trial judge had found the complainant credible but with reliability concerns, which were addressed by confirmatory evidence from the complainant's brother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, including the use of confirmatory evidence and the holistic approach to ongoing sexual abuse allegations.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the five-year sentence within range despite a factual error by the trial judge.

However, a lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order was varied to 20 years in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender based on the sexual offender pathway, finding a high likelihood of future harmful recidivism due to disturbing cognitive distortions, lack of empathy, and personality disorder traits.

However, the court imposed a determinate sentence of 8 years (plus 7 years and 15 days pre-sentence credit, totaling approximately 15 years) followed by a 10-year Long Term Supervision Order, rather than an indeterminate sentence, finding a reasonable expectation that the offender's risk could be managed in the community with appropriate treatment and supervision.

On a Crown summary conviction appeal from an acquittal on a child pornography charge, the court held that the trial judge erred in law in quashing the search warrant on the basis that the police had not investigated whether the subscriber address had a secure or unsecured wireless network.

Applying the law governing review of judicial authorizations, the court held that speculative possibilities of third-party use of a target IP address do not negate otherwise sufficient grounds in an ITO.

The appeal court found the trial judge failed to follow binding authority addressing the same wireless-network argument and improperly treated the absence of such information as fatal to the warrant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Edwin Subia, was found guilty of possession and accessing child pornography, and attempting to obstruct justice.

This decision focuses on the sentencing, where the court considered the nature and quantity of the child pornography, the accused's prior record, and mitigating factors.

The judge declined to view the actual images, relying on detailed descriptions and balancing probative value against prejudicial effects and the open court principle.

The court imposed a sentence of three years in prison for possession, with a concurrent four-month sentence for obstruction of justice, and stayed the accessing charge.

Ancillary orders included a 15-year prohibition on contact with minors and internet use restrictions.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a police interview following his arrest for child pornography offences.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and that his rights under sections 7 and 10(b) of the Charter were breached, particularly when police asked for his cell phone password without restating his right to counsel.

The court found the statements were voluntary, noting the accused had an operating mind and was not subjected to oppressive conditions or inducements.

The court also held that asking for a cell phone password in these circumstances was a routine question that did not require a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The statements were ruled admissible.

This addendum clarifies the payment deadline for fines imposed in the main appeal decision (2021 ONCA 665).

The respondent requested clarification, and the court ordered that the fines be paid within seven days of the release of this addendum.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that reduced fines and eliminated a custodial sentence for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellate judge that the sentencing judge erred in principle by comparing the case to one involving deliberate environmental harm, thus upholding the elimination of the custodial sentence for the individual respondent.

However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the reduction of fines, finding no error in the original sentencing judge's imposition of separate fines for each count, and restored the original fines for both the corporate and individual respondents.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 99 months.

The court found that the accused had actively evaded arrest in Central America for over four years, characterizing this pre-extradition period as defence delay.

Further deductions were made for defence-requested adjournments and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay was calculated at 24 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with multiple counts of robbery alongside a co-accused, applied for severance on the basis that a joint trial would infringe his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, jury trials were suspended, causing significant delay.

The applicant was willing to re-elect for a judge-alone trial, while the co-accused was not.

The court granted the severance application, finding that while most factors favoured a joint trial, the potential injustice caused by the delay and mutually inconsistent elections warranted severance.

Daniel Miller appealed convictions for simple assault and breach of undertaking, following a trial where a mischief to property charge was stayed.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to adequately assist the self-represented accused, insufficiency of the reasons for judgment, and misapprehension of evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice, that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient for appellate review, and no misapprehension of evidence that affected the result.

The individual and corporate accused appealed their sentences for environmental offences under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, involving the failure to safely dispose of PCBs and comply with an environmental protection compliance order.

The sentencing judge had imposed significant fines and an intermittent jail term on the individual.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on a precedent involving a much higher degree of moral culpability and actual harm, whereas the present case involved passive negligence and potential harm.

The appeal court vacated the jail sentence for the individual and reduced the fines for both accused, emphasizing the principle of restraint in regulatory sentencing and the distinction between actual and potential harm.

The appellant was convicted of child luring contrary to s. 172.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and communicating with a person believed to be under 18 for sexual services contrary to s. 212(4).

He was one of 104 people caught in a police sting operation on Backpage.com.

The appellant claimed he believed he was engaged in role-play with an adult, not a 16-year-old.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and found the appellant actually believed the person was 16.

The appellant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 12 months' imprisonment under s. 172.1(2)(a) and 6 months under s. 212(4), to be served concurrently.

On appeal, the conviction was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part: the mandatory minimum under s. 172.1(2)(a) was declared unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable circumstances, though the 12-month sentence imposed was fit.

The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, cannabis resin, and oxycodone) and sentenced to ten months custody less three days' presentence custody.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds for arrest based on reliable confidential informant information corroborated by police surveillance, that the trial judge did not apply uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and that the trial judge's findings on the trafficking purpose were supported by the totality of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of a serious medical issue, and the custodial portion was reduced to time served (44 days with credit for pre-sentence custody), with the victim surcharge set aside.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant based on information from confidential informants.

The Crown relied on redacted portions of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and invoked the "step six" procedure from R. v. Garofoli, providing the accused with a judicial summary rather than the full unredacted ITO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the judicial summary was adequate to permit meaningful challenge to the warrant and that the warrant was validly issued.

The sentence of two years less a day was also upheld as within the appropriate range and not manifestly excessive.