Lucy Anne Cecchetto

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping, extortion, and assault following a home invasion involving sexual assault and confinement.

They appealed their respective sentences of 13 and 12 years' imprisonment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider mitigating factors and the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the sentences fit given the heinous nature of the crimes and the trial judge's proper application of sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child, as well as his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing post-offence conduct, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to consider the reliability of the child's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, provided sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, and adequately addressed reliability.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied as it fell within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global three-year sentence for procuring a 16-year-old girl into prostitution, living off the avails of prostitution, and obtaining sexual services for consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the convictions were reasonably supported by the evidence, including evidence of persuasion and encouragement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court emphasizing the gravity of the offences and the vulnerability of the young complainant.

The applicant, an Aboriginal man, applied for release on bail pending a new trial for second degree murder and firearm offences.

He had been in custody for almost seven years.

The Court of Appeal had previously quashed his convictions and ordered a new trial due to improper jury instructions on self-defence.

Applying Gladue principles and the three grounds for detention under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code, the court found the applicant met his onus.

The court noted his strong community support, model institutional record, and the weakened Crown case.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on a $5,000 cash deposit and sureties.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and using a firearm while committing an indictable offence after shooting the deceased at a party.

The appellant claimed self-defence, testifying that the deceased had threatened him and appeared to be reaching for a gun.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made several errors in instructing the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the issue of retreat, reversed the burden of proof regarding the third element of self-defence, and failed to provide a Baxter instruction.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepdaughter, as well as his seven-year sentence.

He argued that the trial was rendered unfair by the admission of discreditable conduct evidence, that the Crown improperly invited the jury to link the complainant's bad behaviour to the abuse without expert evidence, and that the trial judge gave an improper exhortation to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was relevant to the narrative and credibility, the Crown's arguments were appropriate responses to the defence theory, and the jury instruction was proper.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's strict pre-trial bail conditions and the seven-year sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from a gunfight on Yonge Street that resulted in the death of Jane Creba by a stray bullet.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on how armed persons conceal firearms, by inadequately instructing the jury on the mutual gunfight theory of causation, and by refusing to leave self-defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or conclusion that self-defence lacked an air of reality.

The appellant appealed his convictions and seven-year sentence for historical sexual offences, including indecent assault and buggery, committed against four complainants between 1968 and 1978.

He argued the trial judge made unreasonable credibility findings and failed to address evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and adequately explained.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though a lifetime SOIRA order was reduced to 20 years on consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of touching for a sexual purpose, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding delayed disclosure and alleged recovered memories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully scrutinized the evidence, properly accounted for the historical nature of the offences, and made no palpable and overriding error in finding the complainant credible and reliable.

The appellant appealed her conviction and 18-month sentence for aggravated assault.

She argued the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons by omitting mention of specific evidence and erred in refusing to reopen the trial based on fresh evidence concerning the complainant's victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the omitted evidence was not prominent and the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to reopen the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month sentence was not manifestly excessive.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and choking, as well as his 4.5-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge should have recused himself for having presided over a prior bail review, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the W.(D.) framework.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 4.5-year term was fit given the violence, threats, and the appellant's criminal record.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant and a nine‑year custodial sentence.

He argued that the trial judge erred in refusing an application under the Criminal Code for production of the complainant’s Children’s Aid Society and counselling records, asserting the records were needed to challenge credibility due to inconsistencies between statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the accused failed to establish the statutory threshold of “likely relevance,” emphasizing that speculative assertions or hopes of finding prior inconsistent statements do not justify production of confidential therapeutic records.

The court also rejected the argument that the sentencing judge made factual findings inconsistent with the jury’s acquittals on related charges.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the breach of trust, the complainant’s young age, and the prolonged and intrusive nature of the offences.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for second degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge had ruled that the Crown could not call alibi evidence in reply to the defence's alternate suspect theory, forcing the Crown to call the evidence in-chief and prejudicing its case.

The trial judge also excluded the Crown's expert evidence regarding the type of instrument used to inflict the fatal wound, erroneously concluding it would not assist the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings, which had a material bearing on the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury for the shooting death of his former common-law partner.

On appeal, he conceded liability for second degree murder but argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge fairly reviewed the evidence and was not required to review every competing inference or all of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, particularly stopped timepieces, to establish the appellant had the exclusive opportunity to commit the offence before leaving for work.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence in his jury instructions, instead merely reading the parties' positions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to relate the evidence to the key issues and improperly instructed the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard to a specific piece of evidence (the timepieces).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for uttering threats to cause bodily harm and to damage property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was supported by testimony and extensive audio recordings.

The court also refused leave to appeal the sentence of one month imprisonment and three years' probation, finding it fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility for a murder conviction.

He argued that the unforeseen statutory consequences of a subsequent drug sentence on his overall period of parole ineligibility rendered the murder sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the subsequent drug sentence and the order of proceedings had no bearing on the fitness of the sentence imposed for the murder conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for child pornography and weapons offences.

He argued the trial judge erred by not severing the charges, admitting his statement, refusing mid-trial disclosure of his computer, and providing the jury with a written copy of the charge.

He also argued the verdict was unreasonable and the sentence for the firearms offence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary decisions or findings of fact, and held the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly imposed a consecutive sentence above the minimum for the loaded restricted firearm.

The appellant, a 17-year-old youth, was involved in a gang shootout on a crowded street that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander.

He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as an adult.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding his identification as a shooter and causation of the victim's death, and challenged the Crown's decision to require a jury trial under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, the mutual decision to engage in a gunfight established causation, and the Crown's decision to require a jury trial did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the deceased in the appellant's apartment.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's failure to retreat from his own home when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as there is no duty to retreat from one's own home when attacked, nor is it a factor for the jury to consider under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.