Murray D. Segal

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child, as well as his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing post-offence conduct, provided insufficient reasons, and failed to consider the reliability of the child's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, provided sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence, and adequately addressed reliability.

Leave to appeal the sentence was denied as it fell within the appropriate range.

The appellant was convicted of a large-scale, complex fraud and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with a $100,000 restitution order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning, noting that denunciation and deterrence are dominant for such offences.

However, based on sealed material regarding post-sentence events, the parties consented to a sentence reduction.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to three years.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and related offences.

His trial was delayed for 13 months, during which he was subject to bail conditions prohibiting him from driving.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the framework from R. v. Morin.

The Court found that the delay was not unreasonable given the inherent time requirements of the case, the actions of the accused, the institutional delay guidelines, and the minimal prejudice suffered.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

Her trial was held 14.5 months after her arrest, with the delay caused solely by limits on institutional resources.

The trial judge dismissed her motion for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal and entered a stay, but the Court of Appeal restored the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was not unreasonable given the strain on institutional resources and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellant.

The Court established guidelines for acceptable institutional delay in Provincial Courts.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had set aside a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

On consent of both parties, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Crown's appeal.

The order of the Court of Appeal was quashed and the stay of proceedings was restored.

The appellant was randomly stopped by police as part of the R.I.D.E. program.

The officer smelled alcohol and demanded a breath sample, which the appellant failed to provide.

The appellant argued the random stop was unlawful, providing a reasonable excuse for his failure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while there was no statutory authority for the random stop, it was authorized at common law as a justifiable use of police powers associated with their general duties to prevent crime and protect life and property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The sixteen-year-old appellant was convicted of arson.

At trial, a first statement made to police was ruled inadmissible as the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

A second statement, made two months later to the same officers, was admitted.

The appellant appealed, arguing the second statement was tainted by the oppressive atmosphere of the first.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no presumption of tainting merely because a prior statement was ruled inadmissible.

The admissibility of the second statement depends on factual considerations, including the lapse of time and similarity of circumstances, which in this case supported its admission.

The respondent, a chronic alcoholic, set fire to the house where he lived with his companion and her two children.

The children died.

He was convicted of murder.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in his charge on s. 212(c) of the Criminal Code by failing to relate the defence of drunkenness to the accused's knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the test under s. 212(c) is objective, it must be applied based on the knowledge the accused actually had of the surrounding circumstances, making drunkenness a relevant factor.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified under s. 238(3) of the Criminal Code after his driver's licence was suspended by provincial administrative action.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 238(3) was ultra vires the Parliament of Canada, as it attached criminal consequences to provincial licence suspensions that could be imposed for reasons entirely unrelated to driving ability or highway safety, thereby exceeding the federal criminal law power under s. 91(27) of the B.N.A. Act.