Gerald R. Kluwak

The sixteen-year-old appellant was convicted of arson.

At trial, a first statement made to police was ruled inadmissible as the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

A second statement, made two months later to the same officers, was admitted.

The appellant appealed, arguing the second statement was tainted by the oppressive atmosphere of the first.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no presumption of tainting merely because a prior statement was ruled inadmissible.

The admissibility of the second statement depends on factual considerations, including the lapse of time and similarity of circumstances, which in this case supported its admission.

The appellant was acquitted of a drunk driving charge after the trial judge held that the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption of blood alcohol level without proceeding by certificate evidence or proving the suitability of the breathalyzer solution.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown may rely on the statutory presumption whether it proceeds by viva voce evidence or certificate, and that proof of the suitability of the breathalyzer solution is not required as part of the Crown's case.