Julien Chouinard

Appeal concerning whether bargaining rights and obligations under Quebec labour legislation transferred when janitorial service contracts for school cleaning were terminated and re-awarded to a new contractor having no legal relationship with the prior contractors.

The Court held that the labour commissioner’s interpretation of ss. 45 and 46 was jurisdictional and subject to judicial review, and replaced the preliminary-question formalism with a pragmatic and functional analysis focused on legislative intent, expertise, and statutory purpose.

It further held that s. 45 requires continuity of the undertaking and a voluntary legal relation between successive employers involving the same undertaking or part of it.

Because the competing contractors were separate undertakings and no legal relation existed between them, no transfer of rights and obligations occurred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The town of Brossard adopted an anti-nepotism hiring policy disqualifying members of the immediate families of full-time employees and town councillors from taking up employment with the town.

The mis en cause's application for summer employment as a lifeguard was rejected because her mother worked as a full-time typist at the municipal police station.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the hiring policy constituted discrimination based on civil status under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter.

The Court further held that the policy was not justified under s. 20 of the Charter, as the blanket exclusion was disproportionately stringent and not a bona fide occupational qualification, nor was the municipality a non-profit institution of a political nature.

Following a collision between two Canadian National Railway trains in Quebec, an inspector from the provincial Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail initiated an investigation under the provincial Act respecting occupational health and safety.

The railway company challenged the investigation, arguing the provincial statute could not constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety legislation, because of its preventive nature, directly regulates the working conditions and management of the undertaking.

Consequently, the investigative powers under the Act are wholly inapplicable to an interprovincial railway undertaking.

The appellant, an interprovincial trucking company and federal undertaking, was ordered by a provincial Workers' Compensation Board officer to comply with provincial industrial health and safety regulations regarding safety footwear and safety committees.

The appellant challenged the orders, arguing the provincial regulations were constitutionally inapplicable to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety regulations relate to working conditions, labour relations, and the management of the undertaking, and therefore cannot constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The appeal was allowed and the provincial regulations were declared inapplicable.

The respondent son sued his appellant father for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement for the sale of farm land.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the acts of part performance were insufficient to displace the Statute of Frauds and that no oral agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, substituting its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an appellate court cannot reverse a trial judge's findings of fact based on credibility unless there is a palpable and overriding error.

As the trial judge made no such error, the Court of Appeal erred in substituting its version of the facts.

The appellant and an accomplice committed an armed robbery during which the accomplice shot and killed a client.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, despite testifying he believed the gun was unloaded.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 213(d) violates sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because it allows for a murder conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least objective foreseeability of death.

The provision was not saved by section 1, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder as a party to the offence under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, after his brother beat a homeowner to death during a break and enter.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the constructive murder provision violated the Charter.

Applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Vaillancourt, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the constructive murder provision was inoperative as it violated the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, customs inspectors, challenged the selection of other inspectors for a newly created 'dog handler' function, arguing it constituted an appointment to a new position under the Public Service Employment Act requiring selection according to merit.

The appeal board agreed and revoked the appointments, but the Federal Court of Appeal set aside that decision, holding that a new position requires a formal administrative decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that a significant change in functions requiring special qualifications amounts to the creation of a new position, and thus the appointments were subject to the merit principle and the right of appeal.

The appellant appealed the temporary assignment of a co-worker to a newly created but unclassified supervisory position, arguing it was an appointment not based on merit under the Public Service Employment Act.

The Federal Court of Appeal had ruled that without a clear intent to create a position and make an appointment, no appointment occurred.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the objective facts, not the Department's intent, determine if an appointment occurred.

The Court found that the prolonged temporary assignment to new functions constituted an appointment to a position, triggering the merit principle and the right of appeal.

The respondent entered the home of a 15-year-old girl uninvited, grabbed her breasts, and made suggestive comments.

He was convicted of sexual assault at trial, but the Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for common assault, holding that sexual assault required contact with genitalia.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the sexual assault conviction.

The Court held that sexual assault is an offence of general intent and is determined by an objective test of whether the sexual or carnal context of the assault is visible to a reasonable observer, considering all circumstances including the part of the body touched, words, and gestures.

The appellant, who had successfully appealed his impaired driving conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a Charter breach, sought a rehearing to amend the judgment to award him costs on a solicitor and client basis.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the broad discretion to award costs under the Criminal Code should not be fettered by a general rule that successful accused appellants or those establishing Charter infringements are automatically entitled to costs.

The Court found no oppressive conduct by the Crown to justify such an award.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the deaths of his two adopted sons, who were found dead on a burning mattress in his town house.

The evidence against the appellant was entirely circumstantial, establishing that the boys were dead before the fire started and that the appellant had exclusive opportunity to commit the crime.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable under s. 613(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly applied the test of whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.

The Court also found that the Crown's failure to call the appellant's wife as a witness did not render the verdict unreasonable, as there was no evidence she possessed any knowledge of the events.

The appellant, a non-custodial father, brought an action against his former wife and her new husband, alleging they deliberately frustrated his court-ordered access to his children.

He claimed damages for conspiracy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that no tort action exists for interference with access rights, as the legislature has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme for custody and access.

The Court also declined to recognize a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty in this context, finding that such litigation would not be in the best interests of the children.

The appellants, a union and individual provincial civil servants, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Ontario Public Service Act that prohibited them from engaging in certain political activities, including during federal elections.

They argued the province lacked jurisdiction to legislate regarding federal elections.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the impugned provisions were intra vires the province.

The Court found the legislation was validly enacted under the province's power to amend its constitution and regulate the tenure of provincial offices, as it aimed to ensure the political impartiality of the provincial public service, a fundamental principle of responsible government.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission and Action Travail des Femmes appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision that set aside a portion of a Human Rights Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had found that the employer engaged in systemic discrimination against women in blue-collar jobs and ordered an employment equity program, including a requirement that the employer hire one woman for every four non-traditional jobs until women constituted 13% of that workforce.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under s. 41(2)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act to order an employment equity program to prevent future systemic discrimination.

The appellant's employee forged signatures on cheques drawn on the appellant's account at the respondent bank.

The bank honoured the cheques and debited the appellant's account.

The appellant sued the bank to recover the funds.

The bank argued the appellant was precluded from setting up the forgeries because it breached a duty to examine its bank statements and maintain adequate internal controls.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, in the absence of an express verification agreement, a customer does not owe a duty to the bank to examine bank statements with reasonable care and report discrepancies, nor does it owe a duty to maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls.

The appeal was allowed and judgment entered for the appellant.

The parties divorced in 1969 and entered into a maintenance agreement where the wife accepted a lump sum in full satisfaction of future claims.

The agreement was incorporated into a court order.

Years later, the wife's health deteriorated, she depleted her funds, and went on welfare, while the husband became wealthy.

She applied to vary the maintenance order under s. 11(2) of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that where parties have freely negotiated a valid settlement agreement, it should be respected.

The court may only intervene to vary the order if there is a radical change in circumstances that flows from an economic pattern of dependency engendered by the marriage.

Since the wife's hardship was not causally connected to the marriage, the application to vary was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of rape and indecent assault after engaging in sexual acts with a prostitute.

At trial, they argued that the complainant consented or, alternatively, that they held an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The trial judge left the defence of mistake of fact to the jury but instructed them that the belief must be supported by reasonable grounds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the defence was properly left to the jury due to an 'air of reality' in the evidence, the trial judge erred in law by requiring reasonable grounds for the honest belief.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants sought compensation for injurious affection after the respondent Minister acquired adjoining land and constructed a public highway.

No part of the appellants' land was taken, but they claimed damages for loss of prospect and privacy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that to recover under the Expropriations Act, the damage must be actionable at common law.

The Court found that the loss of amenities, such as prospect and privacy, does not constitute an actionable nuisance, and the Minister's use of the land for a highway was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with tax evasion and his assets were placed in receivership.

During the trial, the trial judge took eleven months to decide a motion for a directed verdict, initiating nineteen adjournments.

The appellant applied to the superior court under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The superior court granted a stay of proceedings, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear the application since the trial judge caused the delay.

The Court found the eleven-month delay unreasonable and held that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy for a violation of s. 11(b).