Jean-K. Samson

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision declaring provisions of the Act respecting municipal taxation unconstitutional.

The impugned provisions created a new system of school financing based on government grants, making taxation a complementary method subject to a referendum requirement for amounts exceeding a certain limit.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions prejudicially affected the rights and privileges respecting denominational schools guaranteed by section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Specifically, the legislation failed to ensure proportional distribution of grants and subjected the taxing power of denominational school boards to the approval of electors outside their districts.

The appeal was dismissed and the provisions were declared ultra vires.

The Quebec Commission des valeurs mobilières recommended the suspension of the board of directors of Prêt Hypothécaire due to deteriorating financial conditions.

The Minister suspended the board and appointed a provisional administrator pursuant to s. 112 of the Securities Act.

The respondents brought an action in nullity, arguing the provision violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's power was administrative, not judicial, as it was based on expediency rather than legality and did not involve a true lis between parties.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was upheld as intra vires.

The appellant appealed judgments declaring that the provisions regarding English instruction in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the French language (Bill 101) were inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 72 and 73 of Bill 101 are inconsistent with section 23 of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency.

The Court found that the limits imposed by Bill 101 on minority language educational rights could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, as section 23 was specifically drafted to remedy the type of regime established by Bill 101.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of provincial legislation that repealed a statutory lease, revested water and water power rights in the province, vested hydro-electric works in the Crown, and limited compensation to creditors and shareholders.

The Court held that extrinsic evidence was admissible in constitutional cases to determine both the operation and effect of legislation and its true object and purpose, particularly where colourability was alleged.

Applying pith and substance analysis, the Court found the legislation was a colourable attempt to interfere with contractual rights to the delivery of power in Quebec under a long-term power contract.

Because those civil rights were situated outside Newfoundland, the legislation was ultra vires.

The appeal was allowed and the Act, taken as a whole, was held invalid.

The Attorney General of Quebec and the Régie du logement appealed a decision holding that certain powers conferred on the Régie du logement by its enabling statute contravened s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the three-step test for s. 96 challenges and found that in Lower Canada at the time of Confederation, jurisdiction over relations between lessors and lessees was not exercised exclusively by superior courts.

Therefore, conferring this jurisdiction on the provincially appointed administrative tribunal did not violate s. 96.

The appeal was allowed and the jurisdiction of the Régie du logement was upheld.

The Government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal asking whether its consent was constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption of a resolution to amend the Canadian Constitution in a way that affected its legislative competence or status.

The Court of Appeal answered in the negative, and Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments.

The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that there is no conventional rule of unanimity among the provinces, and found that Quebec failed to demonstrate that the other political actors had recognized or accepted a specific conventional veto power for Quebec.