Raynold Langlois

Appeal decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 2013 SCC 73, addressing the legal issues presented and disposing of the proceeding on the terms stated in the reasons and judgment.

On a motion in related leave applications, the moving parties sought an order requiring multiple opposing parties to post $3,250,000 as security for amounts payable if appeals were unsuccessful.

The Court held that security under s. 60(1)(b) of the Supreme Court Act has traditionally been symbolic and that the substantial security requested is ordinarily addressed in stay proceedings under ss. 65 or 65.1 or equivalent provincial provisions.

The Court found that existing stay conditions imposed by the court below continued to govern and that the motion effectively attempted to review that decision.

The Court also emphasized access-to-court considerations in the leave framework.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

The media organizations challenged rules and a directive that limited filming, taking photographs, and conducting interviews to predetermined locations in courthouses, and prohibited the broadcasting of official audio recordings of hearings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while these activities are protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter and the measures infringe freedom of expression, the limits are reasonable and justified under s. 1.

The measures advance the pressing and substantial objective of maintaining the fair administration of justice by ensuring the serenity of hearings, protecting the privacy of litigants, and reducing stress on witnesses.

The applicants brought motions seeking an order to amend a previous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada or for a re-hearing of the appeal to clarify the disposition.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding they did not meet the criteria under Rule 81(1)(a) for accidental slips or omissions, nor the criteria under Rule 76 for exceptional cases involving a failure of justice.

The Court held that its previous judgment clearly expressed that the matter must be remitted to the Government and National Assembly for reconsideration.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard multiple appeals from New Brunswick, Ontario, Alberta, and Quebec regarding the constitutional requirement for independent judicial compensation commissions.

The Court clarified the principles from the Provincial Judges Reference, establishing a three-stage analysis for determining whether a government's response to a commission's recommendations meets the standard of rationality.

The Court upheld the government responses in New Brunswick and Ontario, found the Alberta government's response partially irrational but globally effective, and struck down the Quebec government's response for failing to address the committee's core recommendations.

The City of Beauport appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding municipal taxation powers.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's decision.

The Court held that there is no contradiction or incompatibility between s. 13 of the Charter of the City of Beauport and s. 486 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The taxation power granted by s. 13 is not subject to the requirement of taxation by annual by-law provided for in s. 486, as only the tax rate is annual.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that a federal statutory provision conferring a professional title was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Marceau J.A. from the court below.

The Court held that the mere conferring and holding of a title is a neutral act unconstrained by the division of powers, provided it is not directly linked to the regulation of the profession.

The CRTC granted Bell Canada an interim rate increase in 1984, subject to review.

In 1986, after a final hearing, the CRTC determined that the interim rates had yielded excess revenues of $206 million and ordered Bell Canada to distribute this amount to customers via a one-time credit.

The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the CRTC's appeal, holding that the power to make interim orders under the Railway Act and National Transportation Act necessarily implies the power to review those rates retrospectively and to make remedial orders, such as a one-time credit, if the interim rates are found to be unjust or unreasonable.

The Attorney General of Quebec and the Régie du logement appealed a decision holding that certain powers conferred on the Régie du logement by its enabling statute contravened s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the three-step test for s. 96 challenges and found that in Lower Canada at the time of Confederation, jurisdiction over relations between lessors and lessees was not exercised exclusively by superior courts.

Therefore, conferring this jurisdiction on the provincially appointed administrative tribunal did not violate s. 96.

The appeal was allowed and the jurisdiction of the Régie du logement was upheld.

The appellant owned land that was leased to a third party for farming.

The municipal and school authorities valued and taxed the land as ordinary immovables, ignoring the special tax provisions for land under cultivation in s. 523 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The appellant brought direct actions in nullity to set aside the valuation and collection rolls and to recover the taxes paid in error.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the land was land under cultivation and that the authorities had acted ultra vires by ignoring the statutory exemption.

The Court allowed the direct actions in nullity, but found that the claim for recovery of municipal taxes for the first two years was prescribed by the five-year limitation period.

The appellants challenged an Order in Council extending the limits of the port of Saint John to include their private harbour facilities, and a National Harbours Board By-law imposing harbour dues on vessels using those facilities.

The appellants argued the Order in Council was passed for improper motives to increase revenues, and that the By-law unlawfully interfered with their private property rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the Governor in Council in passing an Order in Council, and that the imposition of harbour dues on vessels entering the harbour does not constitute an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction over private property.

The Government of Quebec referred a question to the Quebec Court of Appeal asking whether its consent was constitutionally required, by convention, for the adoption of a resolution to amend the Canadian Constitution in a way that affected its legislative competence or status.

The Court of Appeal answered in the negative, and Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Quebec has no conventional power of veto over constitutional amendments.

The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that there is no conventional rule of unanimity among the provinces, and found that Quebec failed to demonstrate that the other political actors had recognized or accepted a specific conventional veto power for Quebec.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that dismissed its application to intervene in a reference ordered by the Government of Quebec.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for leave to appeal, holding that pursuant to section 1 of An Act respecting a reference to the Court of Appeal and section 37 of the Supreme Court Act, the decision of the Court of Appeal is not subject to appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that dismissed its application to intervene in a reference ordered by the Government of Quebec.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for leave to appeal, holding that the decision of the Court of Appeal is not subject to appeal under the relevant legislation.

The Attorney General of Quebec applied for a rehearing to determine whether section 133 of the British North America Act applies to delegated legislation, such as regulations of statutory bodies, municipalities, and school boards.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 133 applies to regulations enacted by the provincial government, ministers, and agencies subject to government approval, as well as to court rules of practice.

However, the Court concluded that section 133 does not apply to municipal or school body by-laws, even if they are subject to government approval.

The appellants challenged the validity of the Pacific Pilotage Regulations, specifically provisions that conditioned exemptions and waivers from compulsory pilotage on a ship being registered in Canada or the United States.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the regulations were not invalid due to conflict of interest or bias.

However, the Court found that conditioning exemptions on a ship's flag was not relevant to safety and was therefore ultra vires the Authority's regulation-making power under the Pilotage Act.

The Court concluded that the invalid words relating to ship registration could be severed from the rest of the regulations.