Sean Hanley

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) and two individuals applied for a declaration that the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology Labour Dispute Resolution Act, 2017, which ended a five-week college strike, infringed their freedom of association rights under section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and sought damages.

The Crown in Right of Ontario and the College Employer Council argued the Act did not infringe the Charter or was justified under section 1.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Act did not substantially interfere with meaningful collective bargaining, as the parties were at an impasse.

Alternatively, the court held that even if there was an infringement, it was justified under section 1, given the pressing and substantial objective of resuming college instruction, the rational connection of the legislation, its minimal impairment (by substituting a neutral arbitration process), and its proportionality.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to Ontario's COVID-19 public health measures, specifically the proof of vaccination requirement enacted by Ont.

Reg 364/20.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the provincial government had ceased enforcement and subsequently revoked the Regulation.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding no practical effect for the declaratory relief sought and that the claim for nominal damages did not cure mootness.

Concerns about judicial economy and the utility of deciding fact-specific constitutional issues in the absence of a live controversy also weighed against exercising discretion.

The applicants brought an application challenging the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 proof of vaccination requirement (Ont.

Reg. 364/20) under sections 2(a), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The applicants argued that the regulation, which required patrons to provide proof of vaccination to enter certain businesses, violated their freedom of religion, right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and equality rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no Charter contraventions.

The court held that the regulation did not interfere with the applicants' religious beliefs, did not compel medical treatment or engage the right to security of the person, and did not discriminate based on religion or disability.

The defendant government brought a motion to transfer the plaintiff's action challenging mandatory COVID-19 vaccination laws from Ottawa to the Toronto Region.

The government sought to have the plaintiff's Charter claims heard alongside a similar application already scheduled in Toronto.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that transferring the action would result in a loss of discovery rights for the plaintiff, risk duplication of evidence, and create a risk of inconsistent verdicts between the Charter and Human Rights Code claims.

The court concluded there was no connection between the action and the Toronto Region to justify a transfer.

The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.

Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.

The appellant was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers while walking to a counter-protest flag rally, having committed no offence and presenting no threat of violence.

The police relied on a purported common law power to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by others.

Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Court held that no such common law power exists: the power is not reasonably necessary because statutory arrest powers already address situations where individuals resist or obstruct officers taking less intrusive measures, and effectiveness of a police action alone cannot justify an arrest if less intrusive means were available.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of damages for battery, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and found no new trial was warranted on the issue of excessive force because the arrest itself was unlawful.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal of a trial judgment in a civil action involving allegations of excessive force during arrest.

The respondent sought to avoid paying the costs of the appeal on the basis that the matter constituted public interest litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the nature of the proceeding did not fall within the recognized categories of public interest litigation.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The respondent was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers on May 24, 2009, near Douglas Creek Estates in Caledonia while carrying a Canadian flag to participate in a flag-raising rally.

The trial judge found the arrest was unlawful and awarded damages for false arrest, wrongful imprisonment, and breach of Charter rights.

On appeal, the majority (Nordheimer and Cronk JJ.A.) found the arrest was lawful as a preventive measure to avoid an imminent breach of the peace, but remitted the case for a new trial on the issue of excessive force.

Huscroft J.A. dissented, finding the arrest was unlawful and that the trial judge's findings should not be disturbed.

Lawyers under investigation by their professional regulator sought constitutional declarations and procedural protections concerning potential disclosure of client confidential information during disciplinary proceedings.

They argued provisions of the governing statute violated ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter by failing to adequately protect solicitor‑client privilege and requested public interest standing to advance broader constitutional relief.

The court held the application was premature because the administrative process before the regulator’s tribunal had not yet been completed.

The tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the constitutional arguments and grant most requested remedies, with courts reviewing the matter only after the administrative process concluded.

The application was dismissed and public interest standing refused.