Tanya Jemec

The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.

Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.

The representative plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of inmates in Ontario correctional institutions who were placed in administrative segregation.

The plaintiff alleged that Ontario's use of administrative segregation constituted systemic negligence and violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court found that administrative segregation as practiced in Ontario was equivalent to solitary confinement and caused severe psychological harm, particularly to inmates with serious mental illness.

The court held that Ontario breached the inmates' Charter rights and was liable for systemic negligence at the operational level.

The court awarded $30 million in aggregate damages for compensation, vindication, and deterrence.

The plaintiff, Stuart Weinstein, sued multiple government entities and organizations after failing to obtain a General Condominium Manager license following a training program funded by the Second Career Strategy.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the Amended Statement of Claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being frivolous/vexatious, and also sought to quash summonses issued by the plaintiff.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts for his claims (breach of contract, negligence, intentional interference with economic relations, malfeasance in public office, breach of consumer protection laws) and that many allegations were an abuse of process.

The summonses were quashed as irrelevant and an abuse of process.

Leave to amend the claim was denied.

The defendants brought a joint motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim for failing to plead material facts to support the alleged causes of action, including breach of contract, negligence, public malfeasance, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, also brought a cross-motion for an injunction.

The court found the Statement of Claim fundamentally deficient, lacking essential factual details.

Despite the deficiencies and prior warnings, the court struck the Statement of Claim but granted the plaintiff leave to amend within 30 days, acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status.

The plaintiff's motion for an injunction was dismissed as it failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief.

Nominal costs were awarded against the plaintiff to two leading defendants.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her action under Rule 2.1.01.

The motion judge found that the action met the test for dismissal on its face.

The appellant argued that the respondent, having been noted in default, was precluded from taking further steps without leave.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if leave was required, it would have been granted as this was a clear case for application of Rule 2.1.01.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

A law firm sought to replace existing carriage counsel in a proposed pharmaceutical class action on the basis of unreasonable delay in bringing a certification motion.

The court held that under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 it has supervisory jurisdiction to entertain a carriage transfer motion.

The court established a four-part test requiring proof that the delay is clearly unreasonable, that it causes actual prejudice to class members, that the explanation for the delay is inadequate, and that compelling certification within a fixed timeline would be unworkable or not in the class’s best interests.

Applying this test, the moving party failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay or prejudice, and the explanation for the delay was credible.

The motion to replace carriage counsel was therefore dismissed.