8 total
Appeal allowed and new hearing ordered where tribunal improperly excluded central expert evidence on efficiency grounds.
The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) upholding the Director's proposal to refuse to renew its residential care licence.
The LAT had excluded the appellant's proposed expert evidence regarding fire safety and the standard of care for treatment foster homes, citing efficiency and lack of necessity.
The Divisional Court found that the excluded evidence was central to the case and clearly relevant, and that its exclusion amounted to a palpable and overriding error that prejudiced the appellant's ability to make full answer and defence.
The appeal was allowed, the LAT's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different panel.
Appeal dismissed; $30 million aggregate Charter damages upheld for unconstitutional administrative segregation of inmates.
The respondent, representing a class of seriously mentally ill inmates and inmates held in prolonged administrative segregation, brought a class action against Ontario for Charter breaches and systemic negligence.
The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that Ontario's use of administrative segregation violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, and awarded $30 million in aggregate Charter damages.
Ontario appealed, arguing that the Charter breaches were not established for all seriously mentally ill inmates, that Charter damages were inappropriate due to good governance concerns, and that the negligence claim was barred by statute.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the findings that administrative segregation of seriously mentally ill inmates constitutes cruel and unusual treatment, that Ontario's clear disregard for inmates' rights justified Charter damages, and that the operational implementation of segregation policies grounded a valid systemic negligence claim.
Ontario found liable for systemic negligence and Charter breaches for placing inmates in administrative segregation.
The representative plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of inmates in Ontario correctional institutions who were placed in administrative segregation.
The plaintiff alleged that Ontario's use of administrative segregation constituted systemic negligence and violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court found that administrative segregation as practiced in Ontario was equivalent to solitary confinement and caused severe psychological harm, particularly to inmates with serious mental illness.
The court held that Ontario breached the inmates' Charter rights and was liable for systemic negligence at the operational level.
The court awarded $30 million in aggregate damages for compensation, vindication, and deterrence.
Judicial review Motion granted
The plaintiff, Stuart Weinstein, sued multiple government entities and organizations after failing to obtain a General Condominium Manager license following a training program funded by the Second Career Strategy.
The defendants brought a motion to strike the Amended Statement of Claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being frivolous/vexatious, and also sought to quash summonses issued by the plaintiff.
The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts for his claims (breach of contract, negligence, intentional interference with economic relations, malfeasance in public office, breach of consumer protection laws) and that many allegations were an abuse of process.
The summonses were quashed as irrelevant and an abuse of process.
Leave to amend the claim was denied.
The court struck the self-represented plaintiff's deficient Statement of Claim but granted leave to amend.
The defendants brought a joint motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim for failing to plead material facts to support the alleged causes of action, including breach of contract, negligence, public malfeasance, and intentional interference with economic relations.
The plaintiff, who was self-represented, also brought a cross-motion for an injunction.
The court found the Statement of Claim fundamentally deficient, lacking essential factual details.
Despite the deficiencies and prior warnings, the court struck the Statement of Claim but granted the plaintiff leave to amend within 30 days, acknowledging the plaintiff's self-represented status.
The plaintiff's motion for an injunction was dismissed as it failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief.
Nominal costs were awarded against the plaintiff to two leading defendants.
Action dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 despite the respondent having been noted in default.
The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her action under Rule 2.1.01.
The motion judge found that the action met the test for dismissal on its face.
The appellant argued that the respondent, having been noted in default, was precluded from taking further steps without leave.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if leave was required, it would have been granted as this was a clear case for application of Rule 2.1.01.
The appeal was dismissed with no costs.
Court sets four-part test for replacing class action carriage counsel due to delay.
A law firm sought to replace existing carriage counsel in a proposed pharmaceutical class action on the basis of unreasonable delay in bringing a certification motion.
The court held that under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 it has supervisory jurisdiction to entertain a carriage transfer motion.
The court established a four-part test requiring proof that the delay is clearly unreasonable, that it causes actual prejudice to class members, that the explanation for the delay is inadequate, and that compelling certification within a fixed timeline would be unworkable or not in the class’s best interests.
Applying this test, the moving party failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay or prejudice, and the explanation for the delay was credible.
The motion to replace carriage counsel was therefore dismissed.
Appeals quashed as objectors lacked standing under s. 30 of the Class Proceedings Act.
The moving parties (class action plaintiffs) brought a motion to quash appeals filed by the respondent objectors.
The court found that the appellants did not have a right of appeal under s. 30(3) of the Class Proceedings Act because they were not parties to the class proceeding.
Furthermore, they did not meet the requirements of s. 30(5) as they had not obtained leave to act as a representative party for an appeal from a judgment on common issues or an aggregate assessment.
The appeals were quashed and the motion to act as representative plaintiff was dismissed.