David M. Golden

The defendant moved under Rule 49.09(a) to enforce a purported settlement and require the plaintiffs to execute a full and final release.

The plaintiffs had accepted an offer to settle the 'Action', but refused to sign the defendant's draft release because its broad wording could preclude their separate application for judicial review regarding a federal dental care program.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that on an objective basis, the parties had not reached an agreement on all essential terms given the narrow wording of the offer.

The court further held that even if a settlement existed, enforcing it would not be in the interests of justice.

The court denied the moving parties' request for leave to bring urgent motions to vacate claims for lien and certificates of action under section 44 of the Construction Act, finding no true urgency.

The endorsement criticizes the excessive length and lack of organization in the motion materials and highlights the improper use of the court’s urgent motion process.

However, the court allowed the moving parties a limited opportunity to proceed in writing, subject to strict conditions, to avoid jeopardizing an upcoming refinancing.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Kimmel J. dated December 13, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $2,200 to the responding parties.

The defendants, Dentons Canada LLP and Philip Rimer, brought a third-party claim against various individuals and entities, including other lawyers and advisors, seeking contribution and indemnity in a professional negligence action.

The third parties brought Rule 21 motions to strike the third-party claim, arguing that they acted as agents for the plaintiff and therefore any negligence on their part would be attributable to the plaintiff, precluding a third-party claim.

The court struck the claims against one director (Wang) and the escrow agent, finding them doomed to fail based on agency and contractual principles.

However, the court allowed the claims against the other third-party advisors and lawyers to proceed, finding that they fell into a category of non-agency advisory roles where the plaintiff might not be held contributorily responsible for their actions.

Leave to amend was granted to particularize the claims against certain third parties.

The appellants, Enhanced Care Pharmacy and 2819826 Ontario Inc., appealed an order directing them to cease pharmacy operations in a condominium building.

The respondents, World Medpharm Inc., held an exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in the building, granted by an Exclusive Use Agreement and enforced by a Declaration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the appellants were aware of the prohibition, the respondents had standing to enforce the declaration, and there was no basis to exercise discretion to relieve the appellants from compliance.

The court found no error in the application judge's rejection of arguments regarding the impact on the respondents' business or harm to patients.

The appellants, long-term tenants of over 42 years, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating their tenancy due to severe clutter and fire hazards in their unit.

The tenants argued that the Board denied them procedural fairness by refusing an adjournment, failing to follow proper review procedures, and issuing an unconditional eviction order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law.

The Court held that the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment was a reasonable exercise of discretion, the review process was fair, and the factual findings regarding the ongoing fire hazard were supported by the evidence.

The Board had the authority to issue an unconditional eviction order given the tenants' failure to de-clutter the unit over a two-year period.

This endorsement addresses the question of costs for the applications below, following an appeal decision (2023 ONCA 524) where the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in granting an injunction against the appellants (Cowie et al.) based on a band council resolution.

The original injunction was granted to Hiawatha First Nation to prohibit construction of a gas station.

Although the appellants were successful on appeal, no costs were awarded for the appeal itself due to their concession regarding the applicability of a new Land Code.

The application judge had awarded Hiawatha First Nation $235,000 in costs.

This endorsement reduces that award to $117,500, all-inclusive, considering the conduct of both parties and the appellants' socially responsible concession.

The appellants, 2352711 Ontario Inc. and 2819826 Ontario Inc., sought a stay of a compliance order issued by an application judge, which prevented them from operating a pharmacy in a condominium unit without the Declarant's consent.

The motion for a stay was brought under Rule 63.02(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, pending their appeal of the compliance order.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-part test for a stay (serious question, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

While acknowledging a serious question, the court found no evidence of irreparable harm to the moving parties themselves, distinguishing harm to non-litigants (clinic, patients, public).

The balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

Consequently, the motion for a stay was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the responding parties.

The applicants, who operate a pharmacy in a condominium building with an exclusive use agreement, sought a compliance order against the respondents for operating a competing pharmacy in a neighbouring condominium building in violation of that building's declaration.

The court granted the compliance order, finding the respondents were in clear breach of the declaration and had attempted to circumvent it.

The court also granted an interlocutory injunction preventing the respondents from taking steps to amend the declaration pending the hearing of cross-applications for oppression remedies.

The condominium corporation was found to have taken reasonable steps to enforce the declaration and was awarded costs against the respondents.

This appeal addressed whether a Band Council Resolution (BCR) could be enforced as a by-law under the Indian Act.

Hiawatha First Nation sought a permanent injunction to stop three of its members from building a gas station on the reserve, relying on a BCR that imposed a moratorium on new businesses.

The application judge granted the injunction, treating the BCR as a by-law.

The Court of Appeal found that a BCR is distinct from a by-law and does not have the force of law to create rights and duties for band members or third parties under the Indian Act.

The court emphasized that law-making authority under the Indian Act, particularly when affecting proprietary rights, requires adherence to specific by-law formalities.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the injunction based on the BCR was set aside.

This is an appeal from a decision dismissing an action for abuse of process due to the appellant's failure to immediately disclose a settlement agreement.

The appellant, Skymark Finance Corporation, entered into Minutes of Settlement with a key defendant, Lorraine Smith, which fundamentally altered the litigation dynamics by changing an adversarial relationship into a cooperative one.

Skymark failed to disclose this agreement for eight months, only doing so after being threatened with an abuse of process motion.

The motion judge stayed the action, and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, reiterating the strict obligation for immediate disclosure of such agreements and confirming that the absence of prejudice does not excuse non-compliance.

The appellant obtained a judgment for unpaid commissions against Stonebrook Properties Inc. and registered a writ of seizure and sale against a condominium development property registered in Stonebrook's name.

The respondents, who were the beneficial owners of the property, successfully applied to have the writ lifted on the basis that Stonebrook held the property as a bare trustee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that Stonebrook was a bare trustee with no independent discretion, meaning the property was not available to satisfy a judgment against it.

The applicants sought the release of funds held in trust, arguing that a writ of execution obtained by the respondent against a bare trustee did not attach to the property.

The respondent argued that the bare trustee was also acting as an agent for the applicants, making them liable as principals for her unpaid commissions.

The court found that while an agency relationship did exist, the respondent was precluded from recovering against the principals because she had already obtained judgment against the agent, and the limitation period to sue the principals had expired.

The funds were ordered released to the applicants.

Hiawatha First Nation applied for a permanent injunction to restrain three of its members from constructing a gas station on the reserve.

The band argued the construction violated the Indian Act, a band by-law requiring building permits, a band resolution imposing a moratorium on new businesses, and environmental legislation.

The court found that the building permit by-law and environmental legislation did not apply, and that the proposed business structure did not violate the Indian Act.

However, the court held that the band resolution imposing a moratorium was an enforceable by-law.

The court granted an injunction restraining construction while the moratorium remains in effect and until the proponents comply with all applicable laws.

The applicants sought an order declaring that a writ of execution obtained by the respondent against Stonebrook Inc. did not attach to real property registered in Stonebrook Inc.'s name.

The respondent had obtained the writ to enforce a judgment for unpaid commissions.

The court found that Stonebrook Inc. held the property merely as a bare trustee for the applicants (the beneficial owners) and had no independent discretion or beneficial interest in the property.

Consequently, under section 9(1) of the Execution Act, the writ could not attach to the property.

However, the court deferred releasing funds held in trust to allow the respondent an opportunity to argue that the bare trustee acted as an agent for the beneficial owners.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) upholding the Director's proposal to refuse to renew its residential care licence.

The LAT had excluded the appellant's proposed expert evidence regarding fire safety and the standard of care for treatment foster homes, citing efficiency and lack of necessity.

The Divisional Court found that the excluded evidence was central to the case and clearly relevant, and that its exclusion amounted to a palpable and overriding error that prejudiced the appellant's ability to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the LAT's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different panel.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The Participating Nursing Homes (PNH) appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had directed the PNH and unions to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system (GNCS) for maintaining pay equity, specifically to address changes in job duties and ensure ongoing compliance with the Pay Equity Act.

The PNH argued that the Act did not require them to tie their maintenance obligation to the proxy employer's historical valuation of male jobs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's authority to ensure compliance with the Act and the necessity of ongoing comparison, including through the proxy method, to maintain pay equity.

The applicant unions sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision regarding the maintenance of pay equity in predominantly female workplaces.

The Tribunal had ruled that the Pay Equity Act did not require employers to use the proxy comparison method on an ongoing basis to maintain pay equity.

The Divisional Court found that while the Act itself does not violate section 15 of the Charter, the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable because it failed to consider Charter values.

The Court held that a proportionate balancing of Charter equality rights and the Act's statutory mandate requires that women in predominantly female workplaces have continued access to male comparators through the proxy method to maintain pay equity.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing an appeal of an arbitrator's preliminary award.

The franchisor appealed the arbitrator's determination that the limitation period for arbitration had not expired.

The dispute arose from a franchisee's notice of rescission of a franchise agreement based on alleged non-disclosure by the franchisor.

The central issue was whether a mediation requirement in the franchise agreement constituted a precondition to arbitration that suspended the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The arbitrator severed the requirement that mediation occur in Delaware, finding it contrary to the Arthur Wishart Act, and determined that the limitation period commenced only after mediation was deemed completed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arbitrator's decision, applying a reasonableness standard of review.