Adrienne Alexandra Telford

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

This costs endorsement addresses the quantum of costs sought by an intervenor, Canada Post Corporation (CPC), following the unsuccessful constitutional challenge by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) against back-to-work legislation.

While CUPW settled costs with the Attorney General, CPC sought an additional $492,258.13.

The court found CPC's request extraordinarily high for an intervenor, noting the Attorney General was the lead responding party.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced CPC's costs to an all-inclusive amount of $150,000.

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) challenged the constitutionality of the Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act (PSRCA), SC 2018, c 25, arguing it infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The legislation ended a series of rotating strikes and imposed a mediation-arbitration process.

The court found the application moot because the PSRCA was spent legislation, having led to new collective agreements, and there was no live controversy or suitable remedy.

However, in obiter, the court stated that if the matter were not moot, the PSRCA would infringe s. 2(d) but would be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as it constituted a minimal impairment due to its fair and neutral dispute resolution mechanism, unlike previous unconstitutional back-to-work legislation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising," s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign," thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The Participating Nursing Homes (PNH) appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had directed the PNH and unions to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system (GNCS) for maintaining pay equity, specifically to address changes in job duties and ensure ongoing compliance with the Pay Equity Act.

The PNH argued that the Act did not require them to tie their maintenance obligation to the proxy employer's historical valuation of male jobs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's authority to ensure compliance with the Act and the necessity of ongoing comparison, including through the proxy method, to maintain pay equity.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian prison needle exchange program (PNEP), specifically its "threat risk assessment" (TRA) feature, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying effective access to essential health care.

The court dismissed the application, finding it premature due to the ongoing PNEP rollout and evolving design.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to establish that professionally accepted standards required a health services-centered model without security staff involvement, or that the PNEP/TRA model breached Charter rights by being arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate, or by discriminating on enumerated grounds.

The appellant, a federally-regulated Crown corporation, appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision reinstating a Health and Safety Officer's direction that the employer had contravened s. 125(1)(z.12) of the Canada Labour Code by failing to ensure that workplace safety inspections covered letter carrier routes and points of call beyond the physical depot building.

The appeals officer had concluded that the statutory inspection obligation applied only to workplaces the employer physically controls, and the Federal Court upheld that decision.

The majority of the Supreme Court applied the Vavilov framework for reasonableness review and held that the appeals officer's interpretation — confining the inspection duty to employer-controlled premises — was reasonable, internally coherent, and defensible in light of the text, context and purpose of the provision.

The appeal was allowed and the appeals officer's order was restored.

Canada Post Corporation appealed an arbitrator's decision that reinstated Christopher Seivright, a temporary postal worker, after his dismissal for failing to demonstrate reasonable availability in accepting work assignments.

The arbitrator rejected Canada Post's use of a peer average acceptance rate (37.8% versus 49.9% peer average) as the sole basis for termination, finding it arbitrary and unreasonable.

The arbitrator considered contextual factors including the 24/7 operation of the York Distribution Centre, high parcel volume, the grievor's seniority, and the actual number of shifts worked (57 shifts, placing him in the top 25-30% of temporary employees).

The Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator's decision as reasonable despite departing from prior arbitral jurisprudence on certain points.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no binding arbitral precedent for mechanical application of acceptance rate standards and confirming that reasonable availability must be assessed on a case-by-case basis considering relevant workplace circumstances.

Following a judgment that retroactively struck down the Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act (Bill C-6), the applicants sought further declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

They argued that the collective agreement, which had been extended by s. 6 of the invalidated Act, should remain enforceable despite the Act's retroactive invalidity.

The court was asked to determine if this was a "remaining remedial issue" under a prior consent agreement, and if it had jurisdiction to grant such relief.

The court found that the applicants' request was not a "remaining remedial issue" as defined by the consent agreement, which was limited to s. 52(1) declarations and s. 24(1) monetary damages.

The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction to alter its final judgment by granting a new constitutional remedy, emphasizing the principle of finality in judicial decision-making.

The issue of the collective agreement's enforceability was deemed properly before the Québec Superior Court.