Jonathan Michael Bricker

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) challenged the constitutionality of the Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act (PSRCA), SC 2018, c 25, arguing it infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The legislation ended a series of rotating strikes and imposed a mediation-arbitration process.

The court found the application moot because the PSRCA was spent legislation, having led to new collective agreements, and there was no live controversy or suitable remedy.

However, in obiter, the court stated that if the matter were not moot, the PSRCA would infringe s. 2(d) but would be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as it constituted a minimal impairment due to its fair and neutral dispute resolution mechanism, unlike previous unconstitutional back-to-work legislation.

The Crown moved in writing to set a timetable for the next steps in multiple actions challenging the former Access to Cannabis Regulations.

The lead claim by the plaintiff had been struck by the Federal Court of Appeal without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had recently filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and a motion for an extension of time.

The Court found the Crown's motion premature and dismissed it without prejudice, pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on the leave application.

The applicant, a former postsecondary student with disabilities, brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP).

The applicant argued that the 'time in study' structure of the programs disproportionately burdened students with disabilities, who often take longer to complete their studies and thus accrue more debt.

The court found that while the legislation establishing the CSLP did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, the operation and administration of the program infringed the applicant's equality rights by failing to redress the additional debt she accrued due to her disabilities.

The court held that this infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court granted declaratory relief and ordered the return of monies paid by the applicant pursuant to the unconstitutional operation of the CSLP, but denied her request for Charter damages.

Following a successful constitutional challenge to back-to-work legislation, the applicants sought costs against the intervener, the employer.

The intervener sought costs against the applicants for a subsequent unsuccessful remedial motion.

The court analyzed the general rule that interveners are neither liable for nor entitled to costs, and the exceptions based on the intervener's direct private interest and level of participation.

The court found the intervener had a direct private interest in both proceedings.

The court ordered the intervener to pay $54,000 in costs for the main application, and ordered the applicants to pay $26,000 to the intervener for the remedial motion.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to strike the respondent's wrongful dismissal claim.

The respondent, a former CSIS employee, alleged wrongful dismissal based on the revocation of his security clearance.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the CSIS Act provides a comprehensive administrative procedure for redress, precluding a civil action under the Public Service Labour Relations Act.

Furthermore, the respondent's claims for pre-termination salary and benefits were an abuse of process as they attempted to re-litigate issues already addressed through grievances.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

Following a judgment that retroactively struck down the Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act (Bill C-6), the applicants sought further declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

They argued that the collective agreement, which had been extended by s. 6 of the invalidated Act, should remain enforceable despite the Act's retroactive invalidity.

The court was asked to determine if this was a "remaining remedial issue" under a prior consent agreement, and if it had jurisdiction to grant such relief.

The court found that the applicants' request was not a "remaining remedial issue" as defined by the consent agreement, which was limited to s. 52(1) declarations and s. 24(1) monetary damages.

The court also determined it lacked jurisdiction to alter its final judgment by granting a new constitutional remedy, emphasizing the principle of finality in judicial decision-making.

The issue of the collective agreement's enforceability was deemed properly before the Québec Superior Court.

The appellant unions challenged the constitutionality of the federal Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA) and the Government's conduct in collective bargaining, arguing they infringed their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The ERA imposed wage increase caps and rolled back previously negotiated increases in response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The Court of Appeal held that the ERA and the Government's conduct did not substantially interfere with the collective bargaining process.

In the alternative, any limits on s. 2(d) rights were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the pressing and substantial objective of managing the economic crisis.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to admit and prefer the evidence of the Government's participant expert over the unions' expert.

The applicant union challenged the constitutionality of the Restoring Mail Delivery for Canadians Act, back-to-work legislation enacted in response to rotating strikes and a nationwide lockout.

The Act mandated the resumption of mail delivery, extended the previous collective agreement, prohibited strike activity, and imposed a final offer selection arbitration process.

The court found that the Act violated the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by substantially interfering with a meaningful process of collective bargaining.

The court also found that the Act violated freedom of expression under s. 2(b) by prohibiting strike activity, which conveys meaning.

Neither violation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the Act unconstitutional and of no force or effect retroactively.

During the hearing of an application, the intervener provided a chart that was not entered into evidence.

The court indicated that a further chart could be jointly submitted post-hearing only if all parties agreed to its contents.

As the parties were unable to agree, the court ruled that no further charts, including one submitted by the applicants, would be accepted for filing.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing professional negligence claims arising from the prescription and dispensing of Clindamycin for an infected tooth, while the federal defendant moved under Rule 21 to strike a regulatory negligence claim.

The court held that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care, breach, and causation in the medical and pharmacy negligence claims, and the plaintiff had provided no evidence capable of supporting those claims.

The expert evidence filed by the moving parties established that the prescription, dental treatment recommendations, and pharmacy counselling met the applicable standards of care.

The court further held that Health Canada does not owe a private law duty of care to individual users of approved drugs in the circumstances pleaded.

The motions were granted and the action was dismissed against the moving parties.

Three Mexican seasonal agricultural workers were terminated by their employer and repatriated to Mexico.

They sued for wrongful dismissal and alleged violations of their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights, claiming they were 'privately deported' without procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the constitutional and Bill of Rights claims.

The court struck the Charter and Bill of Rights claims, finding that the pleadings did not contain sufficient material facts to support a deprivation of liberty or security of the person under s. 7, nor discrimination under s. 15.

The court also struck the contractual claims against Canada and F.A.R.M.S. as they were not parties to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Charter claims.