Paul J.J. Cavalluzzo

The applicant, a professional hockey player, sought to set aside an arbitral award that dismissed his claims against his former agent as time-barred under a six-month limitation period in the NHLPA Regulations.

The applicant argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction because the claims arose after his Standard Player-Agent Contract expired, and that the limitation period was invalid or unfairly applied.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator correctly determined he had jurisdiction because the NHLPA Regulations govern all player-agent relations, even after a specific contract expires.

The court also upheld the arbitrator's findings that the limitation period was lawful and that the applicant was treated fairly.

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

This costs endorsement addresses the quantum of costs sought by an intervenor, Canada Post Corporation (CPC), following the unsuccessful constitutional challenge by the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) against back-to-work legislation.

While CUPW settled costs with the Attorney General, CPC sought an additional $492,258.13.

The court found CPC's request extraordinarily high for an intervenor, noting the Attorney General was the lead responding party.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced CPC's costs to an all-inclusive amount of $150,000.

The Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) challenged the constitutionality of the Postal Services Resumption and Continuation Act (PSRCA), SC 2018, c 25, arguing it infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The legislation ended a series of rotating strikes and imposed a mediation-arbitration process.

The court found the application moot because the PSRCA was spent legislation, having led to new collective agreements, and there was no live controversy or suitable remedy.

However, in obiter, the court stated that if the matter were not moot, the PSRCA would infringe s. 2(d) but would be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as it constituted a minimal impairment due to its fair and neutral dispute resolution mechanism, unlike previous unconstitutional back-to-work legislation.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

Several public sector unions filed grievances against the Crown in Right of Ontario, arguing that the National Day for Truth and Reconciliation should be recognized as a paid holiday under their respective collective agreements.

The collective agreements provided that employees were entitled to any special holiday 'proclaimed by the Governor General or Lieutenant Governor'.

The employer argued that the holiday was created by Royal Assent to a statute, rather than by an executive proclamation, and therefore did not fall within the collective agreement language.

The arbitrator rejected the employer's argument, finding that the parties intended to include any new holiday established by the federal or provincial government, and that Royal Assent by written declaration constituted a proclamation.

The grievances were upheld.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising" s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

In a grievance arbitration concerning whether the National Day for Truth and Reconciliation is a paid holiday under various collective agreements, the employer sought to introduce evidence regarding its consultations with Indigenous partners and its reasons for treating the day as one of learning and reflection rather than a paid holiday.

The unions objected to the admission of this evidence.

The arbitrator ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding that it was irrelevant to the mutual intention of the parties at the time the collective agreements were negotiated and would cause unnecessary delay and prejudice.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision finding that it lacked just cause to dismiss a Black employee and that the dismissal was tainted by anti-Black racism.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, deferring to the Board's factual findings and credibility assessments.

The Court upheld the Board's reliance on expert evidence regarding implicit bias and circumstantial evidence to conclude that race was a factor in the termination.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign" thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

This appeal concerns the Divisional Court's quashing of three Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decisions, which had declared Tomasz Turkiewicz Custom Masonry Homes (TTCMH) and Brickpol Masonry Corporation (Mr. Turkiewicz's former business) a single employer under s. 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, bound TTCMH to a collective agreement, and awarded damages to the Unions.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred in its application of the reasonableness standard of review, as articulated in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov.

The Court of Appeal held that the OLRB's decisions were reasonable, as the Board properly considered the erosion of bargaining rights as a valid labour relations purpose for the related employer declaration, adequately addressed the hiatus between businesses, and made a reasonable damages award.

The appeal was allowed, and the OLRB decisions were restored.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

This was a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application challenging provisions of election finance legislation under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that partial indemnity remained the appropriate scale because the respondent government's conduct was professional and did not justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

In fixing a fair overall award, the court emphasized that four applicant groups had advanced identical legal challenges in a consolidated proceeding, and that economies of scale had to be reflected in the result.

The court reduced the aggregate request from approximately $690,000 to $500,000 and apportioned that amount among the successful applicants.

No costs were awarded for or against the Chief Electoral Officer or the intervenor.

The respondent, an actor, sued her union (ACTRA) and its rights society in Small Claims Court, alleging they miscalculated and underpaid her royalties (Use Fees) for a movie performance.

The union brought a motion to strike the claim, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute arose from a collective agreement.

The Small Claims Court dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the interpretation, application, and administration of the collective agreement and the union's duty of fair representation.

Therefore, the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board or a labour arbitrator.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions finding him a related employer to his defunct company, binding him to current collective agreements, and imposing a fine for breach.

The applicant had operated a unionized masonry company until a 2007 car accident left him unable to work, leading to personal bankruptcy and the company's dissolution.

Ten years later, he resumed work as a sole proprietor.

The Divisional Court quashed the OLRB decisions, finding it unreasonable that the Board failed to consider whether a related employer declaration served a valid labour relations purpose given the decade-long hiatus and the applicant's circumstances.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.