Sean Gaudet

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Canada's federal electoral system under sections 3 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They argued that the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system violates the right to vote by creating disproportionality between votes cast and seats won, and violates equality rights by underrepresenting women, racial minorities, and small political parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the electoral system does not infringe either section 3 or section 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the right to vote is a right to participate in the electoral process, not a right to have votes translated into representation in any particular manner.

Electoral outcomes resulting from citizens' free choices cannot violate constitutional rights.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of female cadets who allegedly suffered sexual misconduct while enrolled in the Cadet Program.

The plaintiffs alleged systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of s. 7 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the certification motion.

While the negligence claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action, the other claims were struck.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide some basis in fact that there was an identifiable class of two or more persons, that the claims raised common issues, or that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, as the allegations would require highly individualized inquiries.

The applicants sought to strike down sections 2(1), 24(1), and 313(1) of the Canada Elections Act, arguing they infringed sections 3 (right to vote) and 15(1) (equality rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The challenge contended that Canada's single member plurality (SMP) electoral system resulted in disproportionate translation of votes to seats and underrepresentation of small national parties, women, and racial minorities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the SMP system is constitutionally valid, does not violate Charter rights, and that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation.

The court emphasized that voting rights focus on electoral process, not specific outcomes, and that political affiliation is not an analogous ground for discrimination under section 15.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal and cross-appeal in a class proceeding.

The court outlines the disposition of costs, including payments between the Law Foundation of Ontario, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Ontario Health Insurance Plan.

The original appeal by Kathryn Anne Taylor was dismissed, leading to this costs decision.

The appellant, representative plaintiff in a class action concerning defective temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants, appealed the dismissal of her action following a trial of common issues.

She alleged the Canadian government (Health and Welfare Canada, HWC) owed a duty of care to regulate and warn about the devices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that no private law duty of care was owed by HWC, either through the legislative scheme or through interactions with class members, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the approval status of the devices.

The Attorney General's cross-appeal on costs was granted leave but dismissed, with the court affirming the trial judge's discretion in awarding costs, particularly considering the public interest nature of the case and the Class Proceedings Fund.

Following the dismissal of a class action concerning medical device implants, the Crown sought over $6.3 million in costs.

The plaintiff argued for no costs based on public interest and access to justice principles under the Class Proceedings Act, and sought costs for an unproven fraud allegation against a witness.

The court significantly reduced the Crown's costs to $385,000, noting the public interest nature of the case, the access to justice mandate, and the Crown's own contribution to the 20-year delay.

OHIP was ordered to pay 10% of the costs, with the remainder payable by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The plaintiff sued her plastic surgeon for negligence, alleging lack of informed consent for a breast reduction surgery.

She claimed the surgeon failed to disclose the material risk of fat necrosis, which was elevated due to her obesity and smoking, and which she subsequently suffered.

The court found that while the surgeon did not specifically disclose the risk of fat necrosis, and should have, the plaintiff failed to establish causation.

Applying a modified objective test, the court concluded that both the plaintiff and a reasonable person in her circumstances would have proceeded with the elective surgery due to significant and persistent back pain, despite the very low, albeit material, risk.

Therefore, the surgeon was not held liable for damages.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Crown alleging negligent regulation of Vitek Proplast temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants by Health Canada.

The plaintiff claimed that the Crown owed a private law duty of care to the class members and breached that duty by failing to properly regulate the devices, issuing Notices of Compliance negligently, and failing to adequately warn the public or recall the devices.

Following a lengthy common issues trial, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action.

The court applied the Anns test and concluded that the Crown did not owe a private law duty of care to the class members, as there was insufficient proximity between the regulator and the unidentifiable group of potential implant recipients.

Furthermore, the court found that even if a duty of care existed, the Crown did not breach the applicable standard of care, as its regulatory actions and responses to the evolving scientific understanding of the implants' risks were reasonable and appropriate.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants (The Attorney General of Canada and two officers) were successful on appeal and were awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal set aside the trial costs order and awarded the appellants costs at trial on a partial indemnity basis, in addition to costs of the appeal.

An appeal from a trial judgment that recognized a new common law tort of harassment and found the defendants liable for intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The plaintiff, an RCMP constable, alleged harassment and bullying by RCMP managers from 2005 to 2012.

The trial judge awarded $100,000 in general damages, $41,000 in special damages, and $825,000 in costs.

The appellate court reversed, holding that no tort of harassment exists in Ontario and that the elements of intentional infliction of mental suffering were not established.

The court found numerous palpable and overriding factual errors in the trial judge's findings, particularly regarding the plaintiff's failure to comply with regulations requiring leave without pay before running for political nomination and the bona fides of management's concerns about conflicts of interest.

Two Canadian citizens residing abroad for more than five years challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Canada Elections Act that denied the right to vote in federal elections to non-resident citizens absent from Canada for five consecutive years or more.

The Attorney General conceded a breach of s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The majority held that the five-year limit could not be justified under s. 1, finding that the restriction was not minimally impairing and that the vague electoral fairness objective was outweighed by the deleterious effects of disenfranchising well over one million non-resident Canadians.

The relevant impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect and the Act was modified to extend the vote to all non-resident citizens.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 60.12 to strike the defendant's Statement of Defence in a class action, alleging failure to produce documents.

Mid-motion, the plaintiff changed the requested relief to an order for specific further productions and examinations.

The Master found that the plaintiff's mid-motion change in position and late-filed materials prevented the defendant from properly responding.

The Master also concluded that granting the proposed order risked jeopardizing a fixed 17-week trial date, and a Master lacks authority under Rule 37.02(2)(b) to make orders that would effectively adjourn a judge's fixed trial date.

Consequently, the motion was adjourned sine die, and the parties were directed to attend before Justice Firestone for directions regarding the trial date and the relief sought.

The Attorney General of Canada moved to dismiss an application by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Christopher Parsons, arguing it was moot following *R. v. Spencer* and failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The application challenged sections of the *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act* (PIPEDA) concerning the collection and disclosure of personal information to government institutions without consent, alleging breaches of sections 7 and 8 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

The court dismissed the Attorney General's motion, finding that *Spencer* did not render the application moot as it addressed a narrower issue and did not cover systemic challenges, intelligence gathering, or accountability mechanisms under PIPEDA.

The court also found that the Amended Notice of Application disclosed a reasonable cause of action, particularly regarding the lack of oversight mechanisms and the potential for arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate infringements of Charter rights.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.

Applicants in two related constitutional applications sought procedural relief to separate challenges to two different federal statutes enacted within the same budget legislation: the Expenditure Restraint Act and the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

They requested severance of the combined challenges or, alternatively, leave to amend the applications to pursue only the wage restraint challenge while preserving the right to challenge the pay equity legislation later.

The court held that although the Rules of Civil Procedure contain no explicit severance mechanism for applications, the requested relief could be granted through amendment principles under Rule 26.01 where no non-compensable prejudice arises.

The court granted leave to amend the notices of application to retain only the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge and permitted the applicants to commence a future application concerning the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

No costs were awarded, and the parties were encouraged to seek case management.

Public sector unions and individual employees brought constitutional challenges to two federal statutes enacted through omnibus budget legislation: the Expenditure Restraint Act and the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.

The applicants moved to sever the combined challenges or, alternatively, amend their applications to retain only the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge and pursue the pay equity challenge later.

The respondent opposed severance, arguing the evidence and pleadings were already intertwined.

The court held that although the Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for severance of an application, leave to amend under Rule 26.01 was appropriate because no non-compensable prejudice would result.

Leave was granted to amend the notices of application to proceed only with the Expenditure Restraint Act challenge, without prejudice to commencing fresh applications challenging the Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act.