Osborne Godfrey Barnwell

The defendant mortgagor brought a motion to set aside a default judgment for possession and $326,267.88 obtained by the plaintiff mortgagee.

The defendant argued she was mentally incapacitated when she entered the mortgage and when she defaulted, and raised defences of non est factum and lack of independent legal advice.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside default judgments and found the defendant lacked a plausible excuse for default, having deliberately discarded the statement of claim.

The court also found no arguable defence on the merits, as the medical evidence did not support her claims of incapacity at the relevant times, and she had signed documents confirming legal advice.

The motion to set aside was dismissed, but the default judgment was varied to deduct $1,763.60 in un-incurred fees.

The applicants sought the sale of three multi-residential properties owned as tenants in common with the respondents, and an equal division of the proceeds.

The respondents brought a cross-application seeking an unequal division of proceeds based on an alleged settlement agreement negotiated by family members.

The court granted the applications for sale and dismissed the cross-application, finding that the family members who negotiated the alleged settlement lacked ostensible authority to bind the applicants, and that no final agreement had actually been reached.

The properties were ordered to be sold with proceeds divided equally.

The applicant sought judicial review of an HRTO decision that struck the personal respondents and dismissed his human rights application at a summary hearing.

The Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision to strike the personal respondents was reasonable, as the corporate respondent accepted vicarious liability.

However, the court held the HRTO unreasonably dismissed the application by failing to justify its conclusion that there was 'no evidence' of discrimination despite the applicant's factual assertions.

Furthermore, the HRTO breached procedural fairness by ordering a summary hearing after a previous Vice-Chair had already directed a merits hearing which had commenced.

The application for judicial review was granted and the matter remitted to the HRTO for a merits hearing.

Following a successful appeal regarding unreported business income, the appellant sought increased costs on a combined partial/substantial indemnity basis.

The Tax Court of Canada reviewed the factors under subsection 147(3) of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) and concluded that the circumstances did not warrant increased costs.

The Court awarded the appellant lump-sum tariff costs of $4,970, inclusive of fees and reduced disbursements.

This motion concerned whether a consumer debtor required leave under section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to sue her consumer proposal administrator for negligence and breach of duty, and if so, whether leave should be granted.

The debtor's consumer proposal was annulled after missed payments, and she sued the administrator in Small Claims Court.

The administrator sought a stay of the action, arguing leave was required.

The court found that leave was indeed required as the allegations related to actions taken pursuant to the BIA, and dismissed the debtor's request for leave, finding her claim lacked factual support for causation of damages.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision of Wilkinson J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed in the amount of $5,000.

This appeal concerned the enforcement of Minutes of Settlement that resolved prior litigation between two factions of a church, Bethel Restoration Ministries.

The motion judge had ordered enforcement, requiring Bethel to make overdue payments and allowing a property registration.

The appellants challenged this order on three grounds: lack of jurisdiction due to the internal church dispute, the Minutes being void as prohibited by Bethel's constating documents, and the respondents having unclean hands.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Minutes created legally cognizable civil rights (contractual and property rights), thereby grounding the court's jurisdiction.

It also found that the Minutes were not prohibited by the church's by-laws, as they represented a valid exercise of the Elders' power to compromise claims.

The unclean hands argument was rejected as it pertained to conduct resolved by the Minutes.

The appellant appealed net worth reassessments for her 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013 taxation years.

The Tax Court found the 2008 reassessment was validly raised beyond the normal reassessment period due to misrepresentation regarding a principal residence exemption claim.

The Court allowed the appeals in part, reducing the amounts of unreported income by accepting certain deposits as family gifts and non-taxable items, while upholding capital gains inclusions for properties held in a bare trust by the appellant's daughter.

Gross negligence penalties were adjusted accordingly.

Angella Briscoe, whose consumer proposal was annulled, commenced a Small Claims Court action against her insolvency trustee (Spergel Inc. and Colin Boulton) for negligence and breach of duty under the BIA.

The defendants moved to stay the Small Claims Action pending leave under BIA s. 215.

Briscoe brought a counter-motion seeking leave nunc pro tunc and an order to remove the defendants' counsel, Bruce Simpson, alleging conflict of interest due to his potential role as a witness in the Small Claims Action.

The court dismissed Briscoe's motion to remove counsel, finding that the "lawyer as witness" conflict was not applicable to the current motions in the consumer proposal proceeding, as Mr. Simpson was not a witness for those motions, and the Small Claims Action's continuation was still a threshold issue.

The Greaves Group, having successfully enforced Minutes of Settlement, sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court reviewed the context, distinguishing the case from precedents where substantial indemnity was awarded due to reprehensible conduct.

Finding no improper conduct by the Noble Group, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, fixing the amount at $15,800, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The Appellant appealed reassessments for the 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 taxation years, which added shareholder appropriations to his income and imposed gross negligence penalties.

The Appellant did not dispute the amounts but challenged the reassessments beyond the normal reassessment period and the penalties, arguing he relied entirely on his accountant.

The Tax Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding the Appellant made misrepresentations attributable to neglect or carelessness, justifying the statute-barred reassessments.

The Court also upheld the gross negligence penalties, concluding the Appellant's failure to review his returns or question the alarmingly low reported income was a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person.

The parties, representing two factions of a divided church congregation, entered into a settlement agreement to divide church assets and funds.

The respondents partially performed the agreement but stopped making payments, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to intervene in the affairs of a religious organization and that the settlement was unfair.

The court held that while ecclesiastical and theological disputes are non-justiciable, the enforcement of a settlement agreement concerning property and funds is a standard contractual matter within the court's jurisdiction.

The application to enforce the settlement was granted, and the cross-application challenging jurisdiction was dismissed.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the striking out of her statement of claim without leave to amend.

Her claim sought further compensation for alleged racial discrimination, arguing that correspondence with the CEO constituted a binding agreement, despite having signed a full and final release upon dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the letters did not form an enforceable contract and that the elements of promissory estoppel were not pleaded.

The court reiterated that claims with no reasonable chance of success should be struck.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its Rule 21 motion for delay.

The motion sought to determine that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the respondent's action, which challenged the results of a statutory appraisal process under the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appraisal process is final and binding, subject only to judicial review.

The court held that a lack of jurisdiction cannot be treated as a mere irregularity and that delay in bringing a Rule 21 motion challenging jurisdiction should generally only result in costs consequences, not dismissal of the motion.

The action was stayed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a property and paid a $40,000 deposit.

The transaction failed to close because the appellant could not secure financing.

The appellant sought the return of the deposit, arguing there was an oral agreement that it would be refunded if the sale failed.

The application judge dismissed the application, applying the parol evidence rule to exclude the oral agreement and finding no grounds for relief from forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the written contract governed and that the deposit forfeiture was not unconscionable.

The plaintiff, a former employee of Torstar who signed a full and final release upon her dismissal in 2017, brought an action claiming that subsequent correspondence with the CEO in 2020 constituted a binding agreement to pay her compensation for alleged anti-black racism.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the correspondence did not constitute an enforceable contract and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Daley J. dated April 12, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $6,500.

The court monitor brought a motion for advice and directions due to the defendants' failure to comply with a prior court order requiring them to provide financial disclosure and a $500,000 retainer.

The defendants opposed the motion but failed to file any evidentiary record.

The court granted the Monitor's motion, ordering the defendants to comply with the prior order, provide the required financial records, and authorizing the release of the retainer funds from a specific bank account.

The appellant challenged a lower court order that struck two versions of his statement of claim (except for a battery claim) and denied him leave to amend it a third time to add a new party (the Union) and a civil conspiracy claim.

The motion judge had found the claims against the Union and the civil conspiracy claim to be statute-barred, and declaratory relief also barred as it was connected to damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the civil conspiracy elements were not pleaded in earlier claims and that the new claims were out of time, even when reading the self-represented appellant's pleadings generously.

In a long-running dispute over the ownership and management of medical schools, the respondents sought leave from the case management judge to bring a motion to set aside or vary a prior court order under Rule 59.06(2).

The respondents relied on a foreign court order as fresh evidence.

The court denied leave, finding that the foreign order did not constitute fresh evidence that would have changed the result, the respondents had delayed significantly in raising it, and the proposed motion was an abuse of process attempting to relitigate fully adjudicated issues.