Bruce F. Simpson

Eliatha Gregoriou, a bankrupt, brought motions to expunge the proof of claim and notice of opposition to her discharge filed by her former spouse, Angelo Zitella, a creditor.

The court found that Mr. Zitella failed to act in good faith throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, engaging in abusive communication, vexatious conduct, and attempts to delay matters, which increased costs and consumed judicial resources.

Relying on section 4.2 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which requires parties to act in good faith, the court exercised its broad discretion to expunge Mr. Zitella's proof of claim and his notice of objection to Ms. Gregoriou's discharge.

This decision aims to uphold the integrity of the bankruptcy process and facilitate the bankrupt's financial rehabilitation.

This motion concerned whether a consumer debtor required leave under section 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) to sue her consumer proposal administrator for negligence and breach of duty, and if so, whether leave should be granted.

The debtor's consumer proposal was annulled after missed payments, and she sued the administrator in Small Claims Court.

The administrator sought a stay of the action, arguing leave was required.

The court found that leave was indeed required as the allegations related to actions taken pursuant to the BIA, and dismissed the debtor's request for leave, finding her claim lacked factual support for causation of damages.

Eliatha Gregoriou, a bankrupt, brought a motion under subsection 135(5) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to reduce the proof of claim filed by her former spouse, Angelo Zitella, by $17,759.07.

This amount represented funds garnished from her prior to bankruptcy.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy had declined to interfere in the matter.

The court found that the bankrupt had standing and that the Trustee had declined to interfere.

Given the evidence of the garnished funds, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the claim.

Angella Briscoe, whose consumer proposal was annulled, commenced a Small Claims Court action against her insolvency trustee (Spergel Inc. and Colin Boulton) for negligence and breach of duty under the BIA.

The defendants moved to stay the Small Claims Action pending leave under BIA s. 215.

Briscoe brought a counter-motion seeking leave nunc pro tunc and an order to remove the defendants' counsel, Bruce Simpson, alleging conflict of interest due to his potential role as a witness in the Small Claims Action.

The court dismissed Briscoe's motion to remove counsel, finding that the "lawyer as witness" conflict was not applicable to the current motions in the consumer proposal proceeding, as Mr. Simpson was not a witness for those motions, and the Small Claims Action's continuation was still a threshold issue.

The defendants moved to set aside an ex parte order that granted the plaintiff, Kevin Fernandes, leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property.

The plaintiff had previously sued Mohammad Salman Khalid for failing to complete a property purchase.

Mohammad later declared bankruptcy after transferring property interests to his wife and mother.

The plaintiff then initiated a second action to set aside these transfers as fraudulent conveyances and obtained the CPL.

The court considered two tests for CPLs in fraudulent conveyance actions: a prima facie case of fraud and a higher threshold test.

The court found numerous "badges of fraud," including unexplained property transfers, inconsistent separation dates, misleading addresses, and continued co-habitation, which raised compelling suspicions of intent to defeat creditors.

The court maintained the CPL, concluding that the plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case of fraud and that the balance of convenience favored preserving the CPL to prevent asset dissipation.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice determining that fencing and a retaining wall along Greenfield Avenue in Ottawa constituted "Shared Property" under a Co-Tenancy Agreement dated December 15, 1998, governing a townhouse development known as Kings Landing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's contractual interpretation, finding no palpable and overriding error and no extricable question of law.

The application judge had correctly articulated and applied the principles of contractual interpretation and read the contract as a whole.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $20,500 including HST and disbursements.

Following the settlement of a family law application on the day of trial, the applicant sought partial indemnity costs.

The court found that while success was divided, the applicant was markedly more successful and her offers to settle were reasonable.

The respondent behaved unreasonably by resisting child support and refusing to share the value of the matrimonial home, and failed to make any offer to settle.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $7,500.

The applicant law firm sought costs of $2,500 for a solicitor's lien application regarding a direction to pay from the proceeds of a real estate sale.

The matter was resolved in the applicant's favour on the morning of the hearing.

The respondent argued the application was unnecessary as the new solicitor had agreed to hold funds in trust.

The court awarded costs of $750 plus HST to the applicant, noting the application was successful but may not have been necessary.

The Hospital defendants sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued for partial indemnity, asserting their offer to dismiss the action without costs should not trigger an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The court, considering Rule 57 factors, ordered the plaintiff to pay $9,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis to the Hospital defendants.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical negligence action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff had a kidney removed in 2000 due to a misdiagnosis of cancer, which she was informed of shortly after the surgery.

She commenced the action in 2015.

The court found that the plaintiff knew the material facts necessary to make a claim by the end of 2001, as she was aware of the misdiagnosis, the unnecessary surgery, and had been encouraged by family to sue.

The court held that the claim was discovered well outside the two-year limitation period and dismissed the action.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion brought by Her Majesty the Queen in the Right of Ontario and Detective Tracy Martel to strike the claim.

The Attorney General submitted that there should be no order as to costs, a position with which the plaintiff, Sheridan Margaret Diaz, did not take serious issue.

The court ultimately made no order for costs on the motion.

The Attorney General submitted that there be no order as to costs regarding the motion by Ontario to strike the claim.

The plaintiff did not take serious issue with this disposition.

The court ordered no costs on the motion.

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including a nurse, her employer, a police detective, and Ontario, for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and conversion following her acquittal on a charge of failing to provide the necessaries of life to her spouse.

The defendants moved to strike the claims under Rules 21 and 25.11.

The court struck the claims against the nurse and her employer, finding they did not directly cause the arrest or initiate the prosecution.

The court also struck the malicious prosecution and conversion claims against the police defendants for failing to plead material facts.

However, the court refused to strike the false arrest and imprisonment claims against the police on limitation grounds, finding it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period began on the date of arrest rather than the date of acquittal.

The defendants moved under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a long‑standing action for delay or, alternatively, to terminate an interim order freezing a bank account.

The dispute concerned whether certain real property and a bank account were held in trust for the estate of a deceased parent or beneficially owned by two siblings who held legal title.

The action had been commenced more than fourteen years earlier and virtually no steps had been taken to advance it, allegedly due to related estate litigation in the Philippines.

The court found no continuing justification for maintaining the freeze order on the bank account, particularly given the lack of evidence supporting the alleged trust claim and the hardship imposed on the defendants.

The freeze order was vacated and the plaintiffs were ordered to set the matter down for trial within 30 days, failing which the action could be dismissed and the certificate of pending litigation vacated.

Following a successful motion for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning a mutual driveway right-of-way, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the effect of settlement offers under Rule 49.10.

The evidence showed repeated reasonable settlement attempts by the successful party and an inflexible litigation position by the opposing party, which contributed to the need for the motion.

The court found that the result obtained was at least as favourable as the formal offer to settle and awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed at $20,336.52 plus HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking declarations confirming a registered right-of-way over a mutual driveway between neighbouring properties and an injunction preventing interference with that right-of-way.

The parties partially settled the issue of the existence of mutual rights-of-way.

The dispute remained regarding a barrier constructed by the defendant across the driveway which blocked access to the plaintiff’s property.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that the barrier materially interfered with the plaintiff’s property rights and caused ongoing irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured protecting the plaintiff’s recognized right-of-way, and injunctive relief was granted requiring removal of the obstruction.