Joseph Kary

Following the dismissal of the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff sought costs.

Under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, a responding party is generally not entitled to costs unless appropriate in the circumstances.

The court found it appropriate to award costs to the plaintiff due to the defendant's over-litigation of the motion, the potential finding of malice, and the prejudice to the plaintiff in a Simplified Procedure action.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs fixed at $27,263 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a prominent fencing coach, sued the defendant over an online article and blog posts alleging sexual impropriety and athlete mistreatment.

The court found that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that his claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defence.

The court also concluded that the public interest in allowing the plaintiff to vindicate his reputation outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was dismissed.

The landlord brought a motion to extend the time to appeal a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board, which had proceeded in the landlord's absence.

The landlord argued the Board erred in finding it had been properly served with notice of the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the validity of notice and due diligence are questions of fact, not law, and therefore cannot be appealed under s. 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The court awarded costs of $3,500 to the tenant.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board summarily rejecting her request for reconsideration of a consent eviction order.

The tenant argued that her mental health issues vitiated her consent and that the Vice Chair erred by deciding the reconsideration on its merits at the screening stage without an evidentiary hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or denial of procedural fairness, as the tenant failed to provide sufficient information to support a preliminary finding of a serious error as required by the Board's rules.

The applicant, Christina Atkinson, moved to set aside an assessment officer's order that upheld her former lawyers' (Whaley Estate Litigation - WEL) account in full after a four-day hearing.

WEL cross-moved to dismiss Atkinson's motion and confirm the assessment, arguing that Atkinson's failure to make objections to the assessment pursuant to Rule 58.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure meant there was no jurisdiction to consider her challenge.

The court dismissed Atkinson's motion, finding that objections were required for the specific issues raised, which were not jurisdictional.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the assessment officer's credibility findings or his assessment of WEL's skill, competence, and the result achieved, despite the client's ultimate dissatisfaction with the outcome.

The moving party sought a panel review of a prior order by Pardu J.A. that dismissed her motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the moving party's delay or the lack of merit in the underlying appeal.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order, arguing the order was made on consent and required leave to appeal.

The tenant brought a cross-motion for interim possession of her unit pending the appeal, arguing her consent was vitiated by mental health issues and lack of accommodation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the validity of the consent was a serious issue to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court granted the tenant's motion for interim possession subject to conditions, noting she would suffer irreparable harm if the unit was re-rented and her appeal rendered moot.

The appellant/moving party sought to review a previous order granting security for costs and motion costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no reversible error in the original decision.

The moving party was ordered to post security for costs and pay specified motion costs within 30 days, failing which her further review motion would be automatically dismissed by the Registrar.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering a 15% rent reduction for tenants after the landlord unilaterally removed on-site storage lockers to build new rental units.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's determinations regarding the unreasonableness of the landlord's actions and the quantum of the rent reduction were questions of mixed fact and law, which are not subject to statutory appeal.

The Court also held that the Board did not breach procedural fairness by crafting a global remedy for all affected tenants without requiring each individual tenant to testify.

The appellant, a former spouse, appealed the dismissal of her unissued claims against an estate and a costs order.

The appeal addressed whether an alleged dependant has an unlimited right to pursue claims despite procedural misconduct and delay amounting to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's conduct vexatious, including re-litigating previously determined matters, failing to comply with court orders, and causing extensive delay in estate administration.

The court upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the appellant's claims were moot, dismissed, or procedurally untenable, and that her conduct justified their dismissal as an abuse of process.

The appellant, Elisa Romero Hategan, moved to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal and for an extension of time to perfect it.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment that dismissed Hategan's claims (wrongful appropriation of personality, civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, negligence, unlawful interference with economic interests) and awarded damages for defamation against her, along with a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal considered the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length of delay, explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and merits of the appeal.

The court found the appellant's delay unreasonable and the appeal to have little or no merit, as her original claims lacked evidentiary support for false statements and the defamation counterclaim was well-founded.

The motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time was dismissed.

This costs endorsement relates to an appeal from a summary judgment decision in a child protection application.

The intervenor, Ms. Renatta Austin, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully defending against serious, unwarranted, and reckless allegations of professional impropriety and ineffective assistance of counsel made by the appellant.

The court found that such allegations, unsupported by evidence, warranted an award of costs despite the general presumption against costs in child protection matters and the appellant's limited financial means.

The court emphasized the need to deter unfounded attacks on lawyers, particularly those providing access to justice in difficult cases.

Costs were awarded to the intervenor against the appellant.

The applicant son sought to set aside an arbitration award that ordered him to vacate his deceased mother's condominium, arguing he was a tenant of the estate and the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The respondent estate trustee brought a cross-application for vacant possession.

The court found that the applicant's prior arrangement with his mother was not governed by the Residential Tenancies Act because they shared a kitchen, and no new tenancy agreement was formed with the estate.

The court also dismissed the applicant's claim that he was treated unfairly during the arbitration, noting he made a strategic choice to proceed on a paper record.

The estate's application for vacant possession was granted.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order placing her two children in extended society care with no access.

She argued the proceeding was procedurally unfair because she was improperly designated a 'special party' due to mental incapacity, which deprived her of the right to instruct counsel.

She also alleged ineffective assistance by the counsel appointed for her by the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the special party designation was valid and unappealed, the appointed counsel provided competent representation, and the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors in determining that extended society care was in the children's best interests.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for reconsideration of a Rule 49 application, the respondent law firm sought costs.

The applicant argued that as a self-represented law firm, the respondent was not entitled to costs without proving lost opportunity costs.

The court agreed there was no evidence of lost opportunity costs, precluding a partial indemnity award.

However, exercising its general discretion under section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court awarded nominal costs of $750 to the respondent to discourage inappropriate litigation behavior.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene on an appeal from a summary judgment in a child protection case.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and Renatta Austin, a lawyer who previously represented the appellant E.K.B. when she was a special party, sought leave to intervene.

The appeal raised significant issues regarding the role of special parties, their representatives, counsel's duties, procedural fairness, and Charter values.

The court found that these issues had a significant public interest element and that both proposed intervenors had an interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the judgment.

Leave to intervene was granted to both the PGT and Ms. Austin, with terms restricting their intervention to specific issues related to their roles and conduct.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order dismissing her Rule 49 motion to enforce a settlement agreement regarding a solicitor-client fee dispute.

The court dismissed the reconsideration motion, finding no reason in the interests of justice to vary the previous decision.

The court also held that the Rule 49 motion failed on its merits because the applicant had not complied with the settlement terms, there was no meeting of the minds on the essential term of a release, and the court would exercise its discretion not to enforce the settlement.

Furthermore, the applicant was precluded from bringing the motion because she had elected to proceed with the assessment hearing rather than enforcing the settlement.

Christina Atkinson sought to enforce a settlement agreement with her former lawyers, Whaley Estate Litigation, regarding a fee dispute, pursuant to Rule 49.09 or common law.

Whaley Estate Litigation brought a cross-motion to dismiss the proceedings or transfer the matter to Small Claims Court.

The court found that both parties had elected to proceed with the fee dispute litigation before an assessment officer after settlement efforts failed, thereby repudiating the settlement agreement.

Consequently, neither party could enforce the settlement.

Both Ms. Atkinson's application and Whaley Estate Litigation's cross-motion were dismissed without costs.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment order dismissing his action against police services and other defendants.

The action arose from two events: an alleged negligent police investigation into a theft complaint and alleged negligent investigations into complaints of child abuse.

The motion judge dismissed the action on two grounds: no duty of care was owed by the police to the appellant, and the action was commenced after the applicable limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded there was no duty of care owed to the appellant based on established precedent.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash a summons served by the respondent mother on a former OCL investigator.

The investigator had prepared a custody and access report over ten years ago regarding the applicant father and his children from a previous relationship.

The OCL argued the evidence was irrelevant and raised confidentiality concerns.

The court declined to quash the summons entirely because the applicant father refused to admit the authenticity of the prior reports.

However, the court significantly limited the scope of the summons, requiring the investigator to testify only regarding the authenticity of the reports and any independent recollection of the father's parenting abilities at that time, without breaching the confidentiality of the other parties involved.