Susan M. Sack

In this family law motion for summary judgment, the respondent father sought a declaration and final order enforcing an alleged binding settlement agreement based on a letter offer sent by the applicant mother in November 2022.

The applicant cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing no binding settlement existed.

The court found that the letter offer was not available for acceptance because: (1) the respondent's counter-offer in December 2022 terminated the original offer under common law contract principles; (2) the letter offer was implicitly time-limited; (3) the letter offer was incomplete, lacking express child support provisions; (4) the applicant had withdrawn the offer through subsequent correspondence; and (5) the respondent attempted to impose additional material terms less favourable to the applicant.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion and granted summary judgment to the applicant, finding no genuine issue requiring trial.

The court issued a costs endorsement declining to order personal costs against the respondent's former counsel for non-compliance with the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings, specifically regarding the double-spacing requirement in a factum.

The judge found that existing rules (Family Law Rules R. 24(9) and Rules of Civil Procedure R. 57.07(1)) were insufficient to address such breaches, as they require a finding of costs run up without reasonable cause or wasted, which was not the harm in this case.

While acknowledging the non-compliance undermined court authority and interfered with the administration of justice, it was not deemed "serious" enough to warrant personal costs under the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The judge highlighted a persistent problem without sufficient remedial authority and recommended rule amendments to allow courts to hold lawyers accountable for obvious breaches of practice directions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed a civil action brought by Stephen Massey, purportedly also on behalf of his two daughters (J.M. and C.M.), against 31 defendants including the Children's Aid Society, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, various lawyers, and his ex-wife.

The claim, a collateral attack on prior family law proceedings that concluded in 2016, alleged child abuse and professional misconduct.

The court dismissed the action against Mr. Massey with prejudice due to his failure to attend case conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and the action being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, largely barred by the limitation period.

The claim on behalf of J.M. and C.M. was dismissed without prejudice, acknowledging potential discoverability issues and the uncertainty of their authorization.

The court imposed a leave requirement for Mr. Massey to initiate future proceedings against these defendants and awarded costs against him.

The appellant, Melissa Bell, appealed the summary dismissal of her action against her former lawyer, Neda Amini, for negligence, malpractice, and defamation.

The solicitor-client relationship broke down after 13 days due to the appellant's unreasonable litigation strategy and accusation of collusion.

The motion judge found the lawyer was entitled to withdraw and her communications with Legal Aid Ontario were truthful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no evidence of negligence or defamation, and affirmed the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles.

The respondent, William Fuhgeh, brought a motion to strike over 50 paragraphs from the applicants' affidavit and a portion of their Notice of Application in a vexatious litigant proceeding.

The applicants, Marie-Hélène Godbout and Marc Coderre, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, reiterating the principle that pre-emptive motions to strike affidavits are generally discouraged unless the material is clearly improper or would cause unreasonable effort/cost to respond.

The court deferred the questions of admissibility, weight, and relevance of the impugned evidence to the judge hearing the main vexatious litigant application.

The appellant sought a determination on whether a transcript was required for her appeal from a summary judgment and an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The respondent opposed, citing lack of merit and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The court ruled that no transcript was required as the summary judgment motion was heard on a paper record.

A 30-day extension to perfect the appeal was granted, considering the appellant's prompt action, self-representation, and entitlement to appeal as of right, finding no specific prejudice to the respondent.

This costs endorsement follows a prior decision where the Intervenors' motion to stay proceedings against the Respondent, William Ndze Fuhgeh, was granted.

The Intervenors sought full indemnity costs, while Mr. Fuhgeh sought costs for minor successes on his cross-motion.

The court found the Intervenors were the successful party and presumptively entitled to costs, despite not achieving their primary relief.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Intervenors, reducing their claim for time spent on the unsuccessful dismissal argument and preparation for a one-hour motion.

Mr. Fuhgeh's request for costs was denied, and his affidavit regarding financial hardship was not accepted as a shield against costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs against the plaintiffs after dismissing their claims, which were found to be statute-barred, subject to res judicata and issue estoppel, abuses of process, and collateral attacks.

The claims were deemed devoid of merit and repetitive of earlier unsuccessful actions.

The court emphasized that the claims should never have been brought, especially for a third time, and that the plaintiffs' conduct, including unsubstantiated allegations, delaying tactics, and unrealistic settlement offers, warranted the highest scale of costs.

The defendant, Hala Tabl, brought a motion under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim.

The plaintiff, "The Kingdom of Heaven Found a Sean," purported to be an "express trust organization" operated by Sean von Dehn.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked legal capacity as it was not a natural person, a corporation, or a body granted capacity by legislation.

Consequently, the statement of claim was struck without leave to amend for the stated plaintiff.

The court also noted that certain paragraphs of the claim would have been struck as patently ridiculous and a collateral attack on a prior court order, even if the claim had been brought by Sean von Dehn personally.

Costs were awarded against Sean von Dehn personally.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The appellants, parents whose children were made Crown wards, appealed the dismissal of their action against multiple defendants involved in the child protection proceedings.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous and vexatious, being an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the lower court's decision that the action constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant sought to overturn a motion judge's decision to amend prior court orders, arguing that an equalization payment of $280,000 was still owed despite a subsequent settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the final settlement agreement, which divided funds from the matrimonial home sale, was intended to settle "all outstanding issues," including the equalization payment.

The court applied the "officious bystander test" and common sense to conclude that the equalization payment was implicitly offset by other amounts owed, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, a former lawyer whose license was revoked, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss his action against 11 of 16 defendants under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the Law Society Tribunal and Legal Aid Ontario, finding the claims abusive due to outstanding appeals and multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reinstating claims against Doctor Michael Colleton and the Hamilton Police Service, ruling that these claims were not "clearest of cases" for Rule 2.1 dismissal and involved complex legal issues (e.g., absolute privilege, negligent investigation) better suited for a Rule 21 motion.

This costs endorsement relates to an appeal from a summary judgment decision in a child protection application.

The intervenor, Ms. Renatta Austin, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after successfully defending against serious, unwarranted, and reckless allegations of professional impropriety and ineffective assistance of counsel made by the appellant.

The court found that such allegations, unsupported by evidence, warranted an award of costs despite the general presumption against costs in child protection matters and the appellant's limited financial means.

The court emphasized the need to deter unfounded attacks on lawyers, particularly those providing access to justice in difficult cases.

Costs were awarded to the intervenor against the appellant.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as guardian of property for Asha Kumra, sought advice and direction from the court regarding whether Minutes of Settlement, entered into by Asha's sons Sanjiv and Rajiv Kumra, were binding on the guardian and precluded it from pursuing claims related to property transfers made by Asha prior to a one-year limitation period specified in the Minutes.

The court found that the Minutes were not binding on Scotiatrust or Asha Kumra, as neither was a party to the agreement, nor was Asha legally represented during its negotiation.

Consequently, Scotiatrust retains the discretion to pursue claims in Asha Kumra's best interests, irrespective of the limitation period in the Minutes.

The self-represented plaintiff brought an action against a supermarket for a slip and fall, and also sued his former lawyers, the Law Society of Ontario, LawPRO, and the Crown in Right of Ontario.

The non-supermarket defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the actions against them.

The court granted the motions, finding the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts, and were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claims against the moving defendants were struck without leave to amend, and costs of $800 were awarded to each moving defendant.

Following the dismissal of the self-represented plaintiff's action against several defendants under Rule 2.1.01, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that the claim raised novel issues, the costs claimed were excessive, and an award would cause undue hardship.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, finding the claims were not novel and there was no evidence of impecuniosity.

The court awarded global costs of $10,500 to the successful defendants, applying a 20% reduction to the amounts claimed to reflect the possibility that the defendants could have filed a joint motion.

The self-represented plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, commenced an action against 16 defendants, including the Law Society of Ontario, the Law Society Tribunal, Legal Aid Ontario, Hamilton Police Services, and various individuals involved in his disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

Several defendants brought requests under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the claims against the Law Society Tribunal defendants as an improper collateral attack, against the Legal Aid Ontario defendants as duplicative of an existing action, against the Colleton defendants as barred by absolute privilege, and against the Hamilton Police defendants as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The action was allowed to continue against the remaining defendants who had not filed Rule 2.1 requests.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene on an appeal from a summary judgment in a child protection case.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and Renatta Austin, a lawyer who previously represented the appellant E.K.B. when she was a special party, sought leave to intervene.

The appeal raised significant issues regarding the role of special parties, their representatives, counsel's duties, procedural fairness, and Charter values.

The court found that these issues had a significant public interest element and that both proposed intervenors had an interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the judgment.

Leave to intervene was granted to both the PGT and Ms. Austin, with terms restricting their intervention to specific issues related to their roles and conduct.

The Plaintiffs moved to appoint Janina Gal as litigation guardian for Andrzej Gal, who was mentally incapable.

The Defendants opposed, arguing Janina had an adverse interest and was not indifferent to the outcome.

The court found Janina had a conflict of interest, as the litigation's success would result in properties forming part of Andrew's estate, which would then be transferred solely to Janina under Andrew's will, conflicting with Andrew's stated intention to divide properties equally among his daughters.

Furthermore, Janina was not indifferent to the outcome, as she stood to gain financially and had an acrimonious relationship with another daughter involved in the dispute.

The motion to appoint Janina as litigation guardian was dismissed, and the Plaintiffs were ordered to appoint a new, unconflicted litigation guardian or move to appoint the Public Trustee and Guardian.